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I. Introduction

A look at the American
reveals

significant

In America

treatment

exclusive

is hotly contested.

of antitrust":!.has started.

and which

analysis

scenario

dealing,

The outcome

with regard

such as

and tying
for the soul

of this "battle"
antitrust

in determining

restraints.3

for the future

especially

restraints

A "battle

will be applied

of vertical

importance

especially

antitrust,

which goals will govern American

reasonableness
crucial

towards

of vertical

resale price maintenance,

will decide

antitrust

differences:

the approach

the appropriate

arrangements,

and German

the

Both issues

role of antitrust

to application

law2

are of
law,

to vertical

restraints.
The "contestants"
approach
opponents

in this struggle

are the Chicago

of the New CoalitionS

School reduces

the possible

single goal of maximizing
of efficiency.6
antitrust

Schoo14

policy

pursues

on the one side and their
on the other.

number

consumer

In contrast,

for the "right"

of antitrust
welfare

a multi-valued

goals to the

measured

the New Coalition

1

The Chicago

goal.?

by means

asserts

that

2
Similar
titrust,

to the discrepancy

the proper

impact

of vertical

School

applies

the antitrust
According

to this theory vertical

sical economic
evaluate

theory

vertical

This debate

Chicago

the Chicago

School

law should not inter-

the application

as insufficient

restraints

are considered

of neoclas-

to adaequately

and promotes

its multi-value

approach.10

orientated

siderable

restraints.B

Consequently,

rejects

The Chicago

to scrutinize

restraints

that in this area antitrust

fere.9 T~e New Coalition

theory

of vertical

creating.

the competitive

is also contested.

economic

implications

the goals of an-

for evaluating

restraints

neoclassical

to be efficiency
alleges

analysis

in defining

is not merely

influence

School's

on American

approach

tion's

antitrust

gained

considerable

academic,

policy

con-

enforcement.11

The

antitrust

is reflected

in the administraReagan12

under President

influence

but has gained

on the reasoning

and has

of the

courts.13
The result
is American
tability

of this battle

antitrust

law. More precisely,

and reliability

no longer existing
The German

required

Law against

Interestingly,
American

by promoting

by the "rule of law"14

Restrictions

is

restraints.15

of Competition

favors the rule of law ("Rechts-

reliability

and predictability.17

the GWB does not promote

antitrust

and its victim
the predic-

in the area of vertical

(GWB),16 on the other hand,
sicherheit")

is confusion,

law. Like American

debate

antitrust

like the
law the GWB

3
demands

policy

theory;

however,

gained

decisions

the Chicago

perceivable

Rather,

states

towards

theories

of the Chicago

vertical

restraints

School

rowed much of its substance

scene.

to be
Moreover,

a multi-valued

goal

that competition

Because

and the New Coalition.
interest

antitrust

of either

This

the GWB bor-

antitrust

law,

law are based on the
the market. 20

the discovery

the GWB's approach

could reveal points

veil weaknesses

because

should control

of these similarities

between

the GWB's

with the contending

from the American

and both the GWB and American

theories

imperfections.~B

that it pursues

might be of special

crepancies

is deemed

of this study is to compare

approach

assumption

antitrust

policy.~9

The purpose

comparison

has not

of the GWB, the ap-

theory

to cope with market

the GWB clearly
of antitrust

policy

economic

of economic

approach

on the German

to the public

of neoclassical

inappropriate

School's

influence

according

plication

and the application

of dis-

and the American

for further

inquiry

and may un-

theory.

A. Scope of of the Study

The approach
ly on the outcome
titrust".2~

towards

vertical

of the "battle

Therefore,

restraints

depends

for the soul of anti-

to make the implications

pute more comprehensible,

heavi-

this study necessarily

of the dishas to

4
refer to the basics
history

of antitrust

and political

The present
enabled

policy

underpinnings.

confusion

in American

by broad and vague statutes

scholars

and courts

interpretation.22
its procedure,
fusion.

Moreover,

Accordingly,

Hence
forcement

the differences
and the German

system

this study attempts

German

laws in chapter

cepts choosen

to protect

towards

and methods

legal

a short but instrucof the American

laws and compares

and

values
the con-

these values.

Economic

of American

solution

of the GWB.

antitrust

chapter

three evaluates

and policy

arguments

are scrutinized,

law is compared

four, the Supreme

Court's

to the GWB perspective.

sur-

and the

with the

judgment

Corp. v. Sharp Electronics

according

en-

law

antitrust

approach

analyzed

antitrust

also the underlying

resale price maintenance

ness Electronics

antitrust

addresses

rounding

In chapter

take the

two.

Based on these foundations,
resale price maintenance.

should

American

to provide

of policy

and German

to this con-

of the respective

tive description

American

its method,

the way out of this dilemma.

and method

'rhe second chapter

both

law such a wide

contribute

approach

rest in policy

law was

allowed

the legal system,

between

mainly

of

which

the legal system

for leading

antitrust

antitrust

to give the antitrust

and its enforcement

responsibility

such as legislative

Corp.23

in Busiis

5
The fifth chapter

deals with other,

restraints.

The approach

siderations

with regard

compared

to these restraints
of the American

The last two chapters

summarize,

improvements

for the American

B. Objective

and Method

both the American

restraints.

explain

the approach

function
antitrust

in-depth

restraints.

Rather,

and policies
restraints.
titrust

to give the reader

towards
theory

law. According

not provide

antitrust

vertical

the reasoning

of

of this study to

restraints

and the
and German

this study does

of a multitude

of

on underlying

ideas

law in the area of vertical
of the German

law will be illustrated
restraints.

several cases intends

a description

law in the area of

to this objective

this study focuses

of antitrust

portant vertical

law.

and suggest

of both the American

discussion

The approach

antitrust

and

law.

It is the objective

of economic

is described

conclude,

antitrust

con-

of the Study

and German

vertical

vertical

of the GWB and its policy

with the approach

The study attempts

nonprice

and American

by addressing

Additionally,

an-

the most

the analysis

to make the reader more familiar

of the German

courts.

imof
with

II.

American and GermanAntitrust
Special

An analysis
vertical

Regard to Vertical

of the American

restraints

the historical
antitrust

approach

development.

of the "young" German

rence to legislative

The Sherman

dustrialized
intended

years

of

nor the

law which

celebra-

without

refe-

and development.25

Antitrust

Law with Special

Act of 191427

Act of 189026 and the Clayton
antitrust

laws enacted

"the rules of the common
restraints

of trade29

to deal with the demands
nation.30

to challenge

The Sherman

and threaten

in the United

law".2B The comwere deemed

of an increasingly
and the Clayton

the power of the trusts31

formed to impair competition,
vestors,

of American

Restraints

mon law rules against
sufficient

towards

a look at

law precedents

can be understood

history

were the first federal
codifying

without

the approach

antitrust

of the American

to Vertical

States,

Neither

approach

can look back on one hundred

tes its 30th anniversary24

Regard

and German

and even older common

A. Development

an OVerview with

Restraints

would be incomplete

law which

experience

Law --

exploit workers,

liberty.32
6

inin-

Act were

that were
defraud

in-

7

The basic norm against
Sherman
tract,

Act.33

Section

combination

conspiracy,

restraint

literal

means

language

Sec. 1 Sherman

would

Accordingly,

United

Another

important
between

further inquiry

scrutiny.

con-

or
reading

that every

In early decisions
Act literal-

soon that this
business

behavior,

a more sophisticated

law.37

States v. Addyston
restraints

Pipe & Steel CO.3B
constitute

a

law.

step was the development
conduct

of the antitrust

duct which

realized

1

of Standards

to distinguish
violation

"[e]very

A literal

Sec. 1 Sherman

antitrust

of the antitrust

1. Development

34

Act.35

decisions

held that only unreasonable
violation

"

outlaw benign

in subsequent

of interpreting

.....

would constitute

the judiciary

application

and applied

Act prohibits

of trade

indeed interpreted

However,

of trade is Section

in the form of trust or otherwise,

violates

the courts
ly.36

1 Sherman

in restraint

of the statutory

restraints

a "per se"

law -- thus condemned

into possible

is subject

constituting

of standards

to more

justifications39
lenient

without

-- and con-

"rule of reason"

40

However,

the courts

a per se antitrust

in determining

violation

decisions4~

the courts

"restraints

on alienation".42

inflexibility

of what conduct

were inconsistent.

referred

to common

In early

law rules,

such as

In more recent decisions

of these rules was recognized.

was

Therefore,

the
in

8
43

Sylvania

a more practicable

restraints

was established,

economic

theory.

tant application
restraints

towards

considering

At present,

vertical

business

a trend towards

needs and

a very reluc-

of per se rules in the area of vertical

is perceivable.

to establish

approach

Accordingly,

a per se violation

the burden

of the antitrust

of proof

is prohibi-

tively high.44

2. The Vertical/Horizontal
The American

antitrust

horizonta145

between

restraints

Distinction
law generally

and vertical

on competition

scrutiny.

is the proper

subject

standard

by which

Only a rule of reason

against

petition.
trabrand

competition

interbrand
the effects
reliance

competition.51

In Sylvania,

of the particular

restraint

common

the court had established

Arnold Schwinn

& CO.52

enables

vertical
the

on interbrand

com-

on intrabrand

court held that a decrease

on the traditional

alienation

to evaluate

effects

may be outweighed

and

that the rule of

analysis

effects

anticompetitive

The Sylvania

vertical

to rule of reason

in Sylvania

to weigh procompetitive

petition

Horizontal

of resale price maintenance49

The court reasoned

restraints.
courts

case Sylvania4B

tying arrangements50

certain

reason

are -- except

restraints.46

are held illegal per se.47

Since the 1977 landmark
restraints

distinguishes

in in-

by an increase
economic

com-

in

analysis

replaced

the mere

law rule of restraints
in United

of

States

v.

on

9

3. Rule of Reason

Analysis

The continuing
reflected

by the economic

and is increasingly
reasoning.54

becoming

Significantly,

feels uncomfortable

vertical

theory

restraints
theory

importance

by application

of the Chicago

might

of the Chicago

School

change

briefly,

vertical

concern.

This theory

scholars

who assert

biased,

single

should prevail
the landmap

drastically.

of decisions

of lower

with the per se rule and stateindicate

that the per

should be abolished.

is the trend to analyse
of the neoclassical
According

competition

restraints

vertical

economic

to this rationale,

would be ignored,

faces opposition
that the Chicago

from a coalition
School's

approach

If this opposing

vertical

would not be erased

restraints

of antitrust

In conclusion,
restraints

of
is

view
from

law.

this area of antitrust

and it is not clear which

and,

would be no longer of antitrust

sided and improper.

At present,

vertical

the application

restraints

number

School.57

the value of intrabrand

because

theory

se rule for resale price maintenance
Even of greater

restraints

is

on economic

of Justice56

ments of the Department

theory

the pole star of judicial

law on vertical

an increasing

economic

Reliance

This development

of the antitrust

courts55

upholding

benefits.53

of their economic

Theory

trend of employing

in decisions

was fostered

and Economic

approach

American

will prevail.

antitrust

is unclear.

law is hotly debated

law in the area of

The outcome

of any case

10
case depends

heavily

of the deciding

upon which of the theories

judges prefers.58

B. Other Laws Affecting

Unlike
one code59
several

the German

statutes.

1. Federal

Restraints

antitrust

law which

antitrust

The relevant

of vertical

significant

antitrust

the Federal

development

in the history

by the limitations
on the Sherman

to enforce

as unfair

of the Sherman

and Clayton

of the

violations

of competition."

jurisdiction

violations

of

Under Sec. 5 of the FTC Act,

Act.G~

of the

Although

the Sherman

Sec. 5 of the FTC Act gives the FTC a broader
antitrust

apply

are:

can prosecute

Sherman Act as "unfair methods

challenge

in

which might

was the enactment

Act.GO

Trade Commission

FTC has no specific

provisions

in

Act

enforcement

Federal Trade Commission

is contained

law is contained

restraints

Trade Commission

Another
American

Vertical

the American

in the context

the majority

authority

competition

the
Act,
to

unbound

This study focuses

Act. What constitutes

a violation

of Sec. 5 FTC Act will not be discussed.

However,

like under

the Clayton

question

under the

and Sherman

FTC Act is what conduct

law.

Acts the central
is justified

under the antitrust

11

2. Sec. 2 Sherman
Strategic

Act

market

monopolization

3. Sec. 2 Clayton
Under

as Amended

practice;

purposes,

the other,

the German

Robinson-Patman

against

of small

in their transac-

point out that "these two
correlation."54

price discrimination

Act does not distinguish

the firm employing

as an

the protection

have no necessary

statute

is

Act are

of discrimination

Scholars

in practice,

Act

Act price discrimination

firms from price disadvantages

tions in the market."53

Unlike

by the Robinson-Patman

"One is the suppression

individual

to monopolize. 52

The goals of the Robinson-Patman

anticompetitive

conduct

Act if this conduct

or an attempt

the Robinson-Patman

prohibited.
twofold:

and even unilateral

under Sec. 2 Sherman

may be challenged
constitutes

conduct

between

the

the size of

price discrimination.55

4. Other Laws
The fargoing
to the sellers
adequately

Thus, so-called

laws directly

the partner

"dealer

in several

and may provide

These

in certain

termination"
states.55

law leaves
to

relationships.

or "franchise"

Furthermore,

laws

some state

in the area of verti-

laws may overlap with antitrust

better protection

a discussion

antitrust

was deemed unsufficient

deal with subject matter

cal restraints.57

However,

the American

or franchisors

protect

were enacted

freedom

than antitrust

of these laws is beyond

law

law.58

the scope of
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this study. But it is interesting
attempt

to cure shortcomings

to note that state laws

of the Federal

antitrust

statutes.

C. Development

of the German

The German

antitrust

Antitrust

Law

law has no common

law tradition

to

look back on. In 1897, about the time the first decisions
under the Sherman

Act rigidly

the Reichsgericht70

ments,69

constitute
decision

a violation

Germany

became

At that time German

industry

industry

decartelization

scholars

land of the cartels."

was heavily

was decartelizised

cartelizised.

After

by the Allies

under

statutes.
Restraints

(Gesetz gegen Wettbewerbsbeschrankungen

of Competition
(GWB))71 was passed.

the GWB adopted much from American

the underlying

did not

its summit during World War II.

In 1957 the Law against

Although

agree-

law. In the wake of this

the "classic

reached

restrictive

held that a cartel

of existing

This era of cartels

WW II German

prohibited

economic

of the Freiburg

policy was mainly

antitrust

influenced

School who promoted

law,
by the

an ordoliberal

approach. 72
The GWB embraces
ded four times,
partly

of the courts'

required

the BWG follows

and was amen-

the last time in 1980. The amendments

a reaction

draft which

all kinds of restraints

curative

interpretation

legislative

a civil law concept.

were

of the 1957

action.73

Thus,

Both the statute

and

13
its amendments

primarily

reflect

the development

of the Ger-

man antitrust

law. However,

it is also necessary

the reasoning

of the courts

thus the dynamic

the statutory

scope requires

GWB contains
definite

"general

clauses,

terms,

by established

and concepts

political

are subject

of the courts

debate

by German

and has to comply

surrounding

scholars

School's

approach

and antitrust

theory has had no perceivable
law. First,

the courts

without

the Chicago

cannot

legislative

approach

are closely

enforcers.,9
School's

impact on German

an-

alter the law that

action.

Second,

action was not taken and is not to expected.
is considered

legislative

Thus,

contrary

the

to German.

policy.BO

Interestingly,
forcement

or

the "soul of an-

economic

antitrust

there

in the GWB, since the rule

for at least two reasons

School's

is limited

of the GWB. Therefore

However,

Chicago

is norma-

to the courts."

and the Chicago

dramatically

of these

leave too much room for discretionary

The American

titrust

The

to interpretation

by the decisionmaker

the basic policy

of

and some "in-

the interpretation

The discretion

decisions

titrust",B

"vague terms",

for a rule of reason

of reason would

and breadth

interpretation.

rules of interpretation'6

with and foster
is no place

which

Nevertheless,

tively directed.'s

watched

clauses",

legal concepts"

by the courts.,4

iudicial

to look at

attitude

the American

both the policy
of the Federal

antitrust

enforcement

of the GWB and the en-

Cartel Authority

resembles

in the 1960's and
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1970's.B1
however,

The lenient enforcement

of the GWB

The standards
the statutes
ticles,

of antitrust

enforcement

of the GWB. The GWB consists

about the first third of which

containing

of the 1980's,

by the GWB.B2

was not adopted

1. Concept

attitude

detailed

provisions

are laid down in

of over 100 ar-

are substantive

regarding

rules

to competitive

con-

duct.B3

a) Enforcement

Principles

The GWB provides

two enforcement

tion and abuse control.
duct may be allowed

Sometimes

discrimination

typically

under a specific

to note that unilateral

conduct

principles:

prohibited

exemption

as abusive

con-

norm.B4

such as refusal

may be prohibited

prohibi-

It is

to sell and

and/or dis-

criminatory.

b) Distinction

Relating

to Conduct

The GWB distinguishes
other agreements,BG
Cartel agreements

which

are "agreements
agreements

and void.

divided

relationship.

agreements,B5
control.BB

and merger

which pursue

are subject

"Other agreements"

impose a restriction

tractual

cartel

abuse control,B?

purpose,,,.B9 Cartel
tion principle

between

a 'common

to the prohibiare agreements

on one of the parties

These

"other agreements"

in (l)resale price maintenance,9o

in a conare sub-

(2)"normal"

other

15
agreements91

(imposing

nonprice

restrictions),

and (3)licen-

sing agreements.92
While

resale price maintenance

agreements,

such as exclusive

are presumably
latter

they constitute
a pricing

dealing

however,

an attempt

will be considered
to compel

abusive

a customer

and vertical

distinguish

restraints.96

Nevertheless,

GWB will be the same as under American

antitrust

purpose"

-- unless

distribution.

exempted)

horizontal

presumed

restraints. 99

exist

law:97

in agree-

on the same level of

the American

an imposed

will generally

resembles

of the

per se rule

restraints.9B

involving

on different

rization

among enterprises

legal "other agreement"

maintenance)

in al-

(which is a per se illegal

will generally

This resembles

An arrangement

prises

arrangement

or conspiracies

against

to

between

distinction

ments

if

to adhere

most all cases the vertical/horizontal

cartel

The

Distinction

The GWB does not explicitly

A "common

and tying

scheme.95

c) Horizontal/Vertical

horizontal

arrangements

other

to abuse control.94

legal and subject

agreements,

is prohibited,93

restraint

-- except

for resale price

exist in agreements

levels of distribution.
the American

concept

(which is a

among enter-

This catego-

of vertical

16
2. Focus of Enforcement
In Germany,
vertical

the enforcement

restraints

and abusive
firms.loo

and discriminatory

Because

violation

businessmen.
especially

certain

pricing

under

§

effort

to coerce

employed

Cartel Authority
§

of § 15
in

by a
focuses

15 GWB, for example

relationshipslOl

(or lure) customers

or by using
to adhere

to a

scheme.102
to the abuse control

is slight. Reason
statutory

the Federal

Cartel Authority

competition

by powerful

the Federal

Cartel Authority

trol provisions
when challenging
Nonetheless,

of other agreements

Cartel Authorities'

setting

obviously

regards

firms more dangerous.

vertical

concentrates

nonprice

this reluctance

conduct

efforts

of market

are able to create

include

the

of § 18 GWB and the fact that
the threat
Accordingly,

than on § 18 GWB

restraints.103
to enforce

to control

dominating

a dependency

to

on the abuse con-

of §§ 22 and 26 GWB rather

by increased

enforcement

for this lack of effort

complicated

which

language

on resale price maintenance

agency

18 GWB, the Federal

criminatory

of "powerful"

to the clear

to circumvent

untrue

regard

outweighed

conduct

the Federal

on attempts

means

in the area of

of the GWB will be hardly

by establishing

With

agreement

Restraints

on resale price maintenance

-- according

Therefore,

economic

activity

concentrates

GWB -- an explicit
direct

in the Area Vertical

§

18 GWB is

abusive

or dis-

firms or firms

relationship.104
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D. The Impact of the Legal Method

The significant
opposed

criticism

to the general

problems

the dramatic

antitrust

was possible

without

the vague

leaves

and broad

a farreaching

The vagueness
does not satisfy

the concern

approach

of security,

of American

scientific"
economic

theory

concepts

For example,
Court refused
concluded

School.

itself

is deemed

and
com-

un-

of the simplistic

the notion

than struggle

in Business

Hartwell,

rules on

gives a
that courts

if they rely on a "rational,

and public

to consider

law

free market

This approach

strengthening

rather

law

Interestingly,

of promoting

policy

with difficult

notions.~oa

Electronics,~o9

the Supreme

the facts of the case and instead

on the basis of economic

Electronics

antitrust

might deter beneficial

of the success

"right" decisions

action.

antitrust

to have predictable

instead

of the Chicago

will make

legislative

can base their decisions.

are reasons

of

to the courts.

and ambiguity

conduct

out the

shift in American

of American

and the fact that ambiguity

satisfactory

feeling

discretion

that this ambiguity

procompetitive
petition

language

the necessity

which businessmen

points

as

law are largely problems

For example,

Thus,

law~o5

the law is applied

legal method.~o7
policy

law as

antitrust

As Maxeiner~o6

antitrust

Enforcement

antitrust

of German

by which

law itself.

of American

of American

acceptance

is due to the legal method
well as material

on Antitrust

theory.

In Business

one of two Sharp dealers

in the

I
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I
I

Ii

Houston

area complained

Electronics)

prices

and threatened

minate

his relationship

minate

Business

the Houston
conduct

about his competitor's

with Sharp if Sharp would

Electronics,

the only competing

might have promoted

asked, whether

the theory

simplistic

service

probable

and whether

the facts.111

Although

predictability,

an

the

of the law are disregarded

by a

approach.

must be amended

for Antitrust

Enforcement

dilemma,

or the procedural

should change.112

A minimum

either

under the law.113 Providing
establishing

evidentiary

and predictability.

limit the possibilities
both in the time114
even more drastic

to be protected

of these values

would greatly

Another

to challenge

solution

antitrust

and in the enforcer

solution

law

reform would be to

a ranking

standards

the material

rules and enforcement

the courts with a list of values

to clarity

the antitrust

replaced

To solve the existing

provide

in

and prevented

were not considered.

and subtility

E. Alternatives

policy

dealer

existed,

"easy to use" theory promotes
polymorphity

not ter-

issue that should have been

there was better

a free riding problem

service

did not violate

the initial

ter-

that the challenged

consumer

and, therefore,

law.110 However,

Thus,

Sharp that he would

area. The Court reasoned

free riding

(Business

contribute
would be to

violations

dimension.115

would be to transfer

and

An

antitrust

19
cases to specialized
employ

an adequate

decisionmakers

and thorough

antitrust

who are equipped

antitrust

of the antitrust

agencies,~~7

as "parens patriae"

for their citizens.~~9

judge dependent

Antitrust

ligitation

courts

A jury

tends to create

is lengthy

inconsistent

and leads to makes

the courts

is

on the submitted
and costly.

Only some few cases will be heard by the Supreme
procedure

law

individuals,~~B

the facts of the case. The decision

made by an unspecialized
information.~2o

These

a more sophisticated

a violation

by federal

may have to decide

analysis.~~6

in America

in America

may be challenged

to

analysis.

Enforcement

At present,

and states

makers

would be able to employ

and multivalued

1. Antitrust

decision

rulings

Court. This

among the

susceptible

to applying

"easy to use methods".

2. Antitrust
Under

Enforcement

the GWB -- with a few exceptions~2~

ment of the antitrust
tel Authority.
highly

qualified

the political
the enforcement

both lawyers

for antitrust

landscape
policy.

and economists.

enforcement;

Consistency

Senate

Car-

is staffed with

changes

do not have a considerable

of the Federal

Cartel

-- enforce-

out by the Federal

Cartel Authority

professionals,

a decision

a specialized

law is carried

The Federal

The GWB is the basis

against

in Germany

is favored.

in

impact on

If an appeal

Cartel Authority

at the Court of Appeals

is filed,
for West
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Berlin~22

will decide

a Cartel

Senate

the case.~23

of the Supreme

This concentration
makers

contributes

thus enhances

States.

and specialization

antitrust

Jury trials

of decision

and predictability

proceedings

in Germany

from the proceeding
are unknown

and

are fun-

in the United

and pre-trial

discovery

do not exist under the GWB. The judge controls

the trial, preventing

prohibitive

ligitation

costs.

Also,

the rule that the losing party has to pay court costs,
costs of witness'
attorney
titrust

and expert's

fees contributes

controlled

to prevent

and the winner's

lengthy

and costly

of the trial and the taking

by the judge, both parties

for the proof a certain

witness's

testimony

then decides
responsible

an-

for questioning

F. Policy

"offer"

of proof

to evaluate

he wants

which

the conduct

and

to hear. The judge is

the witness,

and the parties

may

questions.~25

and Goals of the American

The most important

question

Antitrust

regarding

Law

antitrust

is how to define what goals should govern

of the law. Because
goals pursued

is

their wit-

fact, the judge decides

is necessary

which witness

ask additional

cement

testimony,

the

proceedings.~24

The proceeding

nesses

in

Court.

to consistency

different

procedures

is vested

the rule of law.

Moreover,
damentally

Final review

of the importance

by the antitrust

application

of this issue,

law are clearly

enfor-

the

defined.
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However,

under present

question

is daunting.

highly

law the search for an answer
The current

controversial.

vocabulary

discussion

The vigorous

debate

used in war scenario,126

and to describe

importance

which

restraints

of antitrust

and of vertical

would be treated

their positive
the approach

effects

restraints.

on interbrand

to the view of the Chicago

School

The latter
-- because

competition129

of

-- if

should prevail.

School vertical

concern

is of crucial

law both in the area

very favorably

of the Chicago

be only of antitrust

back to

revolutions,127

opinion will prevail

to application

of horizontal

is

games.12B

football

The decision

in America

reaches

during

to this

According

restraints

if they have horizontal

would
ef-

fects.
The conflicting
Coalition

views of the Chicago

do not reflect

a scholastic

ivory towers but have immediate
plication

of the antitrust

guage of American
the courts

Thus, the outcome
mitted

confusion

which

As a result,

of the lan-

to follow either

of a case does not only depend

is highly

has already

tempt to solve this confusion

on the subthe court

lead to remarkable

unsatisfying

in their decisions

to

view.

stick which

for all participants.

the rule of the law, which

and courts

held in remote

law leaves broad discretion

the courts

This controversy

and the New

impact on to day for day ap-

facts but also on the measuring

applies.

nessmen

dispute

law. The vagueness

antitrust

and enables

School

should

guide busi-

is abandoned.

has created

several

The at-

new

22
approaches,
conduct

tests,

and filters

should be condemned

there are no indications
American

antitrust

Therefore,

intend to help determine

by antitrust

law.~30 However,

that the facial problems

law will be solved

it is necessary

to explain

both the "goals

according

to the Chicago

of antitrust"

according

to the New Coalition.~32

the core arguments
merely
price

interested
fixing

necessary

in the outcome

school

to extend

of the conflicting

case, a description

1. Approach

of the Chicago

theory~34

the inquiry

to

if one is

of an exclusive

dealing
views

or

is

in the treatment

of

self-maintaining,~36
imperfections

school

and assumes

firms have the tendency

According

school

is based on neoclas-

rational

behavior

to the assumptions

to be efficient,

of both
that

that competition

and that the exploitation

is

of market

-- if there should 'be any -- will be prevented

because

of the possibility

Chicago

school

asserts

of new market

that the economy

entrants,

the

should be free from

interference.

Proponents
analysis~37

it

of the general

of the Chicago

and buyers.~35

governmental

Although

restraint.~33

The approach
sical price

and the "goals

theories

since these views are mirrored

every vertical

sellers

an analysis

of

in the near future.~3~

of antitrust"

seems too broad-ranging

what

of the Chicago

narrow

school's

antitrust

the goals of antitrust

law down to a

23
single question:

whether

a certain

conduct

is efficiency

creating.:l.38
The language of the antitrust statutes, their
legislative histories, the major structural features of antitrust law, and considerations of the
scope, nature, consistency, and ease of administration of the law all indicate that the law
should be guided solely by the criterion of consumer welfare.

Moreover,

the definition

as social welfare
by stating

of consumer

and neglects

welfare

is understood

income distribution

that "the shift in income distribution

effects
does not

lessen total wealth":l.39 and thus "should be completely
eluded

from the determination

of the antitrust

legality

exof

the activity.":l.40
The Chicago
necessarily

School

benefits

goods and services
or services
Consumer

consumers

that "[b]usiness
by lowering

or by increasing

welfare

is measured

tive:l.43and productive
School,

the costs of

the value of the product

by the criterion

efficiency

of economic

is comprised

efficiency.:l.44 According

the latter is mainly

determined

efficiencies.:l.45

Other goals are not accepted,

a multiple-goal

rejected.:l.46

of allocato the
by economies

of scale and transaction-cost

is expressly

efficiency

offered.":l.4:l.

efficiency::l.42 Economic

Chicago

assumes

antitrust

law
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2. Treatment
school's

of Vertical

restraints

luminates

the arguments

school's

the basic
arguments

businessmen

behave

be corrected

treatment

of antitrust

concern

businessmen

attempts

monopoly

treatment

restraints

of

il-

will

restraints

are no longer a subject

School

a restraint

wants

to create market

willing

that

imperfections

of vertical

to be ef-

imputes

that every

to enhance

imperfections

power are unrealistic,

they are irrationally

restraints

they are assumed

The Chicago

who employs

ency because

and market

because

enhancing.147

statement

with the assumptions

rationally

by the market,

of vertical

vertical

Based on the abovementioned

combined

simple. Vertical

various

later, a general

setting.

efficiency

ficiency

surrounding

will be discussed

the Chicago

achieve

under the Chicago

Theory

Although

becomes

Restraints

"unless,

to trade profits

efficior

of course,

for posi-

tion".148
Consequently,
that "vertical
indeed

takes the position

vertical

restraints

of the Chicago

Opponents
antitrust

fixing,

School

market

law pursues

School

law, ignoring

school's

of the Chicago

to consumers

lawful."149

approach

assert

goal. They accuse

the basic values

the legislative

and,

Approach

School's

a multi-valued

of ignoring

division,

are beneficial

for that reason be completely

3. Criticism

Chicago

price

all vertical

and should

the Chicago

history,150

that
the

of antitrust

displacing

the

25
process

of proper

legal analysis,

and subserving

of law to

ideology.~5~
Furthermore,

they allege

is based on irrational
is utterly

artificial

premises,~52

the Chicago

reasoning

of the courts.~54

in enabling

theory

to repeal

however,

left to Congress

school's

and

antitrust

with the
on the

of leaving discretion

judges who favor neoclassical

to the

economic

law.~55 They do agree,~56

scholars

and promote

the goals of antitrust
favors practical

concerned

theory has gained

the problem

with Chicago

theory

is underinclusive,

is particularly

influence

courts

School

and oversimplifying.~53

The New Coalition

They recognize

that the Chicago

that legislation

legislative

law. Accordingly,

action

to clarify

the New Coalition

rules for the administration

law, such as the proposal

should be

of the "Freedom

of antitrust

of the Vertical

Price Fixing Act of 1987".~57
Regarding

the role of economic

tion of antitrust
essential

law, the New Coalition

points with the Chicago

they reject

the plain economic

as a leading principle.
theory

Second,

the task of assisting

than sacrificing
cordingly,

theory

antitrust

First,

of the Chicago

School

they subscribe

the courts'

argues

to economic

reasoning,

rather

theory.~5a

that antitrust

with process

in two

approach.

law to economic

the New Coalition

should be more concerned

disagrees

School's

theory

in the applica-

Ac-

law

than outcome~59

and

26
supports

the view that the law should define

the goals of

antitrust.~6o
For example,
theory

it makes

a difference

is used to overcome

Schwinn~6~
effects,
effects

by showing

certain

a static

restraints

and sound business
theory

vertical

restraints

reasoning

that, in the absence

vertical

economic

whether

without

such as in

of other negative

may have procompetitive

justifications.

gains a different

economic

quality

scrutiny

Nonetheless,
if used to allow

of procompetitive

and

other side effects.

4. Approach

of the New Coalition

The New Coalition
Chicago

School.

is not limited

Rather,

the New Coalition

approach

to antitrust

titrust.

The New Coalition

multivalued

law, centering

Chicago

contends

goal in enacting

lars argue that Congress
School's

concept

Act were adopted.~63

legislative

history

indicates

of economic

of antitrust

law. According

accumulation

of economic

They allege

a

scho-

of the

that
goals were pur-

refers

to the his-

law~65 to conclude

of deep suspicion
Therefore,

that the

of the drafters

to the New Coalition,

power.~66

pursued

law.~62 Those

power was a concern

in an atmosphere

its own

at the time the Sherman

The New Coalition

accumulation

law was created

that Congress

that multiple

of antitrust

the

on the goals of an-

antitrust

and Clayton

torical background

promotes

was not even cognizant

efficiency

sued by Congress.~64

to criticising

antitrust
of the

they assert
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that Congress

had more in mind than establishing

cal price theory when enacting
the New Coalition
scribes

refers

to a multivalued

that Congress
to reverse

the rulings

adhere

uncertainty,

ing to the legislative

compete

on the merits,

(4) protection

no effort

intent

the New Coalition
The purpose

these goals is to limit judicial

of economic

making

to legislative

goals of antitrust.

persion

They point out

of the courts.

that the courts

cates four distinct

case law that sub-

to these decisions,

and to cure the present

scribing

to substantial

Act. Moreover,

goal of antitrust.

acquiesed

To ensure

the Sherman

neoclassi-

advo-

of pro-

discretion

accord-

intent. The four goals are "(l)dis-

power,(2)

freedom

and opportunity

(3) satisfaction

of the competition

of consumers,

process

as a market

to
and
gover-

nor".1G7

5. Treatment

of Vertical

Restraints

According

to the New

Coalition
It is not possible

to give a description

treatment

of vertical

approach.

The New Coalition

who are united
antitrust

outcomes

vertical

under the New Coalition's

consists

in their attempt

law by the Chicago

at different
certain

restraints

of numerous

to oppose

School.

upon applying

Thus,

the lawfulness

several values must be weighed.

of

they may arrive

their united

goals to

they do agree

of vertical

Values

scholars

the erosion

restraints. 1GB Nevertheless,

that, in scrutinizing

of "the"

restraints,

such as freedom

of
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the competitive
structure,

process,

limiting

are universally
According
value

maintenance

economic

included

power,

of a viable market
benefit

in their antitrust

to the New Coalition

intrabrand

for the consumer
analysis.

competition

has a

of its own.

G. Policy

and Goals of the GWB

For a lawyer familiar
in American

antitrust

enforcement

the GWB is not ignorant
economic

theory

sideration
restrictive

conduct

of the GWB.lG9

restraint

is identifying

protected

GWB.l70

according

However,

tion is crucial,
according

the shift
Although

the role of

In Germany,

language

the German

and by

conception

step in approaching

terms,

of

a
on

has been made

must accept

determination.

con-

in evaluating

the impact of that restraint

this decision

If the statute

these terms have to be in-

to the goals of the law.

of competition

is the primary

the term "competition"

the GWB. Therefore,

differs

Under

the decisionmaker

the statutory

Protection

arguments

important

vague or ambiguous

terpreted

different.

by ~he GWB. This evaluation

by the lawmaker,

employs

arguments,

is limited by statutory

law, the most

and follow

of economic

and economic

antitrust

values

is astounding.

is significantly

of policy

the objectives

with civil law systems

the interpretation

and the evaluation
to the values

goal of the

is not defined

in

of the term competi-

of restrictive

subsumed

under

conduct

the term
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competition.
protects
leading
notion

For example,

competition

the statement

that the GWB

but not competitors~7~

if one does not know that according
of competition

the freedom

might be misto the GWB's

of competitors

action

is

essential.
The GWB has embraced
was influenced
School.~72
competitive

a free market

by the neoliberalism

The scholars

orientation

which

of the ORDO, or Freiburg

of the Freiburg

School

favor the

system~73

because they consider it more efficient, but, perhaps still more important, because they believe it
more democratic. They criticize purely economic
perspectives that separate economic well-being
from the issue of freedom. They reject a centrally
administered economy
because they consider the
concentration of power
to be inconsistent with
democratic principles. The neoliberals reject a
laissez-faire economy for related but different
reasons. They criticize laissez-faire positions,
both classical and more recent ones, for overlooking the problems of limitation and control of
private economic power.
The framers
cannot

of the GWB recognized

be defined

of restrictive
meters

so as to deal effectively

conduct.

of economic

tive concepts

that "optimal

Hence,

pursued

with every kind

the GWB adopted

theory designed

competition"

to optimize

the parathe competi-

by the GWB. The GWB also adopted

legal

principles.
The GWB does not merely
but also pursues
functions.~74
freedom

rely on economic

legal, economic,

The legal policy

to make and negotiate

theory

and social policy

function
contracts.

protects

personal

The economic

policy

30

function
place,

is aimed at preserving

for example,

The social policy
and wealth,

function

economic

concentration.

serves to distribute

in part by softening

According

both income

undue differences

to its civil law heritage,

to avoid employing
sumer welfare"
to justify

in

Economic

efficiency

sidered

of market

sided".17B

ensuring

on "market conduct"
is to protect

open markets

participants

Consequently,

competition.1B4

short or
the

structure

market

might

structure,

"bet-

a pernicious

is also poison."1B1
of competition"

and "market
freedom

with a multitude

and competition

tribution.1B3
intrabrand

overall

is con-

on whether

market

"Antidot
"freedom

of

The GWB recognizes

"imperfect"

to assure

goals.

point out that

in the short run while having

Therefore,

GWB's policy

to freedom

depends

is applied.179

in the long run.1BO

relies mainly

policy

Scholars

an even "more imperfect"

ter performing"

the GWB recognizes

on "market performance"

performance

that an existing

be replaced

Further,

takes second place

to be to "single

long term analysis

which may be used

as only one of several

Mere reliance

evaluation

the GWB attempts

such as the terms "con-

efficiency"

every restraint.176

performance"

action.177

vague standards

and "economic

"market

effect

by combatting

power.175

economic

danger

an open and free market

the GWB

structure."1B2

of competition

by

of "free" market

on different

levels of dis-

the GWB emphasizes

the value of
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1. Alternative

Approaches

The appropriate
discussed

before,

Discussed

approach

during,

arguments

Some argued

that restraints

tentions

impair

include

were borrowed

that vertical

enhancing

restraint

businessmen

and stimulating

of competition.
restraints

overall

was

of the

from the Chicago

the competitive

competition

vertical

in single contractual

the freedom

tive effect

terbrand

towards

and after the enactment

GWB. Often,

ships cannot

in Germany

School.

relation-

Other con-

have a procompeti-

edge of some
competition

should be the main concern

and that inof antitrust

law.~a5
To illuminate

the underlying

GWB, it is helpful

to discuss

choose

conceptions

the present

approaches.
embraced

Of special

a. Concept

of Perfect

The perfect
neoclassic

forming markets
distribution,
model,

concept,

the

concepts

by the GWB.

restraints

freedom

of individual

tainting

the "perfection".

economic
of perfect

competition

all market

restrict

to be considered

other

Competition

with unhindered

all vertical

the GWB

is that theoretical

is based on the notion

between

of the

and why it rejected

School were rejected

competition

theory,

theory

for what reasons

interest

by the Chicago

economic

market

per se illegal.~B6

Under

because

participants,

Consequently,

of

per-

on all levels of

participants.

are suspect,

model

restraints

this
they
thereby
are have
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Although

this concept

is not accepted
German

mediate

information

of consumers,

are inadequate

did not choose

the GWB because

dependant

choice"

theory

this theory

experience

theory.

of the GWB, alof perfect

resulted

Therefore,

in suspicion

the so called

theory has shortcomings

suited

to become

Hence,

economic

comof

and there-

with reality.

with plain economic

was made. Thee GWB's drafters

economic

on change,

as leading principle

which do not comport

on assumptions

economic

reaction

The drafters

and im-

fixed demand

it is based on irreal assumptions

fore leads to results
Practical

such as perfect

participants,

by the neoclassic

The

that the underlying

and immediate

in practice.1B7

influenced

petition,

theory,

of all market

on the GWB, it

in its application.

has recognized

of neoclassical

structures

though

as leading concept

legal community

assumptions

had some influence

models

highly

towards

"second best

recognized

that every

and that no theory was

the pole star of the Act's application.
theory

is merely

used to provide

ideas and

guidance.

b. Workability

Concept

Based on the treatises
Clark,1B9
focused

the dynamic

elements

of competition

on by the GWB. The German

who influenced
workability
tributed

of J.A. Schumpeter1BB

the 1965 amendment

theory.

Kantzenbach's

to competition

scholar

and J.M.

were more

E. Kantzenbach,19o

of the GWB, adopted

the

workability

at-

not only the exercise

concept

of business

33

behavior,

but also social values

trol of economic
and increased
theory

power,

such as limitation

promotion

allocative

of technological

efficiency.

is determined

progress,

According

to this

conduct

becomes

the border where procompetitive

ticompetitive

and con-

by market

structure,

market

performance

tests.191

However,

concepts

were not sufficient

to define

the parameters

applying

the GWB. The workability

conflict

between

duct, and market

structure

performance

(freedom of the markets)

These".192

Another

the inability
dynamic

market

shortcoming

to harmonize

market

functions.

able",193

and it is not possible

of economic

the limited

effects

makes

ficult.196

As long as no obvious

not provide

workable.197

condition

is defined

ments alleging
cost economics,

increased

criteria

is

with
to

as "work-

future

concept

effects

analysis

especially

abuse occurs,

The workability

dif-

competition
concept

evaluation

effects.

does

to deter-

Thus no optimal

effects,

interbrand

dependent

impact of vertical

under the workability

procompetitive

concept

cannot be contained

rules for a comprehensive

mine pro- or anticompetitive

"Dilemma

restraint.194

restraints

can be considered

to compare

The multivalent

a workability

and market

it is not possible

scope of a workability

from assumptions.195

for

solve the

-- the so called

can be considered

with and without

A multitude

(efficiency)

Moreover,

how long competition

on competition

cannot

static efficiency

con-

workability

of the workability

determine

within

concept

an-

concept.

market

Argu-

such as transactions

competition,

ease of

34

market

entry of smaller

quality,

and other efficiency

to anticompetitive
foreclosure
lessened

competitors,

impacts

effects,

consumer

other adverse

Exact conclusions

decrease

Thus,

concept

the workability

c. Group Competition
Parallel
and expansion
developed
mainly

preclude

branch

distribution

concept.

restraints
scholars

This theory

School.20~

are described

is

Therefore

the

as the "German

channels

replacing

the com-

participants203

using uniform

supporting

market-

this conception

School uses to support

competition

Therefore,

favors

of small market

The arguments

view that interbrand

familiar

of

Hence the GWB does not

idea," German

concept

are the same as the Chicago

someone

and vagueness

School".202

among a multitude

ing strategies.204

any result

its use as a sound basis

by the Chicago

of this concept

of antitrust.

structure.~9a

use of vertical

of the "franchise

integrated

or market

and

concept.200

The group competition

with

power,

Concept

of the Chicago

petition

market

in price competition,

statute.

the group competition

proponents

and economic

the ambiguity

to the increased

influenced

and

are in opposition

cannot be drawn. Therefore,

for a clear and predictable
follow

service

such as loss of freedom,

on consumers

might be justified.~99
the workability

arguments,

shift of income

choice,

impacts

better

their

should be the main concern

the arguments

are wellknown

with the inter-/intrabrand

dichotomy

to
of
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American

antitrust

productive
hanced

law. Efficiency

efficiency,

interbrand

theoretical

arguments

transaction

competition)

(allocative

costs economics,

are the central

and en-

points

of

concern.

However,

proponents

of the group competition

must restrain

themselves

on criticizing

of the GWB. The concept
port with the economic
the competitive
efficiency
theory,

and

freedom

advantages

the current

of group competition
of the GWB.205

policy

of a multitude

which,

might be created

policy

does not comThe GWB prefers

of individuals

according

through

concept

to

to the workability

limiting

individuals'

freedom. 206
GWB policy
market

participants.

tion with
central
market

leadership

planning.

free competition

The replacement

by the manufacturer

with democratic

and other

of the consumer

to either

duct of a group or not. Moreover,

competi-

lead to

by the group leader.207

choice would be reduced

cept conflicts

would

collusion,

the sovereignity

by dictatorship

among all

of intrabrand

Due to concentration,

imperfections,

be replaced
sumer's

is to maintain

accepting

The conthe pro-

the group competition

principles

could

con-

laid down in the

Constitution.
Therefore,
and stamped
ported

the group competition

as "ideological

by industrie's

concept

war against

interest~".20a

is rejected

antitrust

... sup-
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2. Concept

of the Practical

At present,

the policy

tion by the courts
described

Freedom

of the GWB and its interpreta-

and the Federal

as "theory

of Competition

Cartel Authority

of the practical

tion''.209 This theory

freedom

of competi-

is based on the work of A. Smith2~o

set forth by the theory of the Austrian
Mises,

is best

F.A. von Hayek)2~~

and adopted

School

as

(L. von

in Germany

by E.

Hoppmann.2~2
The practical
an interactive
participants

freedom

process

theory

through which

are able to exercise

This free competition

interprets

notion

petition

as an open and evolutionary

market
comes

place.2~3

This theory

to use their creative

in a competitive
structure

environment.

are of primary

process

freedom.

Market

concern;

of

refers
which

potential

to comallows

while

conduct

market

as

market

is based on an absence

in the market

chances

the individual

their economic

coercion

the individuals

competition

taking
and

performance

second.2~4
Three

freedom

reasons

support

of competition

public

policy

First,

legislative

complies

the view that the practical

theory

is best suited

to describe

the

of the GWB.
history

and the intent of the lawmakers

with this theory.2~5

Second,

the practical

tutory,

constitutional

protects

competition

and egality

freedom

theory

complies

with the sta-

and civil law principles.
as a legal principle

of all subjects.

This value

The GWB

to ensure

freedom

is also recognized
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by the Constitution.216
that democratic

The GWB relies on the assumption

principles

lead to good market

and a high degree

performance.

The principle

GWB is to limit the individual's

freedom

tive covenants

endangers

freedom.

when this freedom

The GWB recognizes

contracts

-- which

not distorted.
competitive

pressure

enter contracts
Third,

This

courts

to compete

enormous

on relevant

multitude

of practical

dimensions

(l)freedom

of the exchange

(3)freedom

the markets,
Evaluation

for

than
in an

of competition

focuses

freedom.

are

choice,

to design

determines

is undue. With regard

norm contains

of

(4)openness

a distribution

impact on freedom

remaining,

These

to use competitive

of consumer's

of choice

restraint

rather

(exchangeability

(2)freedom

of a restraint's

the statutory

to

of the

it possible

facts connected

freedom

process

and (5)freedom

and of freedom
vertical

parameters

of competitive

cross elasticity),

parameters,

the freedom

of interdependencies.218

on several

goods,

the

the GWB practicable.

scope makes

to sort out the numerous

The theory

are

however,

on restrictions

makes

of the statutory

to concentrate

attempting

as long markets

to preserve

of concentrating

freedom

limitation

to conclude

free from coercion.217

GWB policy

individuals'

the overall

environment,

contributes

task of the

for free competition

to be a "freedom"

In a competitive

also

to enter restric-

that the freedom

is a prerequisite

can only considered

of freedom

an abstract

of

system.

of the market
whether

a

to some restraints,
and anticipated

38
evaluation

of the restraint

resale price maintenance
sideration).

the prohibition

and does not allow further

Most of the vertical

subject

to limited

however

is limited because

intention

(for example

iudicial

restraints,

discretion.

con-

however,

are

This discretion,

the courts have to follow

of the applicable

of

the

norm in the light of the goals

of the GWB.
As mentioned
"pure"

theory

lawmakers

earlier,

the GWB does not pursue

of the practical

included

protection

businessmen,

consumer

policy

(conjunctural,

goals

in the catalogue
However,

protection,

and certain

structural,

of values

or promotes

protected

the GWB's main concern

freedom

of competitive

The

economic

and export policy)

under the GWB.219

that the GWB pursues

"societal

Rather,

antitrust".22o

is preventing

processes

a wel-

by economic

impairment

of

power of other

participants.221

Interestingly,
freedom

strictly

under the theory

of competition

demnation

most vertical

of the practical
restraints

escape

under the GWB. Only resale price maintenance
prohibited.

However,

although

as under the Chicago

School's

approach,

reached

of competition.

of small and middle-size

one should not assume

fare approach

market

freedom

the

in a different

The Chicago
of their positive

School

the outcome
the result

conis

the same
is

way.
excuses

effects

vertical

on interbrand

restraints
competition

because
and

39

believes

that vertical

competition

restraints

if they effect

The GWB excuses

are only harmful

interbrand

vertical

to

competition.222

restraints

because

of their

.
probable
Chicago

business
school's

petition

approach,

business

competition

trabrand

restraints.

obstacle

for new market

creasingly

inflexible

competitors,
results

thus the "individual

which

coverage

customers,

a danger

the value

members

of

to competition

of the market

An increased
entrants224

markets.

com-

.... "223

the GWB recognizes

by an increasing

to the

"not only

but also emphasizes

are also of concern

Furthermore

In clear contrast

the GWB protects

as an institution'"

of intrabrand

caused

justification.

coverage

with in-

constitutes

and might

lead to in-

These developments

and consumers,

thereby

the GWB tries to prevent.225

an

might harm

leading

to

III. Resale

The appropriate
buyer's

freedom

Price Maintenance

treatment

of agreements

to set his prices

cludes with third parties

consistently

upheld

price maintenance,227
low Supreme
Justice,

ports

sometimes

is supposed

its task. Rather,

the Chicago

School's

resale price maintenance
At the moment,
reasoning
whether
might

Moreover,

Court

vertical
refused

resale
to fol-

the Department

antitrust

the Department

law, refuses

of Justice

sup-

should be abandoned.229

it is not foreseeable

which

line of

of the courts will take and it is even doubtful

survive

if challenged

of the Chicago

ministration
replacement

of

view that the per se rule against

the per se rule against

influence

the Supreme

lower courts

to enforce

which he con-

among America's

the per se rule against

Court precedent.22B

which

to fulfil

Although

the

the most hotly debated

restraints

and courts.226

legal scholars

in contracts

is probably

issue in the area of vertical

restricting

resale price maintenance

before

the Supreme

School on the courts

is considerable

and might

of the per se rule against

maintenance.
40

Court. The
and ad-

lead to the
resale price

41
The majority

of Congress,

more conservative
enactment
decide

approach

antitrust

and administrative

enactment

of H.R. 585,231

establish

contribute

clear

proscribing

issues,

judicial

1987" would

antitrust.23o

towards

of new legislation

certain

on the other hand, supports

may reverse

developments.
the "Vertical

standards

the

the courts how to

Congress

to solving

Through

a

recent

For example,
Price-Fixing

the present

the

Act of

confusion

in the area of vertical

and

price

restraints.
the per se rule232

In contrast,
maintenance

of the buyer's

terms of business
not questioned
vigorously

by German

provisions

of Resale

void all

"to determine

prices

or

is

and is one of the most

of the GWB.

Price Maintenance

Court established

under American

An-

Co. v. John D. Park & Sons234

the

of price

the per se rule against

not permitting

tion for such restraints.

freedom

declaring

Law

price maintenance,

effect

resale price

... with third parties"

scholars

In Dr. Miles Medical
Supreme

freedom

in contracts

enforced

A. Treatment
titrust

in § 15 GWB233

as codified

restrictions

against

any excuse

or justifica-

The Court addressed

fixing on public

interest235

of the buyer to set his prices.236

the injurious
and upheld

to itself,

the public

the

The Court stated

that, after the seller had "sold its products
satisfactory

resale

is entitled

at prices
to whatever

42

advantage

may be derived

from competition

in the subsequent

traffic."237
The per se rule was soon opposed
and retailers

who feared

their existence.
by the economic

Their

laws,23B

for their profit margins

lobbying

environment

1930's, was successful

by small wholesalers

effort,

which was supported

of the Great Depression

and, under the so called

resale price maintenance

agreements

from Sec. 1 Sherman

Act condemnation.

fying experience239

with the "Fair Trade"

led to their

limitation

and for

and finally

in the

"Fair Trade"

were exempted

However,

the unsatis-

laws increasingly

to their repeal

in

1975.240
Dr. Miles was reaffirmed

in subsequent

and the scope of per se condemnation
Act242

was extended

rangements.243
price

under Sec. 1 Sherman

maximum

price

fixing

One of the most clear statements

restraints

Vacuum

to vertical

decisions,241

is contained

in United

ar-

condemning

States v. Socony-

Oil CO.244

The effectiveness of price-fixing agreements is
dependent on many factors, such as competitive
tactics, position in the industry, the formula
underlying price politics. Whatever economic justification particular price-fixing agreements may
be thought to have, the law does not permit an
inquiry in their reasonableness. They are all
banned because of their actual or potential threat
to the central nervous system of the economy.
At present,

however,

maintenance

is weakened

increasingly

the per se rule against

reluctant

and challenged.
to assume

resale price

The Supreme

a per se violation

Court is
of the

43

law.245 Based on the premise

antitrust

that "[a]ll vertical

restraints,

... , even those that result

competitive

benefits,

may have some effects

scope of per se condemnation
Furthermore,
concerted

action

Court stated
where

American

a single

antitrust

firm's restraints
effect

"economic

Although

effects"

should determine
"conspiracy

rather

or a conspiracy

As a result,

inpracticable

of the Supreme
tiff to prevail

that "[e]ven

affect prices

and

action might
of

that

line drawing"25~

of a restraint,
substantial

the

conduct

the evidentiary
to establish

the advantage

which

standards

a price

for

fixing

standards.

when alleging
an explicit

of the per se

and reliability

is invalidated

Under the present

Cour~ there is hardly

less he can proof

The

on a level which can be considered

rule, its easy applicability
through

Act.247

as resale price maintenance.252

the Court raised

prohibitive.253

resale

under § 1 in the absence

allows

proof of the facts necessary
agreement

directly

than "formalistic

the treatment

requirement"

the

proof of

the Court held in Sylvania250

may have the same effect
Furthermore,

to challenging

as concerted

there can be no liability

agreement."249

law requires

v. City of Berkeley24B

have the same economic
have,

on price"246

under Sec. 1 of the Sherman

in Fisher

pro-

is narrowed.

as a prerequisite

price maintenance

in substantial

any chance

a price fixing
agreement

position

for a plain-

conspiracy

to fix prices.

un-
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1. Some Lower Court's

Interpretations

Some lower courts,
Supreme

Court's

approach

restrictions

In Eastern

Scientific

economic

effect

a policy

restraints.

in Sylvania255

the statement

from the rule of reason

demonstrable

a more

standard

rather

than

broad discretion

under a rule of reason

to a per se standard.
was merely

"ancillary

price

territories

anticompetitive
restrictions"257
restraint.
tation

restraint

than a pure policy

because,

is less restrictive

is basically

upheld

allowed.

analysis.

of how the

the assigned
have a greater

of territorial
the price

could be subject

arguably,

than vertical

to

every price
integration

Under this rationale,

would be left of the policy

behind

se rules,

clear and practicable

i.e. establishing

the

this line of argumen-

price restraint

scrutiny,

and

approached

to conceive

case can possibly

if one follows

every vertical

on

in com-

under a rule of reason

and consequently

However,

rule of reason

which

effect

that "depar-

analysis

used to enforce

in the present

The First Cir-

the vagueness

accordingly,

The Court stated that it was "unable
resale price restrictions

of territorial

The Court held that the price

ancillary,

restraint"

In-

... formalistic

in a way that illustrates

restraint

lenient

must be based

line drawing"256

parison

the

Co. v. wild Heerbrugg

a seller enforced

by price maintenance

cuit interpreted
ture[s]

to follow

resale price maintenance.

Inc.254

struments,

have refused

per se rule and pursued

towards

For example,

however,

of the Per Se Rule

nothing

the implementation

of per

standards

45

and enabling
"elaborate

the courts

inquiry

restraints]

between

the Supreme

vertical

lead to "perverse

harm

without

... caused

[by the

for their use."25B

Corp. v. Sharp Electronics

Court stated that distinguishing

and "ancillary"

restraints

invalidity

excuse

Electronics

"naked"

restraints

as to the precise

or the business

In Business
Corp.259

to condemn

as a means of classifying

is not appropriate

economic

only through

because

consequences

attachment

this would

... to avoid per se

to an express

contractual

obligation. ,,260
The per se rule against
even further
rolet,

invalidated

Inc. v. General

rejected

application

by the Ninth

Motors

agreement

that allegations

of vertical

under

considered

ignoring
Court's

and flatly

wanted

in 4ger Chevthe Court

affirmed

in Monsanto.263
4ger Chevrolet

to promote

stated

verti-

"the principle

are generally

rather

than

[being]

violations."262

was "discovered"

the repeatedly
holding

where

price-fixing

to be per se antitrust

two years before
Circuit

Corp.,26~

the 'rule of reason'

the cited principle

Circuit

was

of the per se rule to an alleged

cal price-fixing

evaluated

resale price maintenance

However,

by the Ninth

Circuit,

per se rule and the Supreme
Monsanto

was decided

and, apparently

its own approach

only

the Ninth

towards

resale

price maintenance.
These decisions
prevailing
antitrust

illuminate

the state of confusion

in the area of vertical
law. Ambiguous

restraints

under American

and vague terms, broad discretion

46
left to the courts,
insecurity
sistent

ruling

and indicate

struggle

price maintenance

tool to coerce

pricing

economics

towards

is even more astonishing
doctrine264

if one

gives sellers

their customer

to adhere

out "[i]n today's

in which many manufacturers

of supplies
possibly

through

pre-sell

national

will almost certainly

a

to their

to terminate

establish

pricing

ters in favor of dealers

announced

mean

behavior.
scheme

which

in advance

and

Therefore,

to carry the products

enforced,

of the offending

they will face termination

on

price cut-

to the suggested

especially

Discounters

the

way to

is to terminate

and vigorously

prices.

the products

the loss

lost profits

Another

adhere

This firm policy,

and higher

and differen-

a price cutter will have its impact

a stable pricing

scheme.

name brand

advertising,

the loss of the entire business."265

the price cutter's

taking

action.

Impact of Colgate

tiate their products

stable

led to incon-

the need for legislative

As Henry J. Hyde points

pricing

and

scheme.

a) The Economic

threat

theory

for the right approach

that the Colgate

powerful

standards,

Doctrine

The present

considers

evidentiary

about the role of economic

2. The Colgate

resale

unpractical

when it is
will

lead to

will often not start
manufacturer,

and loss of "investment"

of this manufacturer

into their

because
in

47
program.266
attracted
turers'

On the other hand, high price stores will be
by this policy,

termination

protection

the initiative

the manufacturer

restraints
illegal

to impose an "enforced"

the Colgate

constitute

rationale

an agreement

Sylvania's

should be decisive.
powerful

b) The Problem
Under

and, hence,

is ignored

of Limiting

the Colgate

conspiracies

Accordingly,

Colgate's

was developed
ment of policy
te an invalid
Parke Davis272

of

as a contrac-

Impact
the problem

and appropriate
conduct.

may escape

&

effect"

by Colgate.26B

Courts

and withdrawal

between

recognized

that

liability.

was limited.

Co. 270 the so-called

and every conduct

becomes

borderline

antitrust

the scope of Colgate

v. Parke Davis

which

pressure

and effective

doctrine,269

and bilateral

are per se

that the "economic

The fact that economic

a practicable

unilateral

that only formal

is a formalism

reasoning

firms is as stringent

tual obligation

States

a price cutter

who often use their posi-

resale price maintenance,

contradicts

harmful

and

scheme.

In conclusion,

drawing

upon complaint

to terminate

comes from the dealers

tion to induce
pricing

of "price cutters"

from price competition.267

Therefore,
frequently

they can rely on the manufac-

In United

"plus factor'l

which exceeded

the announce-

of trade was held to constitu-

resale price maintenance
the Court limited

agreement.271

the scope of Colgate

In
so far

48
that almost

every dealer

manufacturer

termination

into jeopardy

Only conduct

put the terminating

of a treble damage

"of such Doric simplicity

suit.

as to be some-

what rare in this day of complex

business

held able to escape

under antitrust

problem,

however,

condemnation

came trapped
logical
does)

was upheld.
between

punish

274

that communication
business

c) Colgate's
Courts
conduct

conduct

Adoption
realized

in dealer

termination

approach,

amending

conduct

the businessmen

seller

con-

on the other
law be-

It is hardly
(as Colgate

who relies

conduct

on

is applied

A look at the business

between

world

in

reveals

and buyer is normal

and

and should not be deterred.275

to "Real World Business"
this problem

under Colgate.

abolishing

and complexity.

rule when this business

real world business.

while

the antitrust

allow a business

and afterwards

desired

exists,

Therefore,

simplicity

to explicitly

the approved

hardly

was

law. The

was that, on the one hand, business

duct of "doric simplicity"
hand, Colgate

enterprise"273

and broadened

In subsequent
cases,

decisions,

the courts

plaintiff's

the allowed

standard

particularly

changed

their

of proof

rather

than

the rule which does not fit into real world busi-

ness.
However,
compromise

the courts missed

between

allowing

the opportunity

legitimate

prohiibiting

too much anticompetitive

establishing

different

business
conduct.

levels of presumptive

to find a
conduct
Instead

illegality,

and
of
the

49

proof

of a vertical
276

conspiracy

Monsanto

and Business

alleging

a price conspiracy

is almost

impossible

Electronics.277

The plaintiff

faces two obstacles.
an evidentiary

First,

proof

of a conspiracy

known

in other areas of the law.278 It is particularly

ficult

requires

after

to meet this evidentiary

question
illegal

of whether
conspiracy

peded,

because

establishing
Second,

burden.

the termination
or independent

the interests

a certain

Hence,

decision

even if the plaintiff

is further

can submit convincing

facts for

reject plaintiff's

for conduct

-- without

bee submitted

if one pursues

violates

long as the Colgate
achievement
hindered

doctrine

"normal"

whether

the notion

gate and economic

theory

enforcement.

reasons
have

that resale price

law, one has to admit that, as

by Colgate.

requires.

is not

these reasons

is not overruled,

business

claim

the court.279

the

Under Colgate

conduct

Moreover,

Act is
the border-

and "conspiracy"

with the predictability

sanctions

to antitrust

alternative

of the goals of Sec. 1 of the Sherman

definable

criminal

antitrust

and restricted

line between
hardly

considering

not con-

fixing conspiracy

theory provides

in the case before

Therefore,
maintenance

might

that a price

Thus, economic

in

scheme often go hand in hand.

sider the facts but, rather,

probable.

im-

and dealer

the Court might

the flat statement

dif-

of an

at least a prima facie assumption,

with

not

the amorphous

was the result

of manufacturer

pricing

standard

the

a statute

imposing

the coalition

is increasingly

becoming

is

of Col-

an obstacle
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B. Resale

Price Maintenance

Until
tenance

the 1973 amendment

maintenance.2B1

as being

At present

reasons,

subject

only books,

vironment

tion of the lawmaker

It was recognized

in amending

as possible

through

that resale price maintenance
of wealth

Indeed,

Another

the prohibition

in a perceivable
expected

concentration

parameter

is not in
as much comto use

lead to misallocations
the decision

"price".2B4

of resale price maintenance

reduction

of consumer

result of the amendment

on the retail

the

The GWB feared

as result of centralizing

as to the most important

out-

The inten-

every enterprise

as possible.
might

retail

of competition.

of maintaining

enabling

parameters

The

en-

15 GWB was to foster

the freedom

with the GWB's policy

and shifting

§

consumers.2B3

that resale price maintenance

as much competitive

resulted

due to cultural

and competitive

and flexible

goals of the GWB and to promote

petition

to resale price

did not any longer fit in the economic

lets and more educated

ar-

by the idea that resale price

of the 70's with strong

conformity

about 174,000

from the prohibition.2B2

are exempted

in the law was motivated

maintenance

At the time of

of resale price maintenance,

ticles were registered

political

of the GWB resale price main-

was allowed.2Bo

for brand products

the abolition

change

under the GWB

was an increased

level. However,

tion wave" was not that massive,2BG

prices.2B5

the "concentra-

and the abolishment

of

51
resale

price maintenance

the increased

was only one of several

the GWB pursues

the per se rule than American
dency of the American

courts

the GWB displays

a different

antitrust
to reduce

a tendency

vention
price

is safeguarded

resembles

the application
towards

selective

a price

provision

distribution

with selective

the whole

the Colgate

of per

extending

the

resale price
circum-

And vertical

non-

are likely to reach a result which
will also be prohibited.
systems which

level will be outlawed

dealing

GWB shadows
ticular,

conduct.

resale price maintenance,

For example,
maintain

which

towards

the ten-

by other norms to prevent

of the per se prohibited

restraints,

policy

law. Unlike

reach of the per se rule. The key norm against
maintenance

for

concentration.zB7

Interestingly

se rules,

reasons

doctrinezB9

to

under the applicable

distribution

area of vertical

intend

because

§

restraints.zBB

is clearly

rejected

15

In parby the

GWB.

1. The Key Norm
§

-- § 15 GWB

15 GWB is the key norm of the GWB's prohibition

resale price maintenance.

§

15 GWB provides

z90

that:

Agreements between enterprises with respect to
goods or commercial services ... shall be null and
void, insofar as they restrict a party to them in
its freedom to determine prices or terms of business in contracts which it concludes with third
parties in regard to the good supplied, other
goods, or commercial services.

of
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The primary
protect

freedom

and emphasized
of contract

from restraints

purpose

of § 15 GWB is to

and to protect

third parties

imposed by the seller.29~

Indirectly,

the

freedom

of competition

as an institution

is also protected.

Another

goal mentioned

to gather

for the 1973 amend-

ment was fighting

inflation;

however,

in the list of values protected
plainable
§

only by the economic

15 GWB protects

support

the freedom

this goal does not fit

by the GWB and is ex292

climate

of that time.

to enter contracts

direct

and indirect

fixing

and all other kinds of restrictions

prices293

violate

clauses"294

every price
intends

to constitute

to the underlying

the competitive
rather

price

affecting
treatment-

an illegal

process

attempt

-- maintaining

as a way of ensuring

than to relying
restriction

to maintain

GWB policy

on performance

is suspect

competition

of competitive

action

in the use of competitive

good perforstandards

--

under § 15 GWB. § 15 GWB

on all levels of distribu-

tion and to foster the GWB policy
freedom

and maximum

15 GWB.

§

According

Minimum

15 GWB. Even "most favorable

are considered

to circumvent

mance

§

restrictions.

against

of preserving

as possible.

parameters

as much

Every restriction

constitutes

an obstacle

to that goal.295
According

to the legal conception

interbrand/intrabrand

discussion

of the GWB,29G

the

and workable

competition

from consideration.297

The rigid

arguments

are preempted

treatment

of resale price maintenance

in comparison

to other

53
restraints,
economic
value

which

are more favorably

set prices

and conditions

dividual

and the fact that prices

tion are reflected

2. Closing

value of freedom

to

with third

of the in-

are the core of competi-

in § 15 GWB.29B

the Loopholes

Because
GWB a direct

of the clear and unambiguous
violation

However,

the GWB suspects

to mitigate

pricing

to reach the same or similar
15 GWB, additional

provisions

are persis-

or circumvent

the

new ways of distribution

than contractual

to a certain

of § 15

occur.

that businessmen

impact of § 15 GWB by construing
using other means

language

of § 15 GWB will rarely

lured into attempting

herence

freedom

in its contracts

Both the democratic

their

the special

to the individuals'

parties.

tently

although

effect might be the same, emphasizes

the GWB contributes

freely

treated

agreements

to assure

scheme. To foreclose
results

or
ad-

other ways

as prohibited

under

of the GWB safeguard

§

§

15 GWB

and close off other avenues which might be used to induce or
to coerce distributors

to follow

a proposed

pricing

In § 25(2) GWB, the statute

explicitly

d~clares

scheme.

299

a) § 25(2) GWB

"[e]nterprises

... shall not threaten

promise

or grant advantages,

purpose

of inducing

that

or cause harm, or

to other enterprises

them to adopt conduct which,

for the
... must

54
not be made the subject-matter
ment."300
minate

Threatening

a discounter

threatening
promising

of a contractual

to refuse to deal, threatening

advantages,

tempt to circumvent

disadvantages,

constitutes

15 GWB.30:L

§

to sell" is a commonly
prohibition

used strategy

"Refusal

scheme,
or

an illegal

at-

The fact that the "refusal
to circumvent

of resale price maintenance

the OECD Report

to ter-

if he does not follow a pricing

with any other economic
economic

commit-

the

is illustrated

in

to sell":302

Experience has shown that refusal to sell is the
most persuasive means employed by supplier to enforce prescribed resale prices if the buyer has
not observed the prescribed prices. It is pointed
out ... that a supplier may circumvent the legal
prohibition of resale price maintenance
(... ) by
withholding supplies from a distributor who is
reselling his goods at a lower price than he
thinks reasonable. He may also refuse to have
business relations with a particular distributor
because he has reason to believe that this distributor will sell his goods at reduced prices.

§

25(2) GWB refers

to the "real business

nizes that the effect
might

of explicit

also be achieved

pressure

in assuring

(1) Enforcement
The Federal

and recog-

resale price maintenance

by the means

adherence

world"

of reward or by applying

to a certain

pricing

scheme.

of § 25(2) GWB
Cartel Authority

closely

supervises

business

conduct

which might be prone to influence

tractual

freedom

of buyers.

Three examples

strict § 25(2) GWB is enforced.

any

the con-

illustrate

how

55

(2) Case Architektenkammer
In Architektenkammer303
architects

a professional

tried to establish

organization

that architects

only charge

fees at the upper end of the pricing

scale. Architects

charged

by the announcement

lower prices were threatened

"legal consequences."

The Bundesgerichtshof

that this threat was intended
retreat

from price competition

cease and desist
Saxony.304

(3)

Defenses

Uhren Kramer
Monsanto

for watches

from Seiko.

Seiko refused

claimed

trouble

with other retailers

The Kammergericht

would

adhere

bination

doctrine.

watches

and Kramer

that the refusal

that charged

(Courts of Appeals

was
to

to avoid

higher

prices.

in Berlin)

found

to sell was based on the price cutting

Seiko had promised

to Seiko's

of economic

Kramer,

ordered

scheme and that Seiko wanted

because

with

fear that Kramer would not adhere

pricing

of Kramer

of Lower

to fulfil this order,

Seiko's

refusal

a

and deals with conduct

and other jewelry

Kramer

by Seiko's

that Seiko's

upheld

has some similarities

Electronics

distributor

motivated

to

by the BGH.

the scope of the Colgate

sued for delivery.

of

v. Seiko

v. Seiko305

and Business

is within

architects

and, accordingly

were not accepted

who

(BGH) decided

order of the Cartel Authority

Case Uhren Kramer

which

to influence

of

suggested

disadvantage,

case of price cutting,

delivery

if Kramer

retail prices.
"non-delivery"

and the economic

advantage

The comin the
of

a

56
"delivery"
resulted

by adherence

in an attempt

his prices.

Therefore,

Although

§

to restrict
Seiko's

pricing

Kramer's

conduct

scheme

freedom

violated

§

to set

25(2) GWB.

in this case Seiko would have been free not to

deal with Kramer
behavior

to the suggested

at all, Seiko's

was the fact which

attempt

triggered

to influence

the application

price
of

25(2) GWB.
One might

veiling

argue that Seiko made only the mistake

its reason

delivered

for non-delivery.

but had not attempted

ing behavior,

If Seiko had not

to influence

Seiko would not have violated

GWB recognizes

that a seller

his customers.

Although

related

Kramer's
§

is generally306

some price

free to choose
conduct

may es-

because

conduct

the reach of the GWB. In most cases,

of this GWB stance, most harmful

seller who is not interested
attempt

in loosing

a customer

might

is actually

the motivation

lead to termination.
terminated,

for termination

to the problems

addressed

Electronics,30B

evaluation

more problems

will have to consider
and weigh

(or non-delivery).

intent

does not create

delivery

Like

judges,

and must

As seen in Uhren Kramer

the fact that a seller promises

Contrasted

in other cases.

setting

into

and Business

i.e. the deciding

the factual

the evidence.

the

the court has to inquire

of the motivation

in every other case the court,

pric-

If subsequently

in Monsanto307

than determining

a

will

to give at least a "hint" that the customer's

ing behavior
dealer

pric-

25(2) GWB. The

cape condemnation
is within

of un-

analyze

v. Seiko,309

to a retailer

if

57
certain
§

prices

will be charged

strongly

indicates

that

25(2) GWB has been violated.

b) § 26(1) GWB
26(1) GWB opposes

§

per se rule against

resale price maintenance.

the per se prohibition
310

GWB

also illuminates

to the freedom
unfairly

another

any attempt

to adopting

to sell or purchase

boycotts

with intent

is documented

being

The GWB does not
to inducing

which

involving

another

The economic

without

is prohibited

resale price maintenance

arrangements

tries "to incite

enterprises".312

to competing

conduct

of § 26(1)

the GWB contributes

of an enterprise

-- particularly

but also condemns
one party

the value which

the

Furthermore,

in the meaning

by other enterprises.

enterprise

by the GWB311

of boycotts

of third entities

hindered

only prohibit

another way to circumventing

three parties

enterprise

to unfairly

importance

in the OECD Report

when

... to refuse

harm certain

of secondary
"Refusal

to

Sell":313

Cases are becomimg increasingly frequent of traditional dealers and specialized shops threatening
to discontinue the distribution of the supplier's
product if he delivers to discounters, chainstores, department stores or other non-traditional
retailers. With this policy the traditional
dealers tend to hinder the appearance or development of new forms of distribution which are frequently more efficient from the productivity point
of view than the more conservative forms. The
former operate largely on the basis of lower
labour costs and prices achieved through self-service and other rationalization methods.
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The so-called

"secondary

most cases a violation
the inducing

showing

a third firm is suspect

the inducing

initiative"

in

of § 26(1) GWB. The mere attempt

firm to hindering

the GWB. Therefore,
"boycott

boycott"3:L4 constitutes

to

firm has to prove that its

is justified.

that the "boycott

of

It is not sufficient

initiative"

of

was not price motiva-

ted.

C. The Approach

of the GWB and the American

The GWB decided

to apply a strict per se rule against

resale price maintenance.
of extending
duct which

Moreover,

is relevant

to prices.

of action

are of secondary

resale price maintenance
the assertion
the pricing

related

antitrust
conduct

holds

typical

lenient

to other con-

on, while

against

of the GWB's approach
more democratic

to leave

is prohibited
approach

courts

under

towards

price

and courts
conduct

to

are increasingly

theory of the Chicago
conduct

is

level.

than the German

In America,

are aimed at achieving

efficiency

argument

likely to allow price related

on the economic

a policy

to the policy of

Another

law, the American

that price relevant

tenance

concern.

on the dealer

is more

condemnation.

relying

is focused

resale price maintenance

are increasingly
escape

According

that it is arguably

decision

Although
American

the GWB pursues

the scope of per se condemnation

the GWB, freedom
arguments

Dispute

school which

and resale price main-

efficiency

and promoting

59
consumer

welfare

without

and are not intended

efficiency

1. The Economic

gain.3~s

Arguments

The discussion
reflects
School

among American

again the controversial

Scholars

School's

and scholars

standpoints

of the Chicago

increases

the Chicago

between

dealers

School

School,

firms employing

problem,

argue that resale

distributive

efficiency.3~7

recognizes

market

rather

they conclude

services.
vertical

benefits

that the consumer

price,

because

the additional
According

is matched

to the Chicago

services.

may constitute

market

because,

is rejected

School,

the exercise

Chicago

school disregards

and empirical

of market

studies,3~g

are attempting

The Chicago
despite

the price in-

The argument

an exercise

according

and asserts

that

of

to the Chicago

power is unlikely.

newer economic

higher

work in favor

School

resale price maintenance
power

to the Chicago

sales services

by additional

beneficial

such as the "free rider"
consumers.

alleges

of consumers.

According

than to exploit

School

that the per se

suppress

restraints

imperfections,

Al-

that the competition

Thus they might

such as presale

to overcome

Schoo13~6

is restricted,

rule is inappropriate.
effects,

Approach

of the Chicago

price maintenance

crease

courts

and the New Coalition.

a) The Chicago

though

to raise prices

The

acknowledgments3~B

that, based

on

60
neoclassical

economic

tions with regard
market

theory

to market

participants

-- as well as several
behavior

assump-

and rationality

-- anticompetitive

effects

of

are not like-

.
ly. Under

the Chicago

tion has no specific
context

of possible

foreclosure

effects

on interbrand

are neglected

new market

intrabrand

and is only considered

of cartelization.

Other effects

cy argument

analysis,

that cartelization

entry barriers,
pressure.

virtue
effects

as the facilitation
School believes

School's

competiin the

competition,

However,

the Chicago

is not probable;

hence

and, in the absence

entrants

maintain

on competition

such

of

the competitive

besides

the efficien-

are not considered.320

b) The View of the New Coalition
The members
benign

effect

of controling

of the New Coalition

and, therefore,
the businessmen.

about the seller's
market

favor antitrust

and addresses

to sellers,

cement market

power,

cartel.

·tenance makes
seller's

the market

The critics

rather

resale price maintenance,

that resale
from consumer

and to guise a

to this view resale price mainless competitive

than consumer's

concentrate

of

imperfections, 'to

to raise entry barriers,

According

wealth

They assert

of market

casts doubt

the problems

may be used to shift income

to take advantage

in this

law as a means

The New Coalition

power and entry barriers.

price maintenance

dealer

motivation

do not believe

and contribute

to

benefit.32~

more on possible
such as higher

harmful

effects

prices322

of

and the
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fact that resale price maintenance
cartel.323

dealer

Also, the New Coalition

value of intrabrand

competition,

resale price maintenance

enabling

so called

ment which

conscious

freedom

free and democratic
values

by facilitating

is also emphasized

sion to support

pointing

emphasizes

by the German

environment.

effects

Another

Therefore,

argu-

to the

the GWB sees

as long as economic

does not show that convincing

reasons

which urge the lawmaker

or

the basic

no need to amend its approach

policy)

on

GWB is the deci-

according

system which establishes

of the business

the

cartelization

parallelism.325

of the individual

as a

out that vertical

may have substantial

competition324

interbrand

has the same effect

theory

(in light of the GWB's

to consider

a different

ap-

proach.

2. Economic

Arguments

with Regard

to Resale

Price Main-

tenance
An analysis
more

lenient

lustrates

of the economic

approach

towards

the problems

economic

standpoint

The next question
ments

support

in favor of a

resale price maintenance

of how to determine

fects of resale price maintenance.
could help to answer

arguments

the question

the economic

Furthermore
whether

ef-

the analysis

-- from an purely

-- the per se rule should be abandoned.

will be -- assuming

that economic

the view that the per se rule against

price maintenance

il-

should be abolished

-- whether

arguresale

other

62
non-economic

arguments

are convincing

enough

to uphold

the

per se condemnation.

a) Market

Transparency

It is alleged
transparency
consumer

Argument

that uniform

and, therefore,

by reducing

However,

prices

benefit

information

the argument

whether

rejected

he wants

sufficient

justify

it is the consumer's

Only advertising

a different

leads to higher

prices

not be said that the consumer
costs

control

Another

the information

prices

as

might

so that the average
Therefore,

con-

it can-

off by saving

infor-

(higher) price at every
cost benefit

is opposed

by

costs to the manufacturer.

anticompetitive

cy" is that interbrand
affected.

the same price

(if any) when he has to pay more but can be

Moreover,

increased

retail

that resale price

is better

sure that he has to pay the same
outlet.

it is

treatment.32B

sumer has to pay more for the product.329

mation

purposes

with maximum

One must take into consideration
main~enance

choice

or whether

range or a suggested

this price would be almost

the fixed price.

be-

for the "best price"

For advertising

to quote a price

price because

benefits

to buy at the next best dealer

the market.327

to evaluate

and the

costS.326

that the consumer

because

market

competition

cause he does not have to shop around
can be easily

increase

Interestingly,

effect

competition

of "enhanced

transparen-

might be negatively

a result which

is supported

by

63

economic

theory

"perfect

competition"

world"

which

-- that market

so called

instead

of fostering

Economic
imperfect
tenance
prices

in an imperfect

"open price

may harm interbrand

turer cartel
discipline

systems"

several

Generally,

price

of the cartel members

"price signaling"
anticompetitive

be eased.

Price

leadership332

cised without

are not probable.
idealistic

prices

However,

assumptions,

in

l)A manufacthus, the

could be better

controlled

by price cutters;

would be facilitated.

and conscious

School's

where

and lead to higher

established;

behavior

being disturbed

The Chicago

For

resale price main-

inflexibility:33~

could be more easily

would

led to higher

competition

and the cartel would not be disturbed
2)So-called

environment.

situations

such as oligopolies

and increased

to

price competition.330

theory describes

markets,

contributes

-- was ignored by the "real business

is operating

example,

transparency

in oligopolistic

parallelism

by intrabrand

theory

asserts

could be exercompetition.

that these effects

their view is based

such as absence

markets

on some

of market

power

and

entry barriers.333

b) Ease of Market

Entry

Some economists
facilitate
entrant
dealer

market

argue that resale price maintenance

entry of a new producer

can guarantee

his dealers

will be encouraged

if the new market

a safe profit margin.

to strengthen

may

his efforts

The

to sell

64
the product334
endangered

because

his profit

by price cutters

On the other hand,
are not interested

The customer,
product
which

the danger

instead

of a perhaps

market

entrant

tenance.
market

a question

better

entrants

Another
sacrifice
market

competition

argument

entrant

argument
America

and/or

that the products

to set prices

the "protection"

because

the new

businessmen"

law movement"

raised by German dealer
with·"Fair

is not very popular

Also, the GWB did not accept

maintenance

is necessary

to protect

The GWB decided

for

Size Businessmen

the "Fair Trade

after the experience
argument

to

restraints.

anymore.337

businessmen.33B

price competi-

other ways to win retailers

of small and middle-size

and is permanently

of new

will be distorted.

freedom

was used during

product

to use resale price main-

of the Small and Middle

tions. However,

cheaper

is that it is not necessary

can choose

The "protection

the high margin

to intrabrand

such as territorial

c) Protection

margins.336

as to how long a new

to the extent

the dealer's

his product,

remains

are not exposed

tion, the overall

who

for the dealer.

should be allowed

Furthermore,

that dealers

with high profit

will be offered

is not that profitable
Moreover,

exists

at low prices will concentrate

on products

therefore,

and not

(or free riders).335

in selling

their sales efforts

is "guaranteed"

in

associa-

Trade"

laws

in America

that resale price

small and middle

to protect

size

the competitive

65
process

with free price competition,

tion leads to the elimination
cient dealers.339

Economists

sumer would have to support
prices.

Furthermore,

necessarily

protect

of some smaller,

inefficient

and mid-size

chain stores have developed

called

"dealer brands")

pursue

While

the prescribed

these bigger

price policy
created

smaller

dealers

dealers

because
(so

were able to

dealers

A similar

by resale price maintenance

combination

does not

were forced

and were dependent

of their supplier.340

level. Bigger manufacturers

with higher

them to avoid resale

smaller

price

the con-

their own brands

which allowed

their own price policy,

to charge

dealers

resale price maintenance
smaller

less effi-

argue that, otherwise,

bigger

price maintenance.

even if this competi-

on the

effect

is

on the manufacturer

can use their market

with resale price maintenance

power

in

to suppress

competitors.341

d) Free Rider Argument
The argumentation

of the Chicago

resale price maintenance
rider"

argument.

only reason
the strive

Hence,

concentrates
according

for a manufacturer
for efficiencYi342

on the so called

to the Chicago

every restraint

justification.

tenance,

the free rider argument
justifications

supporting

to use vertical

economic

efficiency

School

With regard

"free

School

the

restraints
must have an

to resale price main-

is preeminent.

of the Chicago

School,

Other
such as

is

66
transaction

costs economics,343

are not that important

in

the area of price restrictions.
Chicago
serves

scholars

the consumer

sumer is insured

assert

by enhancing

of getting

The "free ride" which

other,

service

Moreover,

from unfair

the Chicago

restraints,

quality

competition

turers

alleges

rejects

theory

and unable

not to lessen overall

substitutes;

interest

otherwise

(4)the threat

introduce

price competition

pressure
resale

with ser-

competition;345
is to sell higher

he will not raise his prices

costs because

of market

the competitive

the only reason manufacturers

as-

and manufac-

or to take advantage

to escape

the manufacturer's

prices

with its economic

competitive

vice competition,

service

may improve

is based on the following

is to replace

quantities,

would

that less in-

competition

price maintenance

(3)because

efforts

that vertical

arguments

are perfectly

are not able to create

of markets;

e.g. advertising

interbrand

(l)markets

imperfections,

would be prevented.344

may lead to supra-competitive

That economic

sumptions:

he

could take on

resale price maintenance,

School

and may also lessen
theory.

and services

and safety.

The Chicago
trabrand

The con-

free riding.

School

especially

services.

"price cutters"

dealers

other investments,

be protected

product

providing

consumer

the information

wants.

Likewise,

that resale price maintenance

in excess

the consumer

of new market

would

entrants

of the
switch
helps to

to

---------67
maintain

the competitive

manufacturers

pressure

which prevents

from overcharging.

However,

the free rider argument

has its shortcomings.

On the one hand, it is not guaranteed
will improve

the

when price competition

ly fringe dealers

that consumer

is restrained.

services
Especial-

may tend to cheat on the quality

of ser-

346

vice.

On the other hand merely

focusing

ride" notion may lead to a "reversed
This problem

be recognized
products

which need pre-sale

argument

reason.

a free ride might be not probable
The reputation

nores

Otherwise

It is pointed
School

another,

maintenance

providing

incentive

to gain efficiency

reduced

is opposed

efficiency.

on to the consumers.

argument

Resale

Moreover

by reducing

transaction

These dealers

igprice

of more

its transaction

cost economics

of

the dealer's

by enabling

to sell more at lower prices

by fixed prices.

347

by convincing

to pass the efficiencies

dealers

dealers

to the

on the free rider problem

much more probable

costs or aChieving

dealer"

out that the efficiency

focusing

would prevent

for

a free ride is not probable.

efficient

the efficient

are

of a brand name must be

The free ride argumentation

the Chicago

only for

service but that restraints

from the "service

"price cutter".

arguments.

applies

also

to all kinds of products.

Additionally

transferable

does not want the ser-

has to pay for them. It should

that the service

often applied

another

free ride" problem.

arises when the consumer

vices but nevertheless

on the "free

may be

are prevented

from

68
using

the most

important

parameter

"price"

for competitive

means.
Furthermore,
profit

margin

of higher
profit

will be passed

quality

margin

example,

there is no guarantee

and better

and other measures

ticity

services.

profit

which

product

Rather,

is invested

in the form
the higher

for the product.

might decrease

and result

if, for

in advertising

create preferences

preferences

for the product

in further

price elas-

price

in-

so called

"rent seeking".349

Because

the consumer

might be "coerced"

to buy a product

creases,34B
seeking,

on to the consumer

may be used to raise entry barriers

the additional

Establishing

that the higher

which was pushed
market

position

without

regard

into the market
by strategic

for better

sumer is not "better
tised product

of rent

and has established

marketing

quality

its

of a powerful

or lower prices.

The con-

off" if he has to buy a heavily

at a higher

price.

The lawmaker

firm,

adver-

of the GWB

stated:350
Abandoning price competition enables enterprises
which are willing to employ resale price maintenance to refer to surrogate forms of competition
such as product differentiation
and competition in
the service dimension, leading to luxury packaging, increased advertising etc., which are not
always appreciated by the customer. These and
similar measures of competition often contradict
the principle of economic reasonableness and are
not sufficient to grant manufacturers and dealers
the right to introduce resale price maintenance.
Likewise,
necessarily

improved

product

be accomplished

quality

and safety

are not

by resale price maintenance.
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If, for example,
efforts

the manufacturer

of his outlets,

forts instead

he may increase

of improving

the manufacturer

can rely on the sales

product

advertisement

quality.

may have little incentive

ef-

In this case,
to improve

his

products.
Higher

prices

are not an effect

indicate

good market

increase

consumer

performance

welfare

less for a product).

Moreover,

or supracompetitive

market

entrants

arguments

services

without

the argument

prices

support

-- even when considering

fixed by the manufacturer

First,

the fixed price does not reflect

the price which

dealer.

the efficiency

Second,

price
1S

in the cost struc-

or less than average

not know how much the services

the addi-

than the average

is orientated

dealers.35~

new

the view that the price under

resale price maintenance.

the above average

that higher

is not convincing.

-- will be higher

ture of the average

likely to

are not likely because

will be attracted

resale price maintenance
tional

and are hardly

to

(in the sense that the buyer pays

prices

Several

that is considered

Therefore,
advantage

the manufacturer

cost the dealer

of

does

and, accord-

ingly,

the higher price

is not necessarily

outweighed

better

services.

the cost advantage

of more efficient

dealers

is disregarded.352

general,
Therefore,
pressure

Again,

less flexible
the consumer

Third,

fixed prices

in responding
profits

on the market.353

by

are, in

to price changes.

later from the competitive

70
Furthermore,
model

"perfect

competition"

exists

("all other things being equal"),354

markets

every enterprise

raise its prices
if marginal
analysis

without

of the function

school's

shortcoming

dress

constitute

the problems

nalities
Chicago

approach

realities357

of market

and strategic
School

entrants

Moreover,

economic

ignores

predictions

are pos-

and of what

entrants.356
to entry barriers

is a

theory. The Chicago
and fails to properly

imperfection,

market

even

of entry barriers

entry barriers

in that school's

ignores market

to lower or

new market

and importance

they pose for new market

The Chicago

School

exist.355

and in "real"

freedom

a stage where accurate

sible of what factors
obstacles

attracting

entry barriers

has not reached

major

has a certain

only as a

conduct.

the differences

ad-

such as exter-

Furthermore,
between

the

short and

long term performance.35B

3. Evaluation

of the Economic

As the foregoing
gument

can be opposed

Arguments

discussion

exposes

by a counterargument.

may be the result of an ascertained
must not necessarily
Nonetheless,

Certain

ar-

effects

cause; but, the effects

occur.

arguments

favoring

petition

are better

plaining

real world business.

freedom

of price com-

suited than other theories

the core of competition,
tion cannot prevent

every economic

Moreover,

and substitutes

a certain

thus far ex-

price competition

is

for price competi-

loss of competitiveness.
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First,

quality

as price

and service

competition

petition.359

perience

leads to higher
tional

from dealers

to market

not fully compensated

Fourth,

bearing

taking

School,

to plain economic

not helpless
American

"victims"

and German

services,
persons.

distribution

multivalued

a business

legal

proscribing

is free to im-

pre and post sales

and qualification

is also free to employ

to ensure

adequate

are

Under both the

legal system the seller

presentation,

system

has been

that manufacturers

of "free riders".

The manufacturer

in

theory.36o

obligations

adequate

freedom

but it must be considered

one should consider

pose contractual

is shifted

could result

the risk of running

if one does not want to sacrifice

Moreover,

for by addi-

an essential

this freedom

ex-

generally

of an agent. This fourth argument

by the Chicago

reasoning

Third,

the power to set prices

Restricting

dealers

with the freedom

changes.

which can

us that resale price maintenance

to manufacturers,

from the dealer.
restricted

is the only parameter

adapted

prices,

services.

neglected

price

and easily

teaches

is not as measurable

and is often used to hide price com-

Second,

be quickly

competition

of salesa selective

presentation

of its

products.36~

4. Effects

not Included

Furthermore,
effects

in the Efficiency

non- efficiency

of resale price maintenance

tion of a more

lenient

approach

related
oppose

towards

Analysis
and non-economic
the implementa-

resale price

72
maintenance.
prices

Both the freedom

and the freedom

competing
maintain

outlets

dealer
price

turers
price

economic

freedom

order with a multitude

The freedom

for business

is an important

customers'

competition,

by offering

part of democracy.

can be restricted

enabling

Freedom

democratic

a competitive
Both dealers'

by powerful

their product

however,

and

manufacfrom

them to impair the freedom

of competition,

value of the political

of

of the individual

that have the power to withdraw

competition.

price

are values which comply with the goal to

businessmen.

to strive

to set his

of the buyer to choose between

a decentralized

independent

of the dealer

of

is a basic

order of both the American

and German

systems.

5. Legal Method

Argument

The per se rule in German

antitrust

ported

for legal policy

reasons.

shows,

the GWB left the responsibility

As the approach

important

issue with the legislature.

Authority

and the German

courts

vigorously

enforce

it. Economic

into play,

and no discretion

it. The advantages

this decision

has accepted

the statutory

of this strict

costly

need to abandon

and lengthy

the present

and

do not come

and the rule of law is promoted.363

there is no obvious

Cartel

is left to the courts.362

tion and abides

is prevented,

about this

The Federal

considerations

community

prevails,

of § 15 GWB

to decide

accept

German business

that predictability

law is also sup-

The
regula-

rule are
ligitation
As long as

state of the

73
law the lawmaker
reliable
vague

should resist

and predictable

rule. And even if economic
conduct

law should

not be changed

groups,

drastically.

could be developed.

could be softened
illegality.

theory could prove

is more than occasionally

such as an rule of reason

fixing,

to subsitute

rule with a more ambiguous

beneficial

price

tendencies

and
that

suppressed,

For example,

the

case

in the case of maximum
Moreover,

the per se rule

by a rule of reason with presumptive

The seller would have the burden

cause the seller

a

of proof be-

should best know why he employed

the

restraint.
Another

way to create predictability

the GWB choice with regard

to cartels:

tels void, but under certain
validated.

Sometimes,

Authority

is required.

is illustrated

§

circumstances

an approval

by the Secretary

Commerce.

contributes

tability

and avoiding

decisionmakers,
the specific
struggle

ligitation.

who are familiar

markets,

with economic

Cartel
a

of the Ministry

to maintaining

with economic

theory

or juries have to

in the first place.

of

predic-

Thus, specialized

and not courts
theory

car-

a cartel may be

circumstances,

cartel may be authorized
This procedure

1 GWB declares

by the Federal

In extraordinary

by

and

IV. An Example

Recent

American

differences
American

between

antitrust

case law presents
the approaches

under the present

the Supreme

over the appropriate

maintenance,

the chance

Court had, amidst

approach

to clarify

towards

clear standards,

Electronics365

another

became

faced by American

The Courts
dards

reasoning

of Colgate.366

opinion

reflect

tablishing
economic

terms. Hence

stan-

and the dissenting
surrounding

law and properly

it appears

Court attribute

the

law.

the impracticable

of antitrust

the confusion

Business

and confusion

Additionally,

But, in-

to illustrate

Both the majority

a violation

of the Supreme

antitrust
reveals

insecurity

theory.

example

the

resale price

its position.

stead of establishing

problems

of the

law and the GWB.

After Monsanto364
dispute

a paradigm

different

surrounding

esusing

that the justices
meanings

to certain

interpretation

and

use of terminology.
Moreover,
with regard

this decision

to antitrust

presents

ligitation

74

some deeper

concern

and jury trial.
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A. Business

Electronics

Corporation

v. Sharp Electronics

Corporation

After Matsushita,367
economic

theory

that a predatory

reasonable,36B
application

were the court found on the basis

Electronics369

Business

of neoclassical

increasingly

important

In Business

pricing

economic

scheme was not

indicates

theory will also become

in the area of vertical

Electronics

that

restraints.

the Court indicated

again its

reluctance

to apply per se rules in the area of vertical

restraints

and relied on Sylvania's

from the rule of reason

standard

strable

rather

economic

effect

line drawing"370
Furthermore,
competition

to narrow

the Supreme

Hartwell
addressed
reason

must be based on demon-

than

Court reemphasized

that interbrand
law.37l

of antitrust

found that, according

a price

fixing agreement

could not be established.
the question

whether

is the appropriate

2. The Weighing

to the standards

between

Furthermore,

of

Sharp and
the court

a per se rule or a rule of

standard.

of the Evidence

The most interesting
the ananlysis

... upon formalistic

of the Majority

The Majority
Monsanto,372

"that departure

the scope of the per se rule.

is the main purpose

1. The Decision

holding

part of Business

the Court used in finding

Electronics

was

that no price fixing

76
conspiracy
Instead

between

Sharp and Hartwell

of addressing

conspiracy
economic

as done in Monsanto,373
analysis.

consideration
simple

the evidentiary

However,

could be proven.
problems

of proofing

the Court applied

this analysis

of whether

could give any business

the terminating

reasons

want to risk termination

an

did not include

of the facts of the case at hand,

question

a

such as the

manufacturer

other than that he did not

by the customer.

Instead

of inquir-

ing into the actual case, the Court described

the free rider

problem

of higher

and listed the procompetitive

prices

according

based

on economic

likely.374
agreement
maintain

a certain

between

reasoned

Hartwell

that an agreement
levels will

is no merit

dealer's

to provide
and

contention
price or price

that prophylaxis

the District

of the

agreement"375

from terminating

of its price cutting

rule. ,,376.

purpose

to petitioner's

on the remaining

warrants

explicitly.

neoclassical

here was to enable Hartwell

so often follow

price maintenance

and Sharp to

Court applied

under its sales franchise

"[t]here

there was an

the facts of the case both the

and the Supreme

services

are not

level was not addressed

of considering

restriction

effect

whether

and held that "[a] quite plausible

vertical

because

price

The Court found that,

anticompetitive

or a conspiracy

Fifth Circuit

better

theory,

theory.

The main issue, however,

Instead

theory

to economic

effects

another

dealer

against

Court's

per se

resale

77
Interestingly,
tional problem
who might
result

the Supreme

of sparking

convince

of cutting

this concern

Court addressed

lawsuits

rather

not take decisions

plausible
price

that this explanation

tion" and concluded
by a legitimate
combined

desire

other dealers"3Bo
Thus,

the Supreme

reasoning.

with economic

theory,

wanted
inquire

superior

is frequently
provided

services.

the "common

sense"

in a trial)

to replacing

the reasons

argument

the jury
the facts.

of Business
-- based

-- that Sharp

The Court did also not

the termination
bargaining

by

theory).

The Court simply assumed

in the "free rider"

to assure better

Hartwell's

services,

the Court also disregarded

termination.

into whether

provide

to contribute

In addition

the

are often motivated

of economic

The Court did not even investigate

on its belief

of giving

on the services

Court replaced

with economic

a

the "real motiva-

that price cutting

(which a jury is supposed

Electronic's

Instead

to have dealers

(as a matter

to the "highly

of fact) but then continued

Court unveiled

by -free riding'

The

was to terminate

that "manufacturers

with the reality

made possible

element

away from the jury.37B

is not probable.

case to a jury, the Supreme

However,

the facts of a case, and a

claim that its real motivation
(as a matter

was the

the role of the jury. It is

that the jury might be exposed

cutter"379

dealers

cutting.377

than service

the task of the jury to evaluate

Court admitted

of terminated

a jury that their termination

should not obstruct

court should

the addi-

was caused

power.3B1

by

The court ignored

78
Sharp's

inability

to submit evidence

was based on legitimate
insufficient

service

the court assumed

economic

nonprice-related

of Business

reasons,

Electronics.

that a procompetitive

ing price competition
foregoing

that its termination

rationale

Furthermore,

effect

was "quite plausible".

such as

of eliminat-

Based on the

the Court anew replaced

facts with

theory.

3. The Dissenting

Opinion

As the dissent

points

out in Business

Electronics,382

the facts of the case made a price fixing conspiracy

most

obvious.
The termination
by the ultimatum
although

of Hartwell.

Sharp terminated

his discounting
agreement
price

of Business

The dissent

Business

practices,

was initiated

criticizes

Electronics

no inference

that,

because

of an implied

of
price

was drawn. Not even a prima facie assumption

fixing

conspiracy

failed to address
"More importantly,
relevant

vertical
character

identify

not "attach
tion".384

of the dissent

the real problem
if instead
nonprice

of speculating

of the agreement

concern

by the case.
about ir-

we focus on the

before

us, we can readily

nature."383

of the dissent

any weight

is that the majority

presented

restraints,

its anticompetitive

Another

of

was drawn.

The basic criticism

precise

Electronics

is that the majority

to the value of intrabrand

And the dissent

accuses

the majority

of

did

competi-

79
Sylvania3Bs

misinterpreting
demonstrable

benefit

to interbrand

the harm to intrabrand
not imply

since Sylvania

as reasonable

purpose

interbrand

points

out that in Sylvania

interbrand

competition

is interested

efficiently.

However,

of Business

"who care[s]
product's

than

concludes

opinion

"is inconsistent

market

the."value

any evidence

of a

The dissent
effects

was initiated
efficiency

that a

the terby a dealer
of a

[its] own profit margins".3B9

with the statement

Act itself";390

of competition"

judgment

that

i.e., that the

of legal protection",39~
includes

The

that the majority

with the legislative

"is worthy

on

its distribution

Electronics3BB

in Business

dissent

relevant

in structuring

did

competition

the procompetitive

Electronics

the Sherman

Sylvania

competition."3B7

less about the general

promotion

underlies

without

will outweigh

were based on the assumption

manufacturer

mination

while

of intrabrand

could be justified
to improve

competition

competition",3B6

"that the elimination

"held that a

"all elements

and that
of a bar-

gain".392

a) The Suggested

Approach

As the majority
more complex
the dissent
majority:
legality

analytic
addresses

of the Dissenting

acknowledges,

the dissent

structure"393
the crucial

the assumption
of a 'vertical

Opinion
presents

The first sentence
shortcoming

of the

that the case "concerns
nonprice

restraint' ."394

the

"a
of

80

The dissent's
ween

"naked"

argument

focuses

and "ancillary"

on Judge Taft's

holding

on the difference

restraint.

in United

The dissent

betrelies
Pipe &

States v. Addyston

Steel CO.395 for its proposition

that naked restraints,

opposed

have the sole objective

to ancillary

restraints,

396

restraining

competition.

a restraint

cannot have a lawful purpose

ject is to restrain
which

The Court in Addyston
when

as
of

held that

its "sole ob-

trade in order to avoid the competition

it has always been the policy

of the common

law to

foster."397
The dissent
by the majority
which

in Business

Electronics

to the extent

that it is not "ancillarity"

leads to the more favorable

One can interpret

the dissent's

in two ways. The majority

is misinterpreted

rule of reason

"naked/ancillary"

understood

the "naked"

"alone"

approach.
dichotomy
and "ancil-

lary" distinction

as meaning

other covenants,"

and cited Bork for the proposition

"vertical

arrangements

supplying

and purchasing'''.39B

The majority
restraint

scrutiny.

if one looks closer

between

"naked"

of the restraint.

ness Electronics,

The dissent

the mode of analysis

by the characterization

and, accord-

rule of reason

at the dissent,

and "ancillary"
argues

of

that the

restraint,

under a distorted

of

that

to the -transaction

of assuming

was a nonprice

the restraint

However,

distinction
purpose

made the mistake

in question

ingly treated

are ancillary

or "in the context

refers

the

to the

that in Busi-

should be determined

of the restraint.

Therefore,

a price

81
restraint
another

would

not escape per se condemnation

nonprice

restraint

restraint

would penetrate

treatment

of the restraint

Therefore,
failed

terminate

asks a question

a price cutter

the majority

to prevent

boycott,

The dissent

Hartwell.

The dissent

but scrutinizes

by the means

prices.

of cartel,

outlawed.

Electronics

the conspiracy

looks at the facts
between

does not rely on a single

Sharp and
sided theory

Joint Action Argument

under American

to be established
centrates

by Judge Taft:

the fact of the case.

(l)The Dissent's
Because,

is exactly

of the Dissent

in Business

of the case in evaluating

ultimatum.

the restraint

achieved

etc., would be clearly

Arguments

or 2)Sharp

in order to charge higher

if it would

b) The Economic

i.e., to

free riding;

which was condemned

price competition

Business

imputed,

by Hartwell's

In the latter case, however,

A result which,

may have been based

could have terminated

for the reasons

the type of conduct

the majority

for the termination?

that the termination

l)Sharp

look at the

possible.

could simply have been coerced

avoiding

A closer

and make a proper

what was the reason

admits

on two reasons:
Electronics

any disguise

the dissent

to address:

The dissent

is attached.

only because

to condemn

on the joint action

antitrust
a conduct,

law joint action has
the dissent

issue. Therefore,

con-

the dissent

82
in Business
between

Electronics

unilateral

To establish

the incentive

system

interested

efficiency

to employ

system.399

based on the attempt

tual setting

of the case indicates

created

incentive

to assume
tarily

Business

to promote

Electronics

Electronics

not the efficiency
duced Sharp's
recognized
dissent

"on the precise

Electronics
system.

Clearly,

if

Sharp con-

Electronics.

in Business

nature.

question

elimination

Obviously

of Hartwell

argument

in-

is not

Electronics.

The

this point and concentrates

of the agreement,"400

its anticompetitive
of whether

volun-

he could have terminated

This important

specifically

character

Hartwell

and was is speculative

notion but the ultimatum

by the majority

addresses

its view with

Nevertheless,

with Business

termination.

that it

Sharp knew that Business

was a price cutter.

to do business

argues

of a manufacturer

Business

efficiency,

earlier.

than an overall

otherwise.

for the termination

a effi-

system, when the fac-

for the sake of its distribution

Sharp wanted

tinued

distribution

that Sharp terminated

came from

or from a dealer

to support

an efficient

to distin-

in establishing

The dissent

to introduce

out that,

a restraint

for his products,

of the majority

arguments

points

in his profit margin

distribution

is inconsistent

distinguish

it is important

who is interested

cient distribution

efficient

the dissent

point of view,

the manufacturer,

who is more

to properly

and joint action.
joint action

from an economic
guish whether

attempts

The dissent

raises

identifying
the crucial

of price competition

or

83

other

legitimate

existed.
jury's

business

The dissenting

finding

Hartwell

reasons

justices

and the evidence

from price competition

agreement

in question.

for the termination
concluded

that, "given the

in this record,"

protecting

was the sole function

The dissent
within

of the

agued that the agreement,

therefore,

"fits squarely

the category

restraints

of trade with no purpose

except

of 'naked

stifling

of com-

petition'."40:l.
Interestingly,
the restraint
action

the dissent

as "naked"

proof

behavior,

the notion

a price

fixing

high price policy

motivation"

The dissent

by the imposing

restr.aint

manufacturer

However,

con-

the same ef-

if Sharp had pursued

problems

pursued

its own

terminating

price cut-

in prooving

the "real

exist.

Upon further

majority

besides

for his

a "naked" price

in systematically

(2) The Dissent's

dissent

with the stan-

a dealer

arrangement.

difficult

the "joint

requires,

proof of a conspiracy.

fect could have been reached

ters. Therefore,

which

terminates

cannot be justified

stitutes

had its problems

that, most probably,

more qualifying

than addressing

doctrine,402

that a manufacturer

pricing

which

rather

issue". The dissent

dards of the Colgate

concentrated

Boycott

ananlysis,

in Business

is becomes

Electronics

in confusing

dards. The dissent

Argument

economic

correctly

apparent

that the

made the same mistake
effects

reasoned

and established

as the
stan-

that, if there had

84

been more than one competing
Electronic's

termination

been a conspiracy

dealer,

the effect

of Business

might be the same as if there had

between

these dealers

which would have

an illegal boycott:403

constituted

Indeed, since the economic consequences of
Hartwell's ultimatum to respondent [Sharp] are
identical to those that would result from a comparable ultimatum by two of three dealers in a
market - and since a two-party price fixing agreement is just as unlawful as a three-party price
fixing agreement - it is appropriate to employ the
term 'boycott' to characterize this agreement.
However,

this reasoning

standards.

confuses

Under American

a conspiracy

effects

antitrust

may be the same a two level

stitute

a boycott

if one merely

under American

concentrates

among dealers,

because

same as if the manufacturer
restraints.404

rationale

The 'boycott'

dissent

argument

of clearly

itself recognizes

argu-

such as allowing
is arguably

according

the

that "[a]ny attempt

to the same

the 'boycott'

Electronics

legal unilateral

daries of per se illegality

the reverse

of the Business

be as easily be the result of a clearly
the result

does not con-

had imposed vertical

used to support

of Business

the

law. Otherwise,

the effect

could be rebutted

the dissent

ment. The effect

antitrust

other rules,

requires

Although

'boycott'

on the effect,

ment can be made to abandon

Electronics

law, a boycott

on one level of distribution.

effects

conspiracy

and established

termination
illegal
conduct.

to define

by the number

argucould

boycott

as

The dissent
the boun-

of parties

to

85
different
quences

agreements

with the same anticompetitive

can only breed uncertainty

in the law and confusion

for the businessman''.405 Therefore,
confuses
would

confuse

established

conse-

an effect

standards.406

orientated

The rule of law

suffer.

(3) The Dissent's
Another

"Horizontal"

argument

Classification

of the dissent

indicates

the problems

which

necessary

to establish

formalistic

problems

are highlighted

restraint

in question

horizontal.

clusionary

The dissent

because

effect

requirements.

by the dissent's

relied on Cernuto

the Third Circuit

terminated

restraint.

logical merit

Although

in American

restraint

dissent's

rationale,

on the ex-

dichotomy

that,

level, the fact
constituted

a

is not without

for legal reason.
would

Aban-

abrogate

one

rules left in the area of vertical
antitrust

law. Since almost

has its horizontal

vague and discretionary

as

Inc. v. united

this argument

it must be rejected

of the last predictable

vertical

that the

level and concluded

its dealer

the horizontal/vertical

restraints

These

argument

focused

the effect was on the interdealer

horizontal

doning

arise when it is considered

on the dealer

that a manufacturer

Electronics

should have been classified

CO.407 where

Cabinet

in Business

concept

replace

implications,

would,

predictable

according

every
another

to the

standards.
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4. Comment
The dissent
considering
through

employs

a more sophisticated

the facts of the case instead

theory

as done by the majority.

gives

strong

and convincing

price

fixing

conspiracy

arguments

the dissent

does not proscribe

means of adequately

described

Unfortunately,

the dissent

the same mistake
effects

into a per se category.
conduct,

can support

Business
American

stuck with
derlines

committed

virtually

single

between

rather

ing opinion
concentrating
Business

sided economic
per se illegal

tues or whether

conduct

the conduct

on the effect

of

faced by
is

and artificial
and conduct

bor-

which

would be to concentrate
of a conduct.

Electronics

dissent

suggested

of conduct.

is

the sole purpose

a conduct

on

The dissent-

an approach

Furthermore,

asked the question

whether

of competition.4oa

on the

scrutiny.

on the quality

Electronics

focused

legal reasoning

theory

than on the effect

in Business

out

Electronics

the problem

law faces: current

goals of the antitrust:

pression

founded

law,

any view.

A way to solve the dilemma
quality

a

with the

of pointing

to squeeze

illustrates

subject to rule of reason

antitrust

dealing

The dissent

Arguments

the dissent

establishing

in Business

attempting

Electronics

antitrust

American

instead

as the majority.

of the conduct,

Although

facts

is bound by the limita-

law. At present,

this problem,

by

of replacing

toward

tions of antitrust

conduct.

approach

the

central

has redeeming

of the conduct

to
vir-

is the sup-

I
I
II

87

I

However,

under existing

the evidentiary
the Colgate

requirements

doctrine's409

ticompetitive

antitrust

_ much clearly

to establishing

generosity

strategies

law -- particularly
conspiracy

in allowing

and

clearly

an-

as long as they remain unilateral

anticompetitive

conduct may escape

-

condemna-

tion.

B. Business

Electronics

In analyzing
differences
antitrust

Business

between

Electronics

the conceptions

law become

been challenged

and the View of the GWB
the GWB, the

of the GWB and American

clear. Business

under

under

Electronics

several provisions

could have

of the GWB.

1. § 15 GWB
Sharp and Hartwell
tacit agreement
prices

to restrict

in violation

conclude

could have concluded
Hartwell's

scheme

than Business

provide

enough

facts to assume

German

courts would

Supreme
price

to Hartwell's

Electronics,

it is logical

the case does not

behavior.

Under

face the same difficulties

Court in attempting

to classify

to

to Sharp's

that an agreement

pricing

or

to determine

will adhere more closely

pricing

with regard

freedom

of § 15 GWB. Although

that Hartwell

an explicit

was reached
§

15 GWB,

as the

the conduct

as a

fixing conspiracy.
However,

the conduct
restricted

another

"safeguard"

provision

of Sharp and Hartwell,
by the "joint action

might vitiate

since the GWB is not

requirement"

and, therefore,

88
incorporates

a different

than American

understanding

antitrust

of the term "boycott"

law.

2. § 25(2) GWB
To avoid the abovementioned
employs

specific

is intended
which

to condemn.

with regard

Therefore,

the GWB

to behavior

other typical

the GWB

strategies,

are not in the scope of § 15 GWB but are nevertheless

suited
§

safeguards

difficulties,

to influence

pricing

decisions,

are addressed

25(2) GWB.4J..oSharp would have violated

had conditioned
pricing

the termination

behavior

However,

the facts did not indicate

Business

Electronic's

25(2) GWB leaves a loophole
price cutters
proceeding

"without

Electronic's

Business

Electronics.

that Sharp contacted

termination.

Therefore,

for firms which

comment".

However,

to establish

§

that terminate

although

is not probable,4J..J..
this conduct

lenged as soon as an effort

25(2) GWB if it

upon Business

or tried to threaten

before

§

in

this

can be chal-

a certain

price

level is revealed.

3. § 26(1) GWB
§

26(1) GWB addresses

Business

Electronics.

enterprise

situation

given in

Under § 26(1) GWB enterprises

with the intent of unfairly
cite another

the typical

harming

enterprise

to refuse

is presumably

unfair.

have to justify his threat

another

enterprise,

to sell. Inciting
Therefore,

to terminate

may not,

Hartwell

his contract

in-

other
would
with

89
Sharp. Because

the GWB does not accept Business

price

cutting

other

justifications

high value

as a defense,

Hartwell

would have to show

for his ultimatum.

of price competition

tion will be only accepted

Electronic's

According

to the

under the GWB, a justifica412

in extreme

situations.

Hartwell

would have to show that he was in a kind of "self

defense"

situation.413

restraint",

however,

Accordingly,
reached

The attempt
would

The Advantage

tificial

26 I GWB.

Electronics

anticompetitive

conduct

The GWB is not restricted

Arguably,

than the American

anticompetitive
of challenging

distinctions.

triggers

to es-

by the notions

conduct

approach

without

this conduct

harmful

since the GWB

limiting

through

conduct

the application

between

the GWB approach

As soon an the attempt

impose price restrictions,

the GWB

or by the "horizontal/vertical

and "joint action".

the lawmaker)

jury did

of Business

Also, the GWB does not distinguish

is more pragmatic

sibilities

under

like Business

in allowing

and "ancillary"

"unilateral"

addresses

that the termination

in cases

cape condemnation.

dichotomy."

court's

of the GWB Approach

Particularly

of "naked"

condemnation.

as the district

would have been outlawed

is less lenient

a "naked

under the GWB -- if a judge would have

-- there is no question

c.

never escape

the same conclusion

Electronics

to achieve

the pos-

imposing

ar-

is made to

(as identified

by

of the GWB. Moreover,

90

so-called

ersatz

strategies

are recognized

and condemned

by

the GWB.
As the success
shows,

the GWB has arguably

faily well
place.

of the GWB in this area of the law

suited

sharply

antitrust

law.

D. Conclusion

contrasts

Chapter

Three

should be preferred

for several

reasons:

last freedoms
franchisee.

tracting

parties.

constitute
petition.

a further
If freedom

commercial

freedom

and service

towards

of American

resale price main-

to current

American

to set prices

in franchise
limiting

Allowing

with market

and Four

left to the buyer of a product

are extremely

principles
is one of the

or a

agreements

vertical

to the freedom

of the con-

resale price maintenance

step toward

abolishing

to set prices

is diminished,

are inferior

would

intrabrand

com-

almost

is left to the sole proprietor.

competition

is

of the market

the insufficiencies

The freedom

Especially

restraints

which

of the GWB in dealing

The GWB's rigid approach
tenance

an approach

to coping with the realities

The effectiveness

realities

chosen

no

Quality

to price competi-

tion.4~4
Moreover,

the freedom

for business

by using one of his most convincing

a competitive
competitive

of the single businessman

price, would be endangered.

means of lone operators

to strive
arguments,

This denial

would eschew

of

competitive

91
tension

and viable markets.

ficiency
create

argument

an ambiguous

used by rule of reason

uncertainty.

the probability

Furthermore,

This uncertainty

of deterring

scrutiny

ef-

would

is not outweighed

procompetitive

by

resale price

maintenance.
As shown in Monsanto415
Colgate

doctrine417

is mainly

in the area of vertical
abolishing

the Colgate

use pressure

to coerce

tain pricing

scheme,

power.

firms indicates

responsible

restraints.
doctrine.

cerns that urge a reversal

ses market

and Business

Second,

market

maintaining

a viable market

position.

con-

enterprises

to adhere

to a cer-

of market

pos-

dominating

imperfections.

from their negative

of competition;"

dominating

First,

the existence

enterprises

market

support

that these enterprises

To cope with these imperfections

"freedom

factors

There are two primary

other enterprises

the

for the confusion

Several

of Colgate.

indicating

Electronics416

and to protect

effects,

structure

smaller

the GWB favors

as a means

the grim alternative

of ensuring

is to allow

firms to take of their superior

bargaining

V. Vertical

Both German
vertical

affecting

restraints

and therefore

horizontal

zontal

and American

nonprice

purposes4~a

restraints.
vertical

because

competing

manufacturer
suspect

to suppress

interest

Similarly

(interbrand

restraints,

a distribution

conduct

allowed.

limit the competition

competition)

Hori-

to com-

on either

between
the

restraints

are

have no other purpose

however,
chain

primarily

than

(intrabrand

limit competicompetition)

interbrand

competition.4~9

that vertical

restraints

often reflect

in designing
marketing

that the manufacturer,

to sell his products

marketing

market

than

effect

system and to effectively

ensuring

business

to be more harmful

level. Horizontal

of a manufacturer

recognized

strategic

is generally

they presumably

and only indirectly
acknowledged

legitimate

that

competition.

Vertical
tion within

law recognize

treat them more favorably

are considered

or dealer

because

may pursue

they directly

firms

Restraints

antitrust

relationships

restraints

petition

Nonprice

scheme,

the

his distribution

his products.42o

who is generally

at all, has a legitimate

that his products

It is
free not

interest

are sold in accordance

in

with his

that the good will of his products
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It is

is
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protected,

that his products'

the purchaser

of his products

sale services,
restraints

reputation

etc.42~

get sufficient

Another

is the principle

argument

and to agree on contractual

value.

However,

values,

Another

argument

terms is a democratic

reaches

notion with regard

its limits when other,

to consumers

pose their products

in an-

but rather
economic

theory

tant restraints
to illustrate

A. Vertical

the underlying

exclusive
drastic

policy

antitrust

changes

and the role of
an-

cases will be analyzed
law takes.

under American

Antitrust

law in the area of nonprice

such as territorial
dealing,

restraint,

only the most impor-

the respective

Restraints

ex-

to give an in-

vertical

in this chapter,

the approach

tical restraints,

is not

and the American

and some instructive

The American

perienced

of this thesis

of both the German

Nonprice

competition

competition.423

of all the different

law. Therefore

law is the

as long as the manufacturers

to interbrand

to analyse

restraints,

antitrust

of intrabrand

It is not the purpose
depth evaluation

to vertical

under the American

that restriction

that harmful

tions,

to enter con-

such as the goals incorporated

is emphasized

titrust

pre- and after

law are endangered.422

titrust

which

this freedom

that

in favor of vertical

that the freedom

tracts

prevailing

is enhanced,

and consumer

and tying arrangements
in its treatment

Law

ver-

restric-

had ex-

by the courts.424

I
,
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since the 1977 landmark
revolutionized

the antitrust

restraints426
Another

case, Sylvania,425

are subject
important
towards

doctrine.427

The Colgate

unilateral

vertical

conduct

scrutiny.

is heavily

relationships

doctrine

influencing

is the Colgate

generally

by a seller42B

restrictions

most vertical

to rule of reason

factor which

the approach

posed

landscape

which

allows

and preempts

from condemnation

self-im-

other

under the antitrust

law.
Under American
apply to vertical
business

conduct

antitrust

nonprice
which

restrictions

by Sec. 1 of the Sherman

vertical

Act429

Sec. 1 of the Sherman

prohibits

"every contract,

trade.",43~

providing

exclusive

and other strategic
competition.

restraints

Act's broad

are covered

language

... or conspiracy

dealing

may

and Sec. 3 of the Clayton

Sec. 3 of the Clayton

specifically

provisions

is aimed at hindering

Most of the "typical"

Act.430

law, several

generally

in restraint

Act addresses

more

and tying arrangements

by

that432

[i]t shall be unlawful
to lease or make a sale
... on the condition
that the lessee or pur-'
chaser thereof shall not use or deal in goods ...
of a competitor ... of the seller, where the effect of such lease, sale ... may be to substantially lessen competition or tend to create a
monopoly in any line of commerce.
Though Sec. 3 of the Clayton
which involve
described

commodities,

Act covers

only restraints

other restraints

in Sec. 3 of the Clayton

of the kind

Act but involving

of
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services
Sherman

or licenses

are governed

Act. However,

language

despite

the treatment

by Sec. 1 and 2 of the

of the different

of vertical

statutory

restraints

is basically

the same under both provisions.433

1. Exclusive

Dealing

The leading

Arrangements

case for exclusive

Oil of California,

Inc. v. United

States435

is violated

"whenever

substantial

share of the market".436

of the market"

Standard

rule",

tual foreclosure
"quantitative

analysis

contract

market

The "substantial
a "quantitative

on competition

share. Efficiency

Sta-

rule" outlawed

arrangements,

of Standard

the Supreme

Stations438

the foreclosure

analysis"

dealing

arrangements

approach. 440

in a
share
sub-

effects

Because

the

many reasonable
Court mitigated

and applied

a less rigid

Coal CO.439

a "qualitative

to

substan-

the courts were able to treat exclusive
more favorably

by

and ac-

impact of a 20 year requirement

for coal. In employing

tiality

Act

was measured

impact were not considered.437

in Tampa Elec. Co. v. Nashville

determine

(Standard

has been foreclosed

through

the impact

substantiality

dealing

the impact

competition

was determined

Station's

exclusive

is Standard

the Court held that Sec. 3 of the Clayton

tions) where

stantiality

dealing434

under a rule of reason
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2. Analysis
Under

of Vertical

Restraints

the rule or reason

analysing

vertical

dichotomy

and asked whether

has a "permanent
whether

effect"

the "redeeming

the negative
rationale
terias

restraints

competition.

are willing

suming

that a "rational

create

efficiency.

manent

effect" .on interbrand

rely on the premises
to impute

businessman"

or otherwise

catelization

question

Because
to "adopt

imperfect

arises

School
by as-

a restraint

to

of a "per-

is not taken

"[c]artels
replaces

are neither
thorough

are operating
effects
markets

imper-

may occur in
long before

is not addressed

on the assumptions

ignored

virtue"

employs

competition

anticompetitive

concentrated

of the Chicago

of both cri-

On the other hand the threat

the flat statement

the

Electronics,443

the "redeeming

Also the fact that markets

are relying

Although

of the Chicago

easy to form nor easy to maintain"444

which

outweigh

consideration

As shown in Business

and therefore

and

tends to be increasingly

theory

fectly

competition

of the restraint

required

which

scr~tiny.

on

it is likely that a restraint

courts

because

focused

on the inter-jintrabrand

virtues"

of Sylvania441

the Rule of Reason

the courts

on interbrand

the second criteria

seriously

approach

impact on intrabrand

by the courts.442

under

the

by the courts

of the economic

model

School.445

the rule of reason

any standard

approach

of reasonableness

quote any prior opinions

enables

the courts

they see fit and

for any purpose", 446 several

tempts have been made to give the courts

"guidelines"

atfor

97
their rule of reason analysis
cretion.447

However,

when the suggested

the view of the Chicago
economic

theory

effects

on price

sticks44B

and to reduce the courts dis-

School,

and assert

"guidelines"

they rely on neoclassical

that efficiency

and output

arguments

are appropriate

than considering

market

The dispute

about the proper

application

is not decided

discussion

scholars

the American

tain a rule or reason
vertical

restraint

economic

effect

The arguments

views are rooted

in the

law the GWB does not con-

and, although,

the evaluation

a comprehensive

of the restraint

and more

analysis

in question,

(best described

analysis")450

its American

antitrust

requires

is much more directed
directed

to further

of the goals of antitrust.449

perception

Unlike

of the rule of

and courts.

which are raised by the contrasting
different

effects.

yet and will be subject

among American

and

measuring

rather

reason

reflect

of a
of the

the analysis

as: "normatively

limited

in its scope than

counterpart.45~

3. Tying Arrangements
Tying

arrangements452

under American

antitrust

reason approach,453
type standard454

experienced
law. After

the Supreme

and in Northern

States455

expressly

condemned

tie-ins

established

because

a special

the initial

Court moved
Pacific

treatment
rule of

towards

a per se

Ry. Co. v. United

a per se standard.

of their leverage

The Court

effect which

98
foreclosed

competitors

competition

in the market

However,
vantages

from the market

per se rule barred

agreements

did not comply with business
the per se rule was mitigated
pretation

of the separate

analyzing

the agreement

packaged

court has to investigate

developed
analyzed

ment may be defended

standards

and the agreement

tying.45B
with

is given.459

defense"

is accepted

a) Move Towards

"good will"

is raised,

where

jus-

have been
is actually
of the

a tying arrangedefenses

good will and

Also, a "new or infant business
by the courts.460

impact of economic

of per se rules against

recent decision

the

and business

and "quality"

way to protect

as one

a Rule of Reason

The increasing
plication

Furthermore

the

of products

may be considered
defense"

of

standard

a multitude

in circumstances

if if no other reasonable

Hyde461

Instead

by rule of reason to avoid the application

per se rule against

quality

the inter-

requirement.

whether

of the tie. Various
by the courts

the impact of

under a rule of reason

If the "single product

tifications

the harsh per se rule

by manipulating

agreement

ad-

Particularly

needs. Therefore,

product

the question

in a franchise

product.457

economic

the sales of products.456

in the area of franchise

court addressed

free

of the tied product.

the rigorous

of packaging

and restrained

Jefferson

a hospital

Parish
packaged

analysis

on the ap-

tying is reflected

in the

Hosp. Dist. No. 2 v.
acute-care

treatment

and

99

anesthesiology

services.

The hospital

alleged

cies and improved

services

ment.

given for this treatment

The reasons

illustrate

attracting

enough market

power

rule. The remaining
and reasoned
Thus,

but then denied

to trigger

the application

judges favored

is subject

that

patients

-

- had

of the per se

a rule or reason

approach

was involved.

that the treatment

to vague and difficult

The per se rule against

tying is mitigated

emptions

and artificial

interpretation

analysis

resembles

of tying
standards.

by that many ex-

so that a tying

more an rule of reason

approach

than ap-

of a per se standard.

b) Comparison

with the GWB's Treatment

Interestingly,

the GWB's approach

siders most of the arguments
law. First,

as general

tie involves

products

the custom
products

The majority

that the hospital

30% of the district's

it is to conclude

plication

of the "tie-in"

the standards.

that only one product

arrangements

the arrange-

the per se rule and concluded

there were two products
although

and the court upheld

the need to clarify

of the judges upheld

cost efficien-

which

of trade".462

is considered
a business

tying con-

raised under American

are related

Second,

prima

products

"by their nature

or

of non related

Third,

limiting

of a "powerful"

facie abusive

justification

antitrust

tying as long as the

even tie-ins

prohibited.463

this rule, a tie of non-related

has to provide

towards

rule, GWB allows

are not generally

enterprise

of Tie-Ins

and the firm

for the tie. The
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necessity
might

for the tie has to be more convincing

adversely

"powerful"
markets

the market.

enterprises

generally

the requirements

Therefore,
nation

affects

Hence the conduct

has a strong

to justify

a tie of a powerful

Nonprice

Like exclusive
restraints

as mentioned

before

ranging

inquiry

allows,

especially

provided,
American

as newcomer
marketing

defense,

of almost

failing

not consider

restraint

defense,

important

of intrabrand
of antitrust

plaintiff

has to bear is very heavy.

economic

assumptions

Under
such

defense,

and

are also

antitrust

is the fact that the evidentiary

an unreasonable

is

in the evaluation

important

prove

and

orderly

these defenses

is that American

as the main purpose

a broad

are recognized,

new distributors

However,

the protection

requires

However,

every restraint.

company

attracting

scrutiny.

for this inquiry

law abound defenses

under the GWB. More

of vertical

other vertical

of the market

when no "guideline"

the free rider defense.

regarded

arrangements

the rule of reason

defense,

recognized

good will.464

into all circumstances

antitrust

condem-

and less restrictive

to rule of reason

justification

are heavy.

Restraints

dealing

are subject

on

firm will only escape

the businessmen's

4. Other Vertical

of

impact

a restraint

if there is no other reasonable

way to protect

if the tie

law does

competition

is not

law.465 But, most
burden

which

If a plaintiff

the

wants

effect he might have to overcome
of the court. As shown in Business

the

to
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Electronics4GG

the court might be preoccupied

tion that a conduct
Another

economic

restraints

is reasonable

question

is the consideration

court does not realize
court will conclude
market

raised

than questionable.

in evaluating

If the

of entry barriers

that the "qualitative
new market

to enter the market

vertical

of entry barriers.

the problem

does not exist hence

available

rather

with the no-

impact"

entrants

and punish

the

on the

are readily

anticompetitive

conduct.4G7

B. Vertical

Nonprice

Restraints

With the exception
"vertical"4GB
GWB.4G9

of resale price maintenance

restraints

are basically

Only if "powerful"

less lenient.

The lawmaker

that the question
ticompetitive
legislative

whether

effects

under the GWB

permitted

firms are involved
recognized

cannot be answered

authority.470

However,

which has to be interpreted

The GWB defines

certain

points

which

types of conduct

and indicates

should be analyzed.

legal presumptions
plies

to certain

which

resemble

a modified

have pro- or anby the

rule

(such as the

by the courts.

which might unduly

more or less specific

Moreover,

to ease the burden
kind of conduct

the GWB

to avoid too much discre-

rule of reason)

competition

the

is the GWB

in advance

tion the GWB does not have a broad general

restrict

under

in drafting

other restraints

other

the GWB employs

of proof471

of powerful

and ap-

firms standards

per se rule under the American

102
antitrust
rebutted

laws, i.e. presumptive
with an accepted

shown later,
describe

defense.472

the prerequisites
without

and without

which has to be

However,

the GWB has its problems

ly as possible
bility

illegality

as will be

with the attempt

of its applicability

loosing

leaving

to

as accurate-

too much of its practica-

too much anticompetitive

conduct

unchallenged.
To solve this problem

the lawmaker

establish

two "levels"

power"473

of the firm which

All vertical
the Federal

restraints

requirements,

is no reason

presumptively
provisions

and heavy

However,
evidentiary

under § 18 GWB is a weak
coverage

of the market

statutory

setting

of § 18 GWB,

for major

concern

because

which may be subject

18 GWB can be challenged

because

by

agreements.474

the same conduct

partly

to abuse control

18 GWB. The size of the

§

language

the increasing

The unsatisfying

These provisions

to the "market

is not considered.

the abuse control

with restrictive

§

under

statutory

to challenge

however,

are subject

the restraint

due to complicated

according

is using the restraint.

Cartel Authority

firms employing

weapon

of control

of the GWB chose to

under

§§

to abuse control

illegal.

apply only to "qualifying

restraints,

that certain

The only shortcoming

in comparison

under

22, 26 and 37a GWB.

are more rigid with vertical
of their assumption

basically

conduct

is

of these

to § 18 GWB is the fact that they
enterprises",

i.e. enterprises

103
which

are market

dependency

dominating

and 1980 where

"powerful"
strategic

since in the GWB's amendments

tool to outlaw business

firms. The GWB is particularly
market

conduct

the GWB's perception,
position

Therefore,

the

and 26 GWB476
wellknown

a

of "powerful"

in the market

Federal
rather

conduct
concerned

of
with
to

of their

focuses

on §§ 22

than on § 18 GWB. For example
was challenged

the most

as a violation

22(4) GWB and one of the most controversial

Both cases were dealing

26 GWB

able to impair competition.

Cartel Authority

was challenged

§

firms. According

these firms are because

tying case477

ing cases478

of 1973

the scope of § 26 GWB was broadened,

a efficient

superior

are able to create

relationship.475

In particular,

became

or which

as violation

exclusive

of §
deal-

of § 26(2) GWB.

with subject matter

"typical"

for §

18 GWB.
However,

although

focus of enforcement

§

18 GWB itself was never in the

activities,

tion of § 18 GWB is of interest
under

§

a another

are recognized
sidered

because

look at the inten-

the values

protected

18 GWB are the same values which have to be taken

into consideration
under

a closer

when a vertical

provision

restraint

of the GWB. Moreover

as leading principles

if other ambiguous

have to be filled out.479

is challenged
these values

which have to be con-

terms in other areas of the law
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1. § 18 GWB
18 GWB is covers

§

freedom

to choose

restraint

all restrictions

if it unduly

tion. § 18 GWB covers both direct
factual
ween

restraints

intrabrand

The development
with

regard

approach

towards

18 GWB was designed

petition

had to prove

restricted.

only one relevant
§

18 GWB.482

burden

significant

The Federal

Cartel

"individuals
is unduly

as a group"

restricted

However,
to adaequately

§

of competition

the values

as
were

of

to this evidentiary

a restraint

Since 1965 it

when either

or the "competition

the

as institution"

by the restraint.

18 GWB was still deemed

protect

of the "individual

Authority

under the 1957 version

with regard

to challenge

of

and the "com-

of § 18 GWB led to the 1965 amendment.

has been possible

freedom

of proof was hard to meet and

case was decided

The criticism

changes

of the "individuals

and the freedom

This burden

bet-

In the GWB of 1957, §

the competitive

that both the freedom

part of the competition"
unduly

distinguish

as part of the competition"

as institution".481

legal and

under the GWB and the

restraints.

to protect

competi-

competition.

protected

vertical

the "individuals

and indirect,

of § 18 GWB unveils

to the values

the

The use of a

restricts

and does not explicitly

and interbrand

effect

partner.480

one's contracting

may be prohibited

which

the market

and in 1973 the protection

in its individual

protected

to be insufficient

freedom"

was added to

under § 18 GWB. The following

reason

105
was given to support
individual's

the explicit

inclusion

of the
483

freedom within

the scope of § 18 GWB:

The restricted partners have at least to be
protected by § 18 GWB when their freedom to compete
is restricted and when at the same time numerous
enterprises are similarly bound. In this case the
competition on the market is endangered.
The lawmaker
petition

of the GWB recognized

and competitors

that protection

that the freedom

cannot be viewed

of both contributes

of com-

separately

and

to the maintenance

of

competition.

a) Scope of § 18 GWB
To evaluate

whether

GWB, a two step inquiry
must

a restraint
is applied.

is abusive
First,

fall into the scope of restraints

Four types of restraints
1) Restrictions

on the freedom

other goods or commercial
2) Restrictions
mercial

§

18

the restraint

covered

by § 18 GWB.

in § 18 GWB:

to use the supplied

goods,

services.

as to the purchase

services

3) Restrictions

are enumerated

under

of

other goods or com-

from, or their sale to third parties.
as to the sale of the supplied

goods to

third parties.
4) Tying

arrangements.

The courts
Therefore,
not qualify
restraints

interpreted

hardly

this first test very broadly.

any restraint

for further

imposed

scrutiny.

such as territorial

in a contract

will

Not only "typical"

and customer

restraints,
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tying and all kinds of exclusive
also other restraints,
profit

passover

dealing

such as location

arrangements485

arrangements,
clauses484

are within

but

and

the scope of § 18

GWB.
Though
as monetary

§ 18 GWB embraces
advantages

restriction,

rebate
other

or disadvantages.

for example,

on the quantity

purchased

constitutes

also economic

restraints,

A qualifying

might be caused by a rebate based
throughout

an economic

a year. The prospective

incentive

not to buy from

suppliers.
However,

the fact that a restraint

scope of § 18 GWB does not say anything
implication.
restraints

falls within

covered

by § 18 GWB is intended

over restraints

is within

the scope of § 18 GWB, the Federal

Authority

is authorized

the second

focuses

the restraint

If a restraint
Cartel

the restraint

step of § 18 GWB analysis.

on the impact

the types of

only to provide

as possible.

to scrutinize

the

about its antitrust

The broad scope used in defining

as much control

under

such

further

The second

has on competition

step
and

competitors.
Under
abusive

this second

if either

GWB is endangered.
cate that§
effects
cemented

step a restraint

one of three values protected
The thresholds

18 GWB is primarily

and the danger
through

may be considered

enacted

concerned

that a market

the widespread

under § 18

by § 18 GWB indiwith foreclosure

structure

might

use of restraints.

get
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b) § 18(1)(a)
A restraint
restraint

a "significant

to competition

as a collective.

which

The restraint

firm. Hence

it is sufficient

ly used.4B7

§

alternatives

competition

is wide-

to the competing

of

is not unfairly

market

participants.

the restraint

use is the factor

offers

is not of sigtriggering

the

of § 18 GWB.4BB

firms which

that § 18 GWB does not threaten

are innocently

Authority

fore, as a side effect,
to the Federal

firms which

using a restraint.

would prohibit

the firm and no individual

plicated

number

in the latter case the market

It is noteworthy

authority

ap-

by a single

restraint

to a significant

The widespread

application

Cartel

protection

on

are bound by similar

if a certain

The size of the firm employing
nificance.

the enterprises

GWB recognizes' that a certain

Otherwise,
because

and unfair-

of competition".4B6

must not be imposed

must be applied

restricted
enough

18(1)(a)

in relation

bound

The collective

restraints.

enterprises.

of enterprises

is aimed at protecting

to all enterprises

restraint

void if due to the

are similarly

in their freedom

This requirement
the market

number

in the market

ly restricted

plies

may be declared

the restraint

lawsuits

the limitation

at no cost for

of the enforcement

Cartel Authority

requirements

The Federal

could be filed. There-

are often not able to evaluate

threshold

small

protects

smaller

whether 'the com-

of § 18 GWB are met.
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c) § 18(1)(b)

GWB

The second
§

alternative

which might

18 GWB has the objective

"by such agreements
ted".4B9

of protecting

market

entry

Primary

concern

restraint

cements

existing

may have considerable

d) § 18(1)(c)

market

protecting

markets

restriction

foreclosure

structures

if

restric-

is that the widespread

to

of market

use of a

and therefore

effects.

GWB

The third alternative

extent

concentrated

that there might be an unfair

entry.490

third parties

... is unfairly

The GWB does not require

conclude

lead to action under

the freedom

of § 18 GWB is directly

of the markets

of such restrictions

and applies

competition

these or other goods or commercial

aimed at
if "by the

in the market

services

for

is substantially

impaired".491
In most of the cases in which

§

18(1)(c)

GWB may apply,

at least one or both of the former test are also met. There
is no clear demarcation
The Federal

line between

Cartel Authority

may base its order on either

one, two or on all three effects.
freedom

of competition

freedom

of the market

market

entry

needs,

GWB].

According

to § 18 GWB the

as a prerequisite,

participants

[§ 18(1)(b)

the three alternatives.

[§ 18(1)(a)]

both the
and free
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2. Criticism

of § 18 GWB

As mentioned
challenge

before,

vertical

tions492

§

18 GWB is rarely used to

restraints.

Since 1958 only a few injunc-

have been issued under § 18 GWB. Although

reluctance

of the cartel

authority

reaches

"the result which

even agrees with the contemporary

perception

theory"[in

as a scholar

the United

the underlying

policies

a) Heavy Burden
§

is minimal.

Hence,

are quite different.

are met. The quantitative

all restraints

to abuse control.495

be subject

rules intends merely

Authority

to scrutinize

not say abything
restraint.

which

"flexibility

advantage"

established

defining

to consider

restricting

implication

that every restraint

Cartel

of the

does § 18 GWB provide

that no quantitative

competition

of de

the Federal

"substantial".

a restraint

may

under § 18 GWB and does

On the other hand, neither
standards

are perceivable

to authorize

a restraint

and

requirement

But again the absence

about the antitrust

quantitative

vantage

alleges,494

18 GWB will only apply when both a quantitative
threshold

fairly

and reasons

of competition

of Proof

qualitative

minimis

States],493

this

The
threshold

to be "prima

brings

was

facie" un-

with it the disad-

has to be completely

analyzed. 496
A comprehensive
market

structure

the restraint

analysis

requires

and evaluation

in a specific

consideration

of the (future)

product

market.

of

impact

Accordingly,

of
the
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Federal

Cartel Authority

the accused

bears a heavy burden

firms have a wide range of possibilities

challenge

the accuracy

of the Federal

analysis.

Furthermore,

the analysis

that not only the conflicting
tracting

parties

the buyer

and seller

to define

when a widespread
hinder

Because
restraint

of groups

Because

of buyers

has an unduly

under

18 GWB whenever

judgment

method

Authority

another

of proving

tends to

that a

competition-restricting
avoided

challenging

it was possible
provision

effect,

to be abusive without

is guiding

fore, exclusive
are primarily

restraints

to attack

legislative
ticular,
exclude

the analysis

because

intent of maintaining

the design
certain

of selective

further

restraint

analysis.

The

under § 18 GWB. There-

distribution

aimed at establishing
abusive

the

of resale price main-

dealing/selective

will be considered

the

of the GWB.

of § 15 GWB (prohibition

tenance)49B

on both

it is difficult

In only one case will the use of a vertical
be considered

but
and

the interests

distribution

of these difficulties

under

two con-

competition.497

Cartel

restraint

of merely

levels are conflicting

Federal
§

Office

under § 18 GWB requires

interest

interests

have to be balanced.

unfairly

Cartel's

and

to

have to be taken into consideration

that the conflicting
sellers

of proof,

a certain
it would

systems which
price

level

contradict

price competition.
distribution

types of "discounters"

systems

simply because

the

In parwhich
of
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their pricing
tions)

behavior

(in the absence

would constitute

b) Difficult

Balancing

Another
tendency
freedom

to enforcement

of the courts
to employ

on the anticompetitive
stitution.50o

accepted

This approach

markets

as institution"

as in-

justification

good will protec-

concerns.
It is argued

and "competitive

are not contrary.

It is pointed

can only be protected

freedom
out that
if the

of all market

par-

is protected.502

It is pointed

out that for example

tant case of exclusive
rangements

dealing

as institution"

Accordingly

goal of keeping

Hence,

their competitive

the threat

to

of the

has to concentrate

on the

open. But this goal can only be

if the third parties

tive freedom.

effects),

impor-

and tying ar-

is the foreclosure

abuse control

the markets

in the most

arrangements

(which have the similar

"competition

achieved

every

for criticism.

as institution"

than to focus

and gave these justifica-

are kept open and the freedom

ticipants

market.

almost

structure

is reason

of the individual"
"competition

rather

such as adequateness,

than market

that "competition

the individual

on the competition

tion, or fair risk distribution501
tion more weight

of § 18 GWB was the

restraint

effects

The courts

for the restraint,

Interests

to overemphasize

a vertical

justifica-

of § 18 GWB.499

a violation

of Conflicting

obstacle

of other

are able to use their competi-

the third parties

are not able to use

freedom when they are foreclosed

from
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competition.
freedom

The remedy

in this case is to ensure

of the individuals

market

without

being unduly

3. Consequences
Because
effective
employed

by enabling
hindered

them to enter the

by foreclosed

for § 18 GWB as Enforcement

of these problems

basis

for challenging

by smaller

restraints

markets.

Tool

18 GWB failed

§

the

to provide

which were

firms and which did not qualify

22, 26 GWB. It follows

that not the use of economic

but the unsatisfactory

statutory

the increase
widespread
This

of exclusive

power

dealing

in the car, gasoline
"failure"

because

restraints.503
which

impose

ments which
product

For example,

are designed
market

as long as no market
"powerful"
tools"

The "better
at challenging
The enforcement

to exploit

not crucial.

their market

would

potential

these

arrangements

or tying arrange-

would

of one

not be accepted

exist. But as soon as a
the GWB provides

"better

conduct.

are §§ 22 and 26 GWB which

anticompetitive

market

oppose

the position

imperfections

are involved,

tools"

are now

by "powerful"

dealing

on the buyer

imperfections

enterprise

to challenge

the buyers

exclusive

an undue burden

indicate

which

to transfer

are imposed

otherwise

theory

and beer distribution.

the attempt

and impair competition

enterprises

arrangements

which have anticompetitive

they may constitute

for §§

of § 18 GWB led to

of § 18 GWB is fortunately

Most of the restraints
because

setting

an

conduct

are aimed

of "powerful"

of the latter provisions

firms.

is easier because
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they provide

some presumptions

and 26 GWB require
must be weighed
interests

which must be rebutted.

that only the interests

against

each other rather

of a whole market.

guideline.

Because

developed

reliable
assume

case law which

guidelines

facie violation

conduct

of either

enforcement

activities,

additionally

of powerful

provides

the

more

For example

courts

firms is a prima

22(4) GWB or § 26(2) GWB (or

§

with § 18 GWB shows particularly,

of the burden

contributes

a better

for the enforcement.

As the comparison

the allocation
which

of increased

that certain

both).

of two parties
than considering

But not only the law itself provides

courts

§§ 22

of proof

is the deciding

to the effectiveness

factor

of §§ 22(4) and 26(2)

GWB.

4. Other

Safeguards

As indicated

for Competition

before

lead to per se legality
the GWB restricts
"powerful"504
freedom
market

of all vertical

the competitive

of competition.

challenged

employed

more easily

Although

restraints

freedom

though

of certain

restraints

and strategic
may be

than under § 18 GWB. These
freedom

A divestiture

the American

the GWB

of § 18 GWB does not

by these enterprises

these enterprises

dominating".

under

for the sake of the overall

Vertical

tions of the competitive
the price

the "failure"

enterprises

conduct

Available

limita-

of these enterprises

have to pay for becoming
is not possible

antitrust

are
"market

under the GWB.

law goes so far as to
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provide
means

measures505

divestiture

to cope with unilateral

market

dominating

the GWB addresses

concern

In contrast

strategic

conduct

of

doctrine506

market

conduct,

to sell and exploitation. 50? The underlying

of the GWB is that powerful

on market

may result

market

to the Colgate

also unilateral

process50B

tort the competitive
effects

strategic

special

firms as long as these firms do not at-

tempt to monopolize.

such as refusal

it does not provide

structure

firms are able to dis-

which may result

in adverse

and - at least in the long run toO.509

in poor performance,

5. §§ 20, 21 GWB
§§

20, 21 GWB provide

agreements.

Licensing

with patents,

certain

special

agreements,
designs,

know how, may only contain

i.e. agreements

territory,

according

to the legal presumption

and period

restraints,
covenants
of markets

20(2) GWB exempts

outside

Germany

But the

to type, extent,
right are

of § 20(1) GWB not exright and therefore
also technically

resale price maintenance,
not to challenge

right uses this

of a protected

the scope a the protected
§

are not exceed-

position.5~o

with regard

quantity,

Furthermore,

and

right. The intent of § 20 GWB

to abuse his exclusive

most often used restrictions

ceeding

which

that the owner of a protected

right as device

dealing

plant and seed varieties,

restraints

ing the scope of the protected
is to prevent

rules for licensing

legal.

necessary

grant back clauses,

the protected

right,

from application

and division

of § 20 GWB.
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However,

in the latter case the stricter

regulation

of Art.

85(1) of the EEC Treaty may apply.511
The detailed
ingement

test

doctrine).

regulation

(similar to the American

The economic

in the area of certain
legislature,
theory.

beyond

decision

an infr-

"scope of patent"

to allow fargoing

licensing

the courts

The decision

philosophy.

of § 20 GWB applies

agreements

freedom

was made by the

do not have to refer to economic

of the lawmaker

A discussion

is based on patent

of this philosophy,

however,

is

the scope of this studie.512

6. Strategic
with
different
School.

Conduct

regard

of "Powerful"

to strategic

perception

market

of economic

The Chicago

School

Firms
conduct,

theory

asserts

the GWB has a

than the Chicago

that unilateral

does not lead to anticompetitive

effects

cannot

supra-competitive

impair markets

According

to the Chicago

of entry barriers

enterprises

profits.

Furthermore,

that a "rational"

achieve

competition

GWB, however,

of attracting

from collecting
the Chicago

businessmenn
because

efficiencies

enterprises
profits.

School which plays down the effect

the threat

prevents

impair

and obtain

because

conduct

rather

supra-competitive

School does not believe

would willingly

the businessmen
than to distort

does not believe

new enterprises

attempt

attempts

to

to

competition.

that competition

is self

maintaining

and, therefore,

recognizes

the notion

that

businessmen

are primilarily

interested

in raising

their

The
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profits

and thus tend to avoid the competitive

employing

strategic

tries to prevent
their superior

market

conduct.

that "powerful"

bargaining

tion to take advantage
and foster market

In particular

and preeminent

of market

their

market

imperfections,

and to collect

by

the GWB

firms from using

power

distortions,

pressure

posi-

to cement
supra-competi-

tive profits.
The GWB is concerned
their efficiency
rather

firms will use

gain to drive other firms out of the market

than to attempt

GWB imputes

that "efficient"

to achieve

better

that firms are willing

performance

so the

to trade efficiency

for

position.5~3
Because
proach

of these differences

towards

strategic

conduct

est and could reveal points

a comparison

of the ap-

might be of special

for further

inter-

discussion.

a) § 22 GWB
The GWB is particularly
restraints
Cartel

suspicious

caused by circumstance.

Authority

"may prohibit

with regard

Therefore

abusive

to

the Federal

practices

dominating

enterprises".5~4

domination

is given in § 22 (1) and (2) GWB and a rebuttable

presumption

is provided

most difficult

point

the determination

Market

for market

in § 22 (3) GWB. The pivotal

in the application

which

dominating

and

of § 22(4) GWB is

of abuse. The GWB does not define

but it lists some practices
abusive.5~5

A legal assumption

of market

are considered

enterprises

abuse,

to be

may not impair the
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competitive
allowed

possibilities

of other enterprises.

all of "the competitive

enterprises"5~6
behavior.5~7

if they cannot

submit

position

subject

to price control.

allowed

to discriminate

Unlike
general

the Robinson-Patman

dominating

But, more
condemns

Since

justification.5~9

Act the GWB does not have a
Under

without

§

22(4) GWB only

to be so "dangerous"
justification.520

than the Robinson-Patman

all kind of discrimination,

crimination.

They even may be

these firms are not

firms are considered

farreaching

to agree on contract

firm.5~B

factual

provision.

that they may not discriminate

their

of the extraordinary

Furthermore,

without

discrimination

market

because

of the contracting

of other

facts justifying

They are also not allowed

terms which were made possible
market

possibilities

They are not

Act, the GWB

not only price dis-

1973 also dependency

creating

firms may

not discriminate.52~
Morover,

the problem

i.e. big department
their suppliers
average

enumerates

on the demand

policy
buyer

to granting

are able to press

conditions

than the

in the late 60's and led to the

that the use of superior

side is as abusive

on the supply
notion

level considered

and, therefore,

bargaining

as strategic

side. The GWG reveals

that using superior

and seller

markets

them better

side power",

of §§ 22(4) and 26(2) GWB. Since 1980 § 22(4) GWB

explicitly

conduct

"demand

or chain stores which

buyer was recognized

amendment

power

of so called

bargaining

market

the interesting
power

on both

to be able to impair

suspicious.
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(1) Defining

"Abuse"

The indifinite
to describe
biguous

term "abuse" which

the prohibited

and requires

task of the courts
tion whether

to determine

product

analysis

rather

is a normatively

courts

are required

is guided

market,

open.523

In this analysis,

the interests

they use to analyze

law, but

procedure.522
analysis

approach

the competitive

can be best explained

which

and

the

and balance

them

enterprise.
a case and the arguments
impact

and validity

by the leading

(Meto) which

rules on how to approach

The

and to keep the markets

of the restraint

courts

Meto Handpreisauszeichner
general

antitrust

the courts have to evaluate

of the imposing

The way German

restraint

is not as broad as

balancing

of competition

implications

in question

of the GWB, i.e. to protect

the freedom

with

the restraint

under American

maintain

competitive

given the circumstan-

to apply a comprehensive

by the values

It is the

in a case by case applica-

this analysis

directed

choose

22(4) GWB is am-

§

by the courts.

situation,

or not. However,

a rule of reason

under

interpretation

in a specific

ces of a certain
is abusive

conduct

the lawmaker

tying case

established

vertical

of a

some

restraints

and

tying arrangements.
The second
Effem.

case which will be explained

Effem deals with a discounting

lustrates

the GWB's concern

might be employed

by market

more thoroughly

practice

about hindrance
dominating

and il-

strategies

firms.

is

which
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(2) Meto-Handpreisauszeichner
In Meto524
conditioned

a manufacturer

of small labeling

its sale of the machines

machines

to the purchase

of

labels used with the machines.
The court

found a market

controlled
labeling

between

dominating

position

89 and 93 percent
in 1967.525

machines

of the market

Moreover

that the use of the restrictive

of repair

posed

services

practices,

to significant

showed

indicated

competition

which

such as refusal

the labels

though Meto's

is exposed

for small

and the

that Meto was not ex-

that it did not have to behave

like an enterprise

Meto

the court concluded

to sell to users which did not purchase
denial

because

toward

conduct

its customers

to significant

competi-

tion.
The conditioning
sale of the labeling

of the purchase
machine

was held abusive

reasons:

Both the purchasers

machines

and the manufacturers

restricted

in their freedom

the labeling

machines

were

on the market

to do business.

market

for labels.

quality

defense

made the tie-in
court.

of Meto to ensure

its market

position

and the argument
necessary

for labeling

The buyers

forced to purchase

labels and third enterprises

to strengthen

for several

of labels were unduly

priced

The attempt

of the labels to the

excessively

were foreclosed

additional
constituted

of

from the

earnings

and

an abuse.

that technical

A

requirements

were heard but rejected

by the
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To determine
Court referred
havior.

what behavior

to the principles

power to use this power

ness of competition,
performance,

to obstruct

and to prevent

to be suppressed.

"abuse"

of competitive

The Court held that all inherent

with market

market

constitutes

market

tendencies

to endanger

the striving

optimal

supply

The Court reasoned

the
be-

of firms

effective-

for better

to consumers

have

that first of all the
526

has to be kept open for new entrants.

(3) Effem-Tierfertignahrung
Another

instructive

the GWB is Effem.
to the policy

case which

Besides

the policy

some clear statements

of the GWB are designed

same goal and that conduct

which

at the same time constitutes

reveals

to promote

falls within

18 GWB also might be attacked

of

with regard

goals of the GWB this case furthermore

that all provisions

§

reveals

the

the scope of

as abuse under § 22 GWB and

a discrimination

under

26

§

GWB.
Effem,
Mars,

a German

Inc., granted

subsidiary

its customers

rebate was not computed
but on the purchase

of the United
a yearly

of pet food throughout

tomers"527

which

was established
substantial

market

position

allowed
through

advertising

rebate.

efforts,

70 percent

position.

to its cus-

Effem to set prices
Effem's

orders

the year.

dominating

in relation

firm

The

on the basis of the separate

The court found that Effem had a market
The "paramount

States

and conditions

market

share, its

and its strong brand name
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which was considered
brand

loyalty

to be of special

due to the

of pet food purchasers.

The abuse of Effem's
of this yearly
vantages

importance

positions

rebate which

and thus enhanced

The use of the discount
tive competitors

was seen in the effect

lured customers
Effem's

position

system hindered

and no justification

goals of the GWB could be offered

by economic

ad-

in the market.

actual

and prospec-

complying

by Effem,

with the

such as cost

justification.
In Effem the court interpreted
den on market
rooted

dominating

of the contract

the competitive

The court reasonred

chances

for bigger

a reward

orders,

for constantly

the means

order,

from one seller.

by binding

on

such as

a customer
This

by cost savings but rather

other competitors

is not

is computed

but is aimed at giving

intended

the customer

by

of this rebate.

In Effem the Court also addressed
the additional
criminatory
Court

which

of its competitors.

to the single

ordering

rebate was not justified
to foreclose

GWB as a bur-

but is aimed at

that a rebate which

long term basis has no relation
rebate

22(4)(2)

firms to avoid conduct

in the performance

restricting

§

stated

burden

of market

and volative
that market

duties

to its customers

beyond

the general

Court concluded

the question

dominating

firms is dis-

of Art. 3 of the Basic
dominating

Law. The

firms have special

and competitors

rules of conduct

whether

which

are going

in the business.

The

that the fact that these firms may not
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employ

conduct

stitutionally
under what

conditions

other by firms as their con-

freedom

to decide with whom and

to deal does not violate

The law imposed

firms which

to maintain
tributes

is allowed

guaranteed

Basic Law.528
dominating

which

a restriction

is justified

Art. 3 of the

on market

by the prevailing

an open and competitive

market

which

goal

itself

con-

to democracy.

b) § 26(1) GWB
Besides
prohibition

the purpose

ways to circumvent

of resale price maintenance,

tion of boycotts
results

of opposing

embraces

also boycotts

which may be subject

the per se prohibiaimed at reaching

to vertical

restrictions.

26(1) GWB shows the value the GWB contributes
of enterprises

to compete

third enterprises.

Therefore

volving

three parties

another

enterprise

intent

to unfairly

economic
mented

importance

without

when one party tries

harm certain
of so-called

in the OECD Report

harmed

arrangements

enterprises".529

"Refusal

by
in-

"to incite

to sell or purchase

secondary

§

to the freedom

being unfairly

GWB condemns

... to refuse

the

with

The

boycotts

is docu-

to Sell":530

Cases are becomimg increasingly frequent of traditional dealers and specialized shops threatening
to discontinue the distribution of the supplier's
product if he delivers to discounters, chainstores, department stores or other non-traditional
retailers. With this policy the traditional
dealers tend to hinder the appearance or development of new forms of distribution which are frequently more efficient from the productivity point
of view than the more conservative forms. The
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former opera'te largely on the basis of lower labour
costs and prices achieved through self-service and
other rationalization methods.
In most of the cases the secondary
stitute

a violation

to influence

boycott53~

of § 26(1) GWB. Hence,

the freedom

of another

goals of the GWB to keep market

will con-

the mere attempt

firm contradicts

the

open and prevent market

dis-

tortions.532

c) § 26(1) GWB and the Use of Economic
The role of economic
statutory
§

setting

boycott
§

Because

presumably

to the freedom
a boycott
violates

the restraint

theory

with the competitive

kind of defenses

which might

affects

the freedom

duced

faces a difficult

in

and

the firm inducing
which outweighs

process.

However,

the attempt

the

to induce a

by § 26(1) GWB. Since the boycott

of "victim

firm substantially,

boycott

justify

a

codified

is limited

justification

the interference

are predetermined

decision

of whether

has an accepted

boycott

this freedom,

the policy

only on the question

of

of the market par-

restricts

26(1) GWB. The use of economic

focuses

is small and limited by the

of § 26(1) GWB. The policy decision

26(1) GWB refers

ticipants.

theory

Theory

firm" to deal with the in-

the firm attempting

to induce

burden

their

in defending

the

"attack"

on one of the basic goals of the GWB. The inducing

will have

to show that the firm which

of the

is the supposed

victim
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boycott

was behaving

only available

illegaly

and that the boycott

is the

response.533

and least restrictive

d) § 26(2) GWB
The GWB's concern
tion caused
ceived

by market

dominating

26(2)(2)

market

behavior

conduct

tying arrangements

"insofar

market

as suppliers

services

depend

or from treating

similar

enterprises

Two facts indicate,

§

how serious

of "powerful"
provision
of market

and

the lawmaker

dominating

§

relationship

dependency

(l)on assortment,

enterprise.536

types

from un-

activities

of the GWB took

26(2)(2)

GWB, the

(before 1973 only

firms could be challenged

know different

(3)on shortages,

and

differently.

was added in 1973

can be based

of certain

on them"535

cases were a dependency

ticular

to

firms534

in business

firms: First,

26(2) GWB). Courts

relationship,

on

arrangements,

or purchasers

enterprise

under

effects

dominating

another

the conduct

scope of §

such as refusal

dealing

fairly hindering

"dependency"

of §

may be challenged.

of goods or commercial

the threat

can be per-

26(2) GWB, all kinds of

structure;

exclusive

26(2) GWB prohibits

§

§

which has probable

and market

sell, discrimination,

Under

to competi-

abuse provision

and that the statutory

GWB was broadened.

strategic

firms

enterprises

from the fact that the general

22(4) GWB was amended

market

of coping with the threat

categories

may exist.

For example,

(2)on supply

and (4) dependence

Especially

of

on a par-

the first category,

the
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dependence

on a certain

article,

is focused

on. For example,

in the famous Rossignol

case,537

the German

Supreme

held that the manufacturer
wellknown

skies occupied

the market.
obliged

dependency

a dependency

Accordingly,

to supply

of Rossignol

the "dependency"

device

to limit the exercise

GWB which
dividual

goods store with

share of 8 percent.

cially

§

position

notion

protects

was

Therefore,

of "superior

voke their rights protected

espe-

bargaining

the market

as a participant

individual

power."

of the

participant

One of the most important

26(2) GWB is that it enables

Rossig-

of § 26(2) GWB is a strong

and not just indirectly
process.

in

its skies. The

26(2) GWB is one the few provisions

directly

competitive

creating

was held to be given although

nol had only a market

Second,

skies due to the

the BGH held that Rossignol

a sporting

requirement

Court

as an inin the

features

enterprises

of §

to in-

by § 26 GWB.53B

e) § 26(2) GWB and the Use of Economic

Theory

The courts have to apply economic

theory

in considering

market

power or a

several

questions:

dependency

first,

relationship;

conduct

is hindrance

whether

the conduct

"without

to establish
second,

in determining

or discriminatory;
is "unfair"

third,

hindrance

whether

a

in evaluating

or discrimination

justification."

(l)Market
dependency

dominance

is defined

relationship

in the statute

has to be evaluated

itself.539

A

in case by case
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analysis

and requires

specific

markets

(2)Hindrance

the courts

to investigate

into the

involved.

is given when one enterprise

manoeuvers

another
ll

enterprise

in a disadvantageous

of the hindrance

position.

is determined

by

The "unfairness

weighing

the interests

lI

the two parties

in the light of the procompetitive

the statute.540

The more market

possesses,

the greater

goals of

power the hindering

is need to protect

of

party

the hindered

party.54~
According
without

to the legislative

justification"

is prohibited.

firm has to offer a justification
The courts

are required

for the restraint

language

The discriminating

for its discrimination.

to analyze

(in this analysis

the same consideration

a "discrimination

the justification

offered

the courts will employ

as in defining

"abuse",

infra)

f) § 37a(3) GWB
§

37a(3) GWB is another

the GWB in 1973. Although
practical

relevance

the purpose
restraints
§

37a(3)

§

provision

which was added to

37a(3) GWB has insofar

this provision

highlights

of the GWB and its different
even when they are unilaterally

little

very clearly

approach

towards

imposed.

states:

The cartel authority may also prohibit an enterprise which, as a result of its superior market
power in relation to its small and medium-sized
competitors, is able to influence market conditions
substantially from adopting conduct that directly
or indirectly unfairly hinders such competitors and
is likely to impair competition permanently.
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§

37(a)(3)

"social
§

GWBThis

37a(3) GWB clearly

centration

states

competitors

conduct

dealing

GWB it is also necessary
hinder"

of their bigger

However,

con-

which are not

shall be protected

out of business.543

of small and

of market

are goals of the GWB. Enterprises

such as exclusive

"unfairly

However,

that the protection

and the prevention

able to cope with unfair

driven

does not intend to provide

to small businessmen.542

protection"

middle-size

provision

competitors

against being

like §§ 22(4) and 26(2)

to give a meaning

to the vague term

used in § 37(a) GWB to describe

unwanted

conduct.

7. Giving Vague Terms
The question
under

whether

hindrance

or discrimination

the most difficult
GWB. However,

constitutes

antitrust

influence

are limited

arguments

theory

almost

certain

strategies

second place.

are

differently

theories

Unlike

directly

under the GWB the
For example,

cannot be ignored

static while

drastically.544

22(4) and 26(2)

and the time horizon.

of the courts,

competition

of § 26(2) GWB is

can be answered

in their analysis.

are considered

GWB remained

of whether

§§

law where conflicting

the reasoning

GWB intrabrand

in applying

an abuse

to be unfair

in the meaning

to competition

on the applied

American

changed

problem

the question

or harmful

depending

courts

a conduct

22(4) GWB or will be considered

§

benigm

a Meaning

under the

and efficiency

This explains

the American

why the

antitrust

law
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The GWB choose

a compromise

rule of law. The GWB proscribes
its approach
market

towards

conduct

pliance

certain

and the courts pursue

analysis

Moschel

concludes

of their

justiciability
of cartel

evil."545

the following

for the further

of the GWB to protect

a) Development
However,

unfair

ticularly

the freedom

to predict

and/or

26(2) GWB comes

will serve as
an evalua-

it necessary

"to

in the light of the goal
of competition."546

requires

because

circumstances

will be condemned

interpretation

and application

This analysis

the provisions

a

as con-

or discrimination.

theory by the courts.

difficult

facie case is established,

under which

restraints

hindrance

This analysis
of economic

interests

con-

only the

of the court:

makes

as long as no prima

conduct

stituting

phrase

ap-

of Rules

it is very difficult
certain

The German

as it were,

22(4);

reasoning

in question

the conflicting

§§

the

rules and the necessity

to commit,

a case involving

tion of the conduct
balance

the scope of

law has always been intellectually

lesser

reference

in com-

can arise between

and predictability.

that it can attempt

the court,

of

such as strategic

goals. Therefore

of particular

scious

before

and the policy

their analysis

"goal conflicts

plausibility

Whenever

and the

is limited by the legal provisions.

economic

plication

flexibility

the values

behavior,

with the proscribed

the courts

between

is par-

of the GWB
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dealing

with

or prohibit
havior.

strategic
efficient

Moschel

competition

market

or otherwise

the role of economic
antitrust

come into play to assists
conduct,

the specific

case rather

its freedom

Although
to the values

protected

of action

strategic

directed
in

is preeminent.s48
developed

according
rules

conduct

inversely
firm.s49

the freedom

to

proportionately
Likewise,

to

the

the better must be the jus-

which

is aimed at achieving

under the GWB will be automatically

GWB influences

For example,
the reasoning

duct as soon as effects

the legislative

with

conduct

considered

on prices

less restrictive

con-

are probable.sso
the same effect

means.

to

intent of § 15

in the area of strategic

the courts will ask whether

achieved

rule

for its application.

be unjustified.

Third,

ranging

of the individal

the GWB reduces

the conduct,

every restraint

prohibited

of

of the courts.

power of the employing

more restrictive

Second,

market

a broad

the GWB some general

the analysis

employ

the ques-

is normatively

the courts

under

as a rule of thumb,

arguments

focus on the restrictions

that the interest

First,

tification

of

is different

in evaluating

than applying

not codified,

are guiding

the market

be-

a perversion

evidence

the courts

The evaluation

and the GWB proscribes

which

market

law. When economic

the courts

scrutiny.

maintaining

justified

states that this "would-be

than under American

of reason

do not intend to deter

law."s47

However,

tionable

conduct

can be
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Furthermore
defense

it is noteworthy

alleging

procompetitive

effects

the GWB and even if this defense
could not overcome

b) Accepted

the business

ness relationship.

against

is not accepted

were held admissable

structure

there is an objective

flict with

efficiency
by

it

concerns.551

Defenses

To evaluate
whether

market

that a general

justification,
reason

The proffered

the courts

in the specific

justifications

ask

busi-

may not con-

the goals of the GWB and have to be balanced

each other in the light of the goals and purposes

of

the GWB.552
The courts
the parties
favorable
ability

are willing

employing

to accept

the restraint

to restraints

which

to enhance

It is acknowledged

free to design

repair

services,

sales-personal,

the GWB condemns

tain dealer

forms,

from delivery
qualitative

such as discounters

requirements.554

dis·tribution arrangements
these arrangements

adequate

every attempt

when these stores

involve

that
system

requirements

presentation,

and pre- and after sales services.

other hand:

of

the

their distribution

a~d that they are free to impose qualitative
such as qualified

interest

and are particularly

are imposed

of a firm to compete.553

firms are generally

legitimate

On the

to exclude

or department

cerstores

are able to comply with the

Particularly,
are subject
an attempt

selective

to scrutiny
to unduly

whether

suppress
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competition

or to circumvent

the prohibition

of resale price

maintenance. 555

c) Shifting

the Burden

of Proof

But, as the discussion
that a restraint

in America

may enhance

shows,

the ability

the argument

to compete

can al-

ways be raised.
In this case the question
den of proof becomes
with

restraints

market

power)

uses means

crucial.

burden

know for what reasons

has to submit business

cepted

under

However,
courts

or prima

of proof.

weighed

a certain

to describe

conduct

that his conduct

the kind of justification

in evaluating

the proffered

ac-

which

justification
is guiding

of the two parties

in the light of the pro-competitive

d) The Balancing

Process

goals of the

by the Courts

this analysis

antitrust

is not as broad

law, the court's

as under

discretion

is

the

every

have to be

statute".55B

American

is

the GWB).557

"The interests

Although

who

(Gerber uses the term "material

again refer to the statement

analysis:

facie violations

The defendant,

he employed

justifications

justified556

justification"

(because of the

in the area of §§ 22(4) and 26(2) GWB the GWB

of legal presumptions

objectively

the bur-

Hence the GWB is suspicious

caused by circumstance

to ease the plaintiffs
should

of which party bears

132
considerable.

The courts will refer to the goal of the GWB

to maintaining

the freedom

of the individuals

decision

to participate

question

of how much economic

remains

under

whether

an adverse

occurs

in the competitive

the influence
effect

will be analyzed.

balance

the interest

restraint

between

might

and show how economic

defenses

are accepted

Courts decided
to provide

original

manufacturer
independent

theory

the reasoning
is applied

that it is unfair

the

of the

and which

of a manufacturer

However,

shop if this repair
or if its repairs

not

shop to protect

it was accepted

has not the duty to provide

products560

is employing

on the other firm.

spare parts to a repair

repair

still have to

by the courts:

its own repair business.55g

peting

the firm which
imposed

and

of the markets

the courts

illustrate

The

imperfections

on the openness
However,

process.

of the individual

of market

with the restriction

Some examples
courts

freedom

in their

that a

spare parts to an

shop deals with com-

are not satisfac-

tory.561
In a recent benchmark
exclusive

dealing

their repairs

arrangement

exclusively

by VW. VW defended
parts provided

allowed

challenged

with the argument

of VW's good will required
argued

i.e. parts which

an

them to use for

VW spare parts which were

its restraint

The dealers

tical parts",

which

VW dealers

by VW could meet the VW quality

that the protection
restraint.

case,562

supplied
that only

standards
that

that at least so called
are manufactured

and

"iden-

by the same
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manufacturers

which produce

the restrictive

restraint

means"

was abusive

reversed

argument

relied

on the

if they inform

parts may be

their customers

VW part" will be used. The German

and decided

from

and held that the

and thus these identical

used by the VW dealers
no "original

The lower court563

covenant.

"less restrictive

for VW should be excepted

that the quality

defense

that

Supreme

Court

should pre-

vail.564
This decision

was heavily

nized that this case reached

criticized

and it is recog-

the limit of admissable

defenses.565

e) Giving Vague Terms a Meaning
Although

the GWB provides

differentiated

rules the courts

face problems

statutory

such as the "abuse"

terms,

tion." Therefore,
facie abusive
certain

the courts

(i.e. tie-ins

discounting

fered justification

whether

parties

raises

conduct.

the analysis.

a conduct

firms or

as long as no prima

and the impact

extraordinary

Again,

the

on competi-

demarcation
to prohibit

the courts

For example,

is conform

the prof-

it by considering

the GWB does not intend

cient or legitimate
of guiding

dominating

However,

and to balance

tion. This evaluation
Hence,

of market

dicrimina-

some cases as prima

the courts have to evaluate

of the involved

problems.

indefinite

and "unfair

categorized

practices).

facie case is given,

interests

to interpret

and detailed

effe-

created

means

courts will consider

to the concept

of "competition
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based

on performance."566

"suspect"

conduct

If the party which

defends

the conduct

that it is aimed to achieve
new distribution
than to reduce

sysytem)

effiency

(e.g. when designing
competition,

opportunities,

as Schmidt567

may be justified.

However,

term "competition

based on performance"

achieving

predictability.

where

demarcation

which

are almost

explain

Especially

problems
as vague

exist,

questionable

conduct.56B

the tendency

to rely on "terms"

However,

lysis of the justification
weighing
volved

or balancing

out, the

is no advance

in "difficult"

the reference

will,

although

in

cases,

to terms

evaluate

the

the ana-

in the end, include

of the interests

to

the courts have

or "definitions"

of the parties

in light of the goals and purposes

statute. ,,569

the conduct

points

to adaequately

a

rather

as the terms they are supposed

does not contribute

a

with the justification

and promote

the competitive

is employing

of the

"a
in-

VI. SUMMARY

A. Results

of the Research

Vertical
freedom

of market

his whole
prices

restraints

are restricting

participants.

supply

might be restricted.

contribute

ler's freedom

in designing

restrictive

may

or may

the sel-

marketing

scheme

and

part of free

competition.

strategic

market

dividual's
petition.

might

freedom

If most retailers
a new market

outlets

retailer

conduct

competitive

arrangements

means

competition

is an essential

On the other hand, vertical

retail

relationships

Furthermore,

an effective

covenants

to set

in most of the cases

of overall

justifications.

might have to buy

or his freedom

in contractual

to the enhancement

have sound business

imposing

However,

imposed

the competitive

A retailer

from one manufacturer

these restrictions

market

and Comparison

to strive

and, likewise,

not only limit the inbut also stifle overall

are bound by exclusive

entrant

for his product.

is prevented

restraints
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to find

are fixed a

from using the parameter

for business.

dealing

will face problems

If prices

com-

price

as

136
Due to this complexity,
problems
meets

exist.

The difficulty

the requirements

without

suppressing

for dispute
theory

of adequately

among economists

which

trinsically

plausible.

implementing

ty without

siderations,

abandoning

To enact practicable
towards

example,

the decision

sight a policy
However,

this decision

businessmen,
what unclear,
conduct

decision

1. Suggestion

con-

guide the

basic determinations

reflect

policy

and method

theory.

For

is at first

anticompetitive

may have the economic

behavior.

effect

that

when the state of the law is some-

are deterred

because

More-

arguments.

treble damages

to punish

especially

flexibili-

to economic

anew by economic

to reward

of

into the law

sufficient

laws which

restraints,

and are influenced

theory

also noneconomic

must be made. These determinations
decisions

-- are in-

the "rule of law".57o

antitrust

vertical

on theoreti-

face the problem

is not limited

but incorporates

Economic

often conflicting

and of maintaining

over, the legal analysis

is reason

based

of economic

which

competition

conduct

analysis,

Legal scholars

the perceptions

completely

a borderline

and legal scholars.

-- although

and legal reasoning

demarcation

protecting

business

theoretical

cal models,

difficult

of drawing

beneficial

contributes

approach

extreme

of being

from employing

afraid

to trigger

procompetitive
antitrust

suits.

to Solve the Dilemma

To make antitrust

law "work" the following

tions should be made: First,

determina-

the goals of antitrust

must be
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defined.
goals

In particular,

the question

should be included

answered.

Second,

application

of antitrust

be clarified.

patible

Fourth,

decision

to the courts.

protects

The GWB pursues
and social

coerce

power because

"powerful"

restraints.

the "Rule of Law" and

-- according

the

little discretion

a multivalued

goal. It has

The legal function

of contracts:

to agree on contract

that this freedom

otherwise

bargaining

bargaining

reflected

freedom
terms.

requires

this freedom

The GWB's concern

firms is especially

to its

and leaves

of freedom

the party with inferior
covenants.

must

are com-

which establishes

of the party with superior

restrictive

which

functions.57~

and freedom

the GWB recognizes

bargaining
freedom

law choose

the two components

However,

authority

the law must provide

-- an approach

to enter contracts

the

must be guaran-

area of vertical

of the lawmaker

legal, economic,

Third,

Goal

antitrust

law concept

policy

and its role for the

for its application

a Multi-Valued

with the

into action without

of the GWB -- Favoring

The German

must be

complies

enforcement

Fifth,

with the amorphous

Pursuing

civil

efficient

conduct.

standards

noneconomic

law must be clarified.

the legal perception

benign

2. The Approach

theory which

viz a viz the legislative

teed to transform

manageable

analysis

law must be selected

role of the courts

deterring

in antitrust

an economic

goals of antitrust

of whether

equal

becomes

the

power to

power

to accept

with regard
in §§ 22(4),

to
26(2),
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and 37(a) GWB which
firms special

subjugate

treatment.

aimed at maintaining
area of vertical
market

free market
trabrand

place consists

to distribute

vertical

cern. Furthermore,

guidance

cause

to economic

participants

business

or exploitation

The lawmaker

tion maintains
cept which

theory

effects

freedom

of competition".573

freedom

of competition"

the

could provide
The suggested

lacked

adequate

or were suspect
theory

be-

as leading

it did not fit into the real

Therefore,

is best described

con-

of undue differen-

concepts

The GWB mistrusts
itself.

arguments.

to democracy

for the GWB's application.

because

towards

of the GWB recognized

of economic

of static/dynamic

world.

of econo-

is of special

in order to contribute

was rejected

is in-

Prevention

they were too vague. Neoclassical

principle

function

(all

goal of the GWB.

and group competition

comprehension

a

and in-

"Allstufenwettbewerb"

is not limited

model

In the

opposes

of inter-

and wealth.

societal

power.

that no theoretical

workability

place.

is

to the GWB's concept

The social policy

the creation

ces in economic

adequate

of freedom

so-called

of the market

GWB opposes

function

to these goals the GWB's approach

restraints

The freedom

According

income

is another

According

policy

"powerful"

the GWB particularly

effects.

competition,

mic power

of certain

a free and viable market

level competition).572
tended

The economic

restraints

foreclosure

conduct

the notion

that competi-

the GWB has adopted

as a "concept
The "concept

is perceivable

a con-

of the practical

of the practical

from different

norms
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and the legislative
the courts which
their

reasoning

directed

history

apply these concepts,
the direction

the American

they follow

given by the GWB

antitrust

is mainly

vested

Authority

Only in particular

the antitrust

in

("normatively

firms' market

a) Treatment
Vertical
(1) Resale

laws. Another

of Vertical

promotes

restraints

undergo

according

the following

to the

is pe se illegal

behavior

of action,

ticularly

every attempt

to adhere

to a certain

about the core
level.

of resale price maintenance
which

is a major

goal of the
is strictly

by other norms of the GWB. Par-

pricing

nonprice

a dealer

scheme

restraints

to coerce him

is prohibited.
are basically

allowed

it is to note that this favorable

rests in the complicated

of § 18 GWB rather

intrabrand

on the dealer

to threaten

18 GWB. However,
partly

under § 15

of resale price maintenance

and safeguarded

(2) Other vertical

treatment:

the per se rule to foster

the prohibition

GWB. The prohibition

treatment

of the GWB

under the GWB

and to leave the decision

freedom

enforced

feature

standards

Restraints

of competitive

Furthermore

interesting

may invoke

power.

GWB. The GWB adopted

parameter

Cartel

cases individuals

different

price maintenance

competition

law the GWB's enforcement

in the hands of the Federal

is that it establishes

§

rather

it is not

discretion").

Unlike

under

of the GWB. However,

than on economic

statutory

theory.

language

140
b) The GWB's Approach
Both unilateral
dominating
dency
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The Member States of the European Community
share a common commitment to individual rights, to
democratic values and to free institutions. It is
those rights, values and institutions at the
European and national levels that provide necessary checks and balances in our political systems.
Effective competition provides a set of similar
checks and balances in the market economy system.
It preserves the freedom and right of initiative
of the individual economic operator and it fosters
the spirit of enterprise. It creates an environment within which European industry can grow and
develop in the most efficient manner and at the
same time take account of social goals. Competition policy should ensure that abusive use of
market power by a few does not undermine the
rights of the many; it should prevent artificial
distortions and enable the market to stimulate
European enterprise to innovate and to remain
competitive on a global scale.
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tying arrangements will not be challenged as per se violation of the antitrust law when the seller of the tying
product has market power. In Jefferson Parish the Court held
that 30% market share was not sufficient to condemn a tie
between hospital care and anesthesiological
services as per
se violation of Sec. 1 Sherman Act).
51. 433 U.S. 36 (1977) (abound literature is dealing with
Sylvania, for a list of publications, see 49 Antitrust Law
Journal 1639 (1980)).
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52. 388 u.s.

365 (1967).

53. See, e.g. continental
433 u.S. 36 (1977).

T.V. Inc., v. GTE Sylvania,

Inc.

54. For a criticism of this development, see Flynn & Ponsoldt, Legal Reasoning and the Jurisprudence of Vertical
Restraints: The Limitations of Neoclassical Economic
Analysis in the Resolution of Antitrust Disputes, 62
N.Y.U.L.Rev.
1125 (1987) [hereinafter Flynn & Ponsoldt,
Legal Reasoning].
55. See, e.g., 4ger Chevrolet v. General Motors Corp., 803
F.2d 1463 (9th Cir. 1986); Eastern Scientific Co. v. Wild
Heerbrugg Instruments, Inc., 572 F.2d 883 (1st Cir. 1978).
For further discussion, see notes 254-263 and accompanying
text.
56. The Department of Justice filed in Monsanto an amicus
curiae brief arguing that the per se rule against resale
price maintenance is inappropriate.
57. Professor Ponsoldt remarks that Chicago Scholars promote
their view that "antitrust laws should be applied only in a
manner that increases economic efficiency. But, utilizing a
creatively deceptive transformation,
[they have] defined
'efficiency' in neoclassical economic terms to mean maximization of aggregate social wealth without regard for the
distribution of that wealth or its political consequences."
Flynn & Ponsoldt, Legal Reasoning, at 1126-27 note 6
(referring to Ponsoldt, On the docket: Robert Bork, Wall St.
J., Sept. 24, 1987 at 27 (letter).
58. See Fox, Antitrust, Economics, and Bias, 2 ANTITRUST 6
(1988),at 7 ("the formulation of the economic question may
be crucial to the legal outcome in antitrust adjudication").

59. German cartel law is stated in a comprehensive statute
and seeks to attain a specific norm. A decision is found
through subsumption of a particular situation under a given
norm. Although ambiguous language has to be interpreted by
the courts the interpretation of the law is limited by certain principles of interpretation,
such as policy and intent
of the law, wording of the law, and history of the law. The
interpretation
is never allowed to go beyond the law. For a
description of method how to interpret a statutory norm, see
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K. LARENZ, METHODENLEHRE DER RECHTSWISSENSCHAFT
(5th Ed.
1983). German cartel law favors consistency and employs
centralized and specialized decision makers. See MAXEINER,
supra note 17, at 5. But, also, under the German statutory
system it is possible that a violation of antitrust law constitutes a violation of the Law against Unfair Competition
or other laws. See V. EMMERICH, KARTELLRECHT
(1982), at 211.
60. 38 Stat. 717 (1914), as amended,

15 U.S.C.A.

§§

41-58.

61. See, e.g., FTC v. Texaco, 393 U.S. 223 (1968). See also
E. GELLHORN, supra note 31, at 30.

62. 15 U.S.C. § 2 (1982)(Sec. 2 Sherman Act).
15 U.S.C. § 13 (1973) (Robinson-Patman Act).
63. C. KAYSEN & D. TURNER, ANTITRUST
LEGAL ANALYSIS, at 181 (1959).
64.

POLICY:

49 Stat. 1526,

AN ECONOMIC

AND

Id.

65. For a comparison between the German approach towards
price discrimination
and the Robinson-Patman
Act see Gerber,
The German Approach to Price Discrimination
and other Forms
of Business Discrimination,
27 Antitrust Bulletin 241
(1982).

66. See, e.g., Asbill, Starling; Recurring Themes in
Franchise Termination Ligitation, 7 Franchise Law Journal
(1988), at 23 note 2 (citing several state statutes).

1

67. See, e.g., the proposal for Georgia S. Bill No. 177
(1987). "Gasoline Marketing Retail Sales: Prohibitions"
(this legislature would have prevented oil companies from
opening retail gas stations; the bill responds to the coercive practices of vertically integrated oil companies
against their retailers to achieve vertical integration).
However, after the proposed bill had passed both houses of
the Georgia legislature it was vetoed by Governor Harris on
March 20, 1987.

68. See L.B. SCHWARTZ, J.J. FLYNN, H. FIRST, FREE ENTERPRISE
AND ECONOMIC ORGANIZATION: ANTITRUST (1983), at 15 and 793.
See also Baxter, The Viability of the Vertical Restraints
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Doctrine, 75 Cal. Law. Rev. 933 (1987), at 949 (Baxter
states that "the attorneys general of the several states
have behayed, in all too many instances, as political opportunists, rushing in to supply incoherent and damaging state
law doctrines, with the associated populist rhetoric, where
federal law has been rationalized.").
69. See e.g. United States v. Trans-Missouri
Freight Ass'n,
166 U.S. 290 (1897)(in this early interpretation of the
Sherman Act the Court condemned according to the statutory
language of Sec. 1 Sherman Act every restraint of trade
without exception as violation of Sec. 1 Sherman Act). But
see Hopkins v. United States, 171 U.S. 578 (1898) (this case
was a retreat from the rigid position of Trans-Missouri
Freight Ass'n. The Court held that only 'direct' or 'immediate' restraints were condemned under Sec. 1 Sherman Act)

=

70. 38 RGZ 155 (Reichsgericht
German Supreme Court before
1933). See Fikentscher, Introduction, in: F. BEIER, G.
SCHRICKER, & W. FIKENTSCHER, GERMAN INDUSTRIAL PROPERTY,
COPYRIGHT AND ANTITRUST LAWS (published by the Max Planck
Inst. for Foreign and Internat. Patent, copyright and Competition Law, Munich in IIC Studies, Volume 6, 161
(1983) [hereinafter Fikentscher, Introduction].
71. Gesetz gegen Wettbewerbsbeschrankungen
(in der Fassung
der Bekanntmachung
vom 24. September 1980), BGB1. I at 1761
(1980) [hereinafter GWB]. The GWB was effective 1.1.1958.

72. See notes

172-184

and accompanying

73. EMMERICH,

supra note 59, at 22-23.

text.

74. Moschel, Use of Economic Evidence in Antitrust Ligitation in the Federal Republik of Germany, 32 Antitrust Bulletin 523 (1987), at 524 [hereinafter Moschel, Economic
Evidence].
75. See Moschel,

Economic

Evidence,

supra note 74, at 536.

76. See supra note 59.
77. See Fikentscher, Introduction, supra note 70, at 164;
Moschel, Economic Evidence, supra note 74, at 524.
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78. See Fox, Soul of Antitrust,

supra note 1, at 917.

79. Every major recently published German treatise dealing
with restraints of competition under the GWB discusses the
Chicago School's economic approach. See e.g., M. GANAL, DIE
HANDELSRECHTLICHE
UND KARTELLRECHTLICHE
BEURTEILUNG VON
AGENTURSYSTEMEN
(1986); M. MARTINEK, FRANCHISING (1987);
I. SCHMIDT, WETTBEWERBSPOLITIK
UNO KARTELLRECHT,
(2nd Ed.
1987); o. TYLLACK, WETTBEWERB UND BEHINDERUNG: EINE
RECHTSVERGLEICHENDE
STUDIE ZUR BEURTEILUNG VON INDIVIDUALUND WETTBEWERBSBEHINDERUNGEN
NACH DEUTSCHEM UND AMERIKANISCHEM RECHT (1984); V. BEHR, DER FRANCHISEVERTRAG:
EINE
UNTERSUCHUNG ZUM RECHT DER USA MIT VERGLEICHENDEN
HINWEISEN
ZUM DEUTSCHEN RECHT (1976); Markert, Stand und Entwicklungstendenzen des US-Antitrustrechts
aus der Sicht eines
deutschen Kartellrechtsanwenders,
FIW Schriftenreihe
201
(1988); Toepke, Antitrustspruchpraxis
1985/86, FIW Schriftenreihe 175 (1987); for a German treatise analyzing the
Chicago School's economic theory see J.B. RITTALER & I.
SCHMIDT, DIE CHICAGO SCHOOL OF ANTITRUST ANALYSIS (1986).
80. See RITTALER & SCHMIDT, supra note 79, at 122. For example, the Vertical Restraints Guidelines have been analyzed
by German scholars whether they could be of interest with
regard to the sometimes cumbersome and difficult application
of § 18 GWB. However, although the idea of establishing
quantitative thresholds was considered positively the underlying ideas of the Chicago School, especially the fact that
intrabrand competition was ignored, were rejected as appropriate standard for the GWB's application. See Junius &
KOnig, Die Richtlinien des US-Justizministeriums
zu vertikalen Wettbewerbsbeschrankungen,
Recht der Internationalen
Wirtschaft, 364-67 (1985), at 367; Schmidt & Kirschner, Darstellung und wettbewerbspolistische
Wlirdigung der U.S.
tical Restraints Guidelines, Wirtschaft und Wettbewerb
(Int.) 781-91 (1985), Kapp, Die neuen Vertical Restraints
Guidelines der Antitrust Division des U.S. Department of
Justice: Vertikalbindungen
auf dem Weg zur per se-Legalitat,
Recht der Internationalen Wirtschaft, 677 -84 (1985), at
679, 683-84. For a harsh rejection of the Chicago School's
approach see Fezer, Aspekte einer Rechtskritik an der
Economic Analysis of Law und am Property Rights Approach, 41
JURISTENZEITUNG
817 (1986)(Fezer alleges that·economic
theory does not comply with the law. Fezer states, for example, that social effects and other goals, for example
protection of the environment are neglected by economic
theory). Id., at 822-24.

ver=-

81. See Braun,

supra note 17, at 362.
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82. Compare, for example, the Merger and Vertical Restraints
GUidelines of the Department of Justice (supra note ... )
with the 1977 and 1980 amendments of the GWB.
83. For further information about the GWB and English translations of the GWB see generall~ R. MUELLER, M. HEIDENHAIN &
H. SCHNEIDER, GERMAN ANTITRUST LAW (3rd Ed. 1984). See also
F. BEIER, G. SCHRICKER, & W. FIKENTSCHER, supra note 17. For
articles dealing with the treatment of vertical restraints
and strategic market conduct written in English by German
scholars or scholars who are familiar with the German law
~
Gerber, supra note 65; Moschel, Economic EVidence, supra
note 74; Schmidt, Different Approaches and Problems in
Dealin
with Contrpl of Market Power: A Com arison of German Euro ean and U.S. Polic Towards Market-Dominatin
Enterprises, 28 ANTITRUST BULL. 417 (1983).
84. Cartels, for example, are prohibited under § 1 GWB. No
rule of reason excuses a prohibited cartel. But §§ 2 _ 8 GWB
provide specific exemptions for certain cartels, such as
export cartels, crisis cartels, cartels for rationalization,
specialization cartels, rebate cartels, import cartels, and
cartels in the pUblic interest. However, the prereqUisites
for
the application
of an exemption norm are laid down in
the specific
norm.

85. Legally effective cartels agreements are prohibited by
§ 1 GWB. To enable the Cartel Authorities
to challenging socalled 'tacit' or 'gentlemen agreements' __ which are not
legally effective -- the GWB was amended by § 25 GWB.
§
25(1) GWB states that this conduct is similarly prohibited.

86. This are all agreements which are not 'cartel agreements', most of these agreements are vertical. § 15 GWB
prohibits resale price maintenance; § 18 GWB deals with
(mostly vertical) restraints which are imposed in a contractual relationship; § 20 GWB deals with restraints which are
used in connection with protected rights, such as patents.
87. The GWB addresses

in

§§

22, 26, 37 GWB abusive conduct

of firms. Sometimes these firms have to be market dominating
(§ 22 GWB). Sometimes these firms have to be either market
dominating or have to have that a strong position in relation to their customers that a relation of economic dependencyexists
(§§
26, 37 GWB). Furthermore, § 25 GWB prohibits every conduct which is aimed to compel other
enterprises to de facto acceptance of contracts forbidden by
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the GWB, e.g. resale price maintenance
(therefore, § 25 GWB
prohibits conduct which would be considered legal under the
'Colgate doctrine' in American antitrust law).

88. GWB § 24.
89. § 1 GWB (exemptions
8 GWB).

from § 1 GWB are enumerated

in §§ 2-

90. § 15 GWB.
91. § 18 GWB.
92. §§ 20; 21 GWB.
93. § 15 GWB.
94. GWB § 18. See generally V. EMMERICH, KARTELLRECHT,
4.
Aufl. (1982), at 112-30; U.IMMENGA & E.J. MESTMACKER, KOMMENTAR ZUM KARTELLGESETZ
(1981), at 507 et seq.
95. See GANAL, supra note 79, at 284-326. See also J. KUR~
TENBACH, DIE BEURTEILUNG YON BEZUGS-UND ALLEINVERTRIEBSBINDUNGEN
IN FRANCHISE VERTRAGEN NACH § 18 GWB UND
ART. 85 EWG-V. (1986).
96. The GWB distinguishes between agreements pursuing a common purpose and restrictive agreements which are imposed in
a contractual relationship. It is contested what 'common
purpose' means and a lot has been written about this term.
However, for the purpose of this study it is sufficient to
clarify that 'common purpose' is not given when in a contractual relationship both parties 'profit' from their contract, e.g. sale of goods or services.
97. Therefore, some scholars in Germany support the view
that the GWB has to be interpreted as to take an
"functional"(based
on the level(s) of the arrangement)
rather than a "legal" approach (based on the legal quality
of the underlying agreement),e.g. E. Steindorff,
Gesetzeszweck und gemeinsamer Zweck des § 1 GWB, 1977
Betriebsberater
(BB) 569 (1977).
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98. See, e.g., Northern Pacific Railroad Co. v. United
States, 356 U.S. 1 (1958). However, there are tendencies to
loosen the grip of the per se rule. See NCAA v. Board of
Regents of the University of Oklahoma, 104 S.Ct. 2948
(1984). Broadcast Music, Inc. v. Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc. 4~1 U.S. 1 (1979).
99. Compare
Continental
(1977).

, for example, the approach of § 18 GWB with
T.V. Inc. v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 433 U.S. 36

100. For a description
... infra.

of the term "powerful"

firm see note

101. The German Supreme Court held that true agency relationships may escape condemnation under § 15 GWB. See WuWjE
BGH 2238 (EH-Partner Vertrag).
102. § 25(2) GWB. See notes

300-309

and accompanying

text.

103. See Moschel, Economic Evidence, supra note 74, at 533.
See also notes 492-504 and accompanying text.

104. See notes

513-543

and accompanying

text.

105. Barbier, Bewahrtes Instrument mit Schonheitsfehlern,
Sliddeutsche Zeitung of July 28, 1982, at 4. (Editorial in
the "Sliddeutsche Zeitung" (one of the leading German
newspapers) when the twenty-fifth anniversary of the GWB was
reason for comment).
106. See MAXEINER,
107. See Braun,
17, at 116.

supra note 17, at 2 et seq.

supra note 17, at 368. MAXEINER,

108. This argument is focused
Reasoning, supra note 54.
109.

U.S.

supra note

on in Flynn & Ponsoldt,

108 S.Ct. 1515 (1988).

Legal
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110. For a discussion of Business
367-409 and accompanying text.

Electronics,

see notes

111. See the dissent of J. Stevens in Business Electronics,
108 S.Ct. 1515, 1526 (1988). Referring to Professor Flynn's
presentation of the article "Legal Reasoning and the Jurisprudence of Vertical Restraints"
(supra note ... ) at the
Airlie House Conference, a scholar commented that Professor
Flynn in attacking the Chicago School unveiled that
Chicago's economic theory is "simply Alice-in-Wonderland
economics", Ponsoldt, The Enrichment of Sellers as a Justification for Vertical Restraints: A Response to Chicago's
Swiftian Modest Proposal, 62 N.Y.U.L.Rev. 1166 (1987), at
1169.

112. This problem is addressed in MAXEINER, supra note 17,
at 116-22. See also Braun, supra note 17, at 368.
113. Flynn
1151.

& Ponsoldt,

Legal Reasoning,

supra note 54, at

114. Unlike American antitrust law the provisions of the GWB
are directed against conduct with effect for the future. The
GWB can only prohibit present conduct and conduct which
might have effects in the future. For example the use of
vertical restraints can be prohibited if harm for the market
structure is to expect. Past-directed legal consequences are
not available under the GWB. This difference has a strong
impact on the application, effectiveness and enforcement
policy of the antitrust laws. When under the GWB a practice
involving a policy decision is considered to be harmful the
worst which can happen is that the party which employs the
practice has to abandon the practice. Private claims are
under the GWB generally not available. However, some important exceptions exist (§§ 26, 35 GWB). Under the GWB approach, the businessmen has not to face the consequences of
possible criminal sanctions or (treble) damage suits when he
enters a restrictive agreement. Particularly the fear of
treble damage suits combined with extremely high costs of
the lawsuit which might deter businessmen from using
procompetitive
restraints is not known under the GWB.
Moreover, the GWB formulates prohibition norms very clearly,
comparable to the per se rules in the American antitrust
law, these norms
provide businessmen and courts with clear
and unambiguous guidelines. Although these provisions might
outlaw some harmless or procompetitive
conduct the enhanced
rule of law justifies this approach.
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The American antitrust law, however, knows mainly
directed legal consequences such as civil damages
nal sanctions. See MAXEINER, supra note 17.

pastand crimi-

115. The way how the antitrust laws are enforced and who may
invoke a violation of the antitrust laws determines which
role they play for the protection of a free market place.
The best law remains useless if it is not enforced. Under
the GWB basically the Federal Cartel Authority is authorized
to challenge antitrust violations, only a few provision
allow the individual to challenge restraints (e.g. §§ 26(2),
35 GWB). The Federal Cartel Authority surveys the market and
market developments and will act if a certain conduct or the
widespread use of a restraint constitutes a threat for free
market competition. The Federal Cartel Authority is equipped
with experts and the necessary information to screen harmful
conduct out. This concentration of enforcement authority
contributes in avoiding that courts (if the addressee of a
"cease and desist order" challenges this order before court)
have'to deal with cases which are not representing harm for
competition. On the other hand the antitrust enforcement
relies on the quality and willingness of the enforcement
agency. However, if one accepts minor shortcomings, it is to
acknowledge that the Federal Cartel Authority fulfills its
duty in protecting free market competition. See Moschel,
Economic Evidence, supra note 74, at 550. A second feature
which contributes in avoiding inconsistent ruling of the
courts and thus enhances predictability
and reliability of
the law is the fact that the decisionmaker in the German
system is highly specialized. Furthermore, lower courts
generally adhere to the ruling of the superior courts.
Moreover, almost every "bigger" antitrust case might be
appealed to the highest court in Germany, the Bundesgerichtshof
(German Supreme Court), which itself has several
panels (chambers) of judges. One of these panels is specialized in dealing with antitrust cases.
This procedure contributes enhancing the "rule of law."
116. See e.g., Ponsoldt, The Unreasonableness
of Coerced
Cooperation: a Comment upon the NCAA Decision's Rejection of
the Chicago School, 31 ANTITRUST BULL. 1003 (1986), at 104552 [hereinafter Ponso1dt, NCAA].
117. Sec. 5 FTC ACT, see notes 60, 61 and accompanying
118. Sec. 4 of the Clayton Act gives private parties
right to sue antitrust violators for treble damages,
attorneys fees.

text.
the
plus
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119. The Hart-Scott-Rodino
Antitrust Improvement Act of
1976, 15 U.S.C.A. § 15c-h authorized the State Attorney
General to recover for monetary injury suffered by "natural
persons residing in such state." See, e.g., Hawai v. Standard Oil Co .. , 405 U.S. 251 (1972).

120. See MAXEINER,

supra note 17, at 4-8.

121. See e.g. §§ 26, 35 GWB which enable individuals to
challenging discriminatory
conduct. See also notes 534-538
and accompanying text.

122. The Court of Appeals
mergericht
(KG).

for West Berlin

is named Kam-

123. An appeal can be filed to the court when an administrative appeal procedure with the Federal Cartel Authority did
not help.

124. Braun, supra note 17 points out that "'Fishing expeditions' and unmeritorious antitrust suits would be curtailed
if the courts generally awarded attorney's fees to defendants who prevail in the lawsuit." Id. at 367.

125. Braun alleges that "[IJf American judges would assert
greater control over civil antitrust proceedings generally
(as well as over other forms of civil ligitation), and particularly if the scope of pre-trial discovery were limited
to areas of inquiry determined in advance by the judge instead of by the lawyers, the time and expense of pre-trial
proceedings might be significantly reduced." Braun, supra
note 17, at 366-67. See generally MAXEINER, supra note 17.
See also Langbein, The German Advantage in Civil Procedure,
52 U.CHI.L.REV. 823 (1985).

126. Fox, Soul of Antitrust, supra note 1, describes
scenario as a "battle", id., at 917.

the

127. The headline of the National Law Journal used
the word "counterrevolution"
to describe the present discussion regarding the proper application of the antitrust
laws. See Headline of the National Law Journal on May 4,
1987: "Steam May Be Building for a Counterrevolution
in Antitrust", Nat'l L.J., May 4,1987,
at 1. For the background
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of this headline see Fox & Pitofsky,
tive, 62 N.Y.U.L. REV. 931, at 932.

The Antitrust

Alterna-

128. In an article dealing with the Supreme Court's rejection of the Chicago school in the NCAA case Professor
ponsoldt stated: "The Supreme Court has dealt the Chicago
school its most solid body block since Jay Bringswanger's
days." See Ponsoldt, NCAA, supra note 116, at 1044.
129. This argument was emphasized in Continental
v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 433 U.S. 36 (1977).

T.V. Inc.

130. See, e.g. Easterbrook, The Limits of Antitrust, 63
TEXAS L. REV. 1 (1984); Baxter, supra note 68. But see
Markovits, The Limits of Simplifying Antitrust, 63 TEXAS L.
REV. 41 (1984 )•
131. See, for example, Change in Administration,
Change in
Antitrust? Interview with Dean Robert Pitofsky, published in
2 ANTITRUST 24 (1988).
132. It is to note that neither the Chicago School nor the
New Coalition represent a single view in detail, but that
under the label "Chicago School" and "New Coalition" the
prevailing view of the majority of the proponents of the
respective view is addressed. For a list of Chicago scholars
see note III. A good overview of the antitrust alternative
promoted by the New Coalition see e.g. The Antitrust Alternative (papers presented at the Airlie House Conference
published in 62 N.Y.U.L.REV.(1987).
133. For examples,
text.

see notes 147-149;

168 and accompanying

134. Professor Posner states "The Chicago School has largely
prevailed with respect to its basic point: that the proper
lens for viewing antitrust problems is price theory." Posner, The Chicago School of Antitrust Analysis, 127 U.Pa.
L.Rev. 925 (1979), at 930 [hereinafter Posner, Chicago
School].
135. The argument that consumers might be "irrational and
manipulable" is not accepted by the Chicago school: "the
Chicago theorist rejects this assumption as inconsistent
with the price theory". Posner, Chicago School, supra note
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134, at 930. Consequently the Chicago School asserts that
"[t]he rational consumer will pay for advertisement .•• only
to the extent that advertising reduces his costs of search.
The services provided by advertising are therefore real services." Id. However, if one looks at advertisements most
often the information provided is not suited and not intended to reduce costs of search but rather to create preferences between similar or identical products. If according
to the Chicago School assumption this advertising will not
be honored by the consumers billions of dollars in advertising expenses would be wasted. However, if the Chicago
School's assumption that manufacturer behave rational is
correct, the theory of the Chicago School must be either
wrong with respect to consumers or manufacturers.

136. See Baxter, supra note 68, at 948. However, also the
Chicago School recognizes the problem of facilitating cartelization, but accepts it only for extraordinary circumstances. See also the Court's reasoning in Business
Electronics
(infra notes 367-409 and accompanying text).
137. For a description of the development of the Chicago
school approach to antitrust analysis, see Posner, The
Chicago School of Antitrust Analysis, 1~U.Pa.L.ReV:-925
(1979).

138. R. BORK, THE ANTITRUST
139. BORK,

PARADOX

(1978), at 50.

supra note 138, at 111.

140. Id.

141. BORK, supra note 138, at 7. This argument, however, is
based on the assumption that consumers automatically participate in an increase of business efficiency. The consumer
will only benefit from an efficiency increase if competition
forces the buyer to pass the increase on to the consumers.
Under the Chicago School theory the competitive pressure is
maintained through the threat of new markets entrants which
are able to enter the market in the absence of entry barriers (the absence of entry barriers is another assumption
of the Chicago School theory). But see RITTALER & SCHMIDT,
supra note 4 (opposing this assumptions as simplistic, unrealistic and single sided). See also Ponsoldt, Enrichment,
supra note 111.
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142. Bork states: "Productive efficiency, like allocative
efficiency, is a normative concept and is defined in terms
of consumer welfare. Since a free market system assumes that
consumers define their own welfare, it follows that
productive efficiency consists in offering everything
whether products or services, that consumers are willing to
pay for." BORK, supra note 138, at 104.
143. Allocative efficiency is defined by the Chicago School
as "the placement of resources in the economy, a question of
whether resources are employed in tasks where consumers
value their output most." BORK, supra note 138,
at 91. Applying neoclassical price theory the Chico School reaches
the result marginal costs will equal the market price. Id.,
at 93.
144. Productive efficiency is defined by the Chicago School
as "the effective use of resources by particular firms."
BORK, supra note 138, at 91.
145. See RITTALER

& SCHMIDT,

supra note 4, at 48.

146. Bork notices that a multiple-goal antitrust law might
be attracting, but he argues that the exclusive orientation
on consumer welfare is superior:
[A] consumer welfare goal is superior in that it
(1) gives fair warning,
(2) places intensely political and legislative
decisions in Congress instead of the courts,
(3) maintains the integrity of the legislative process,
(4) requires real rather than unreal economic
. distinctions, and
(5) avoids arbitrary or anticonsumer rules.
A multiple-goal approach can achieve none of these
things.
BORK, supra note 138, at 81. For arguments questioning the
superiority of a consumer welfare goal see notes 150-167 and
accompanying text. It is to note that the German Law against
Restraints of Competition pursues a multiple-goal approach
without being exposed to complaints by either manufacturers
or consumers. Moreover it is to remark that Congress had a
multiple-goal
approach in mind when enacting antitrust law.
The history of American antitrust law shows that American
Congress enacted the antitrust provisions of the Sherman Act
in 1890 as reaction to the trusts. See H. THORELLI, THE·
FEDERAL ANTITRUST POLICY (1955). See e.g., Brown Shoes Co.
v. United States, 370 u.S. 294 (1962), Justice Warren argued
that Congress' concern was also the accumulation of power.
Id. The discussion which goals should govern the American
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antitrust policy has not ended yet. See Hovenkamp, Distributive Justice and the Antitrust Laws,-sI GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1
(1982); Schwartz, "Justice" and Other Non Economic Goals of
Antitrust, 127 U.PA.L.REV. 1076 (1979).

147. See, Williamson, Assessing Vertical Market Restrictions: Antitrust Ramifications of the Transaction Cost Approach, 127 U.PA.L.REV. 953, 993 (1977).

148. Posner,
149. BaRK,

Chicago

School,

supra note 134, at 928.

supra note 138, at 297.

150. Fox, Soul of Antitrust,
151. Flynn & Ponsoldt,

supra note 1, at 919.

supra note 54, at 1133-34.

152. See Hovenkamp, Antitrust Policy After Chicago, 84
Mich.L.Rev. 213 (1985) (criticizing the Chicago School's efficiency approach pointing out that the theory is too static
in comparing the extreme hypotheticals of purely competitive
and monopolized markets). RITTALER & SCHMIDT, supra note 4,
at 57-72 are attacking the Chicago School theory for the
same reasons. They argue that the Chicago School failed to
implement newer research in the area of the oligopoly theory
and with regard to the interdependencies
of the size of a
firm and its profits. Id.
153. Flynn & Ponsoldt,

supra note 54, at 1133-34.

154. Flynn & Ponsoldt, supra note 54, at 1131. Citing the
Supreme Courts decision in Matsushita Elec. Indus. v. Zenith
Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574 (1986) as example that neoclassical theory leads to the result that facts of actual disputes
are substituted by the assumptions of the model (and though
the reality is replaced by artificial assumptions). It is
argued that the Supreme Court "ignored the facts of the
antitrust dispute, the goals of antitrust policy, the
separate functions of judge and jury, and the role of summary judgment in Matsushita", id. at 1131 n. 21. See also
Business Electronics Corp. v. Sharp Electronics Corp.,
U.S.
; 108 S.Ct. 1515 (1988).
155. Flynn & Ponsoldt,

supra note 54, at 1136.
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156. However, although the contesting views agree in this
point they pursue different goals. Chicago scholars want to
implement their views into the law. The New Coalition wants
to use legislation to oppose the Chicago School's theory.
157.
tion
tian
Fox,

See Ponsoldt, The Enrichment of Sellers as a Justificafor Vertical Restraints: A Response to Chicago's SwifModest Proposal, 62 N.Y.U.L.Rev. 1166 (1987), at 1170.
Soul of Antitrust, supra note 1, at 920.

158. For the view that economic theory should support rather
than lead antitrust reasoning and that noneconomic arguments
should also be considered see L. A. SULLIVAN, ANTITRUST
(1977), at 1-13.
159. See Adams & Brock, Antitrust and Efficiency: A Comment,
62 N.Y.U.L.Rev.
1116 (1987)(The article deals primarily with
the appropriate treatment of mergers and acquisitions.
Nevertheless,
the underlying policies of antitrust are also
valid for vertical restraints). Adams and Brock argue that
purpose of antitrust is "to preserve not only individual
freedom, but also more importantly, a free system", ide at
1116. The argument addresses the freedom of the individual
and the freedom of the system. According to the view of
Adams & Brock freedom of both is pursued by the antitrust
laws. This argument seems to reflect more properly the purpose of the antitrust laws than the statement that antitrust
laws are designed to protect competition, not competitors.
See Copperweld Corp. v. Independence Tube Corp., 467 U.S.
752, 767 n. 14 (1980); Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-a-Mat,
Inc., 429 U.S. 477, 488 (1977). Otherwise it could inferred
from the latter statement that competition could exist
without competitors. Compare Flynn & Ponsoldt, Legal Reasoning and the Jurisprudence of Vertical Restraints: The Limitations of Neoclassical Economic Analysis in the Resolution
of Antitrust Disputes, 62 N.Y.U.L.Rev. 1125. "The competitive process, not -competition', is the key concept in the
analysis. Id., note 87. Interestingly the GWB pursues a
similar approach towards the value of protecting competition
and competitors by favoring the competitive process which,
however, is dependent from a competitive structure, i.e. a
multitude of businessmen which are striving for business.
See, e.g., Fikentscher, Introduction, supra note 70, at 168.
160. See Fox, Antitrust,
at 10.
161. 388 U.S. 365 (1967).

Economic,

and Bias,

supra note 58,
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162. See notes 147-168

and accompanying

text.

163. See Lande, Wealth Transfers as the Original and Primary
Concern of Antitrust: The Efficiency Interpretation Challenged, 34 Hastings L.J. 65, 88-89 (1982). See also
THORELLI, supra note 30, at 120-21.

164. See Flynn
at 1137.

& Ponsoldt,

Legal Reasoning,

supra note 54,

165. For description of the historic development of the
Sherman and Clayton Acts see THORELLI, supra note 30.

166. See, e.g. the dissent of Justice William O. Douglas in
United Steel Co. v. Columbia Steel Co., 334 U.S. 495, 534
(1948). "Size
should ... be jealously watched. In final
analysis, size
is the measure of the power of a handful
men over our economy. It can be benign or it can be
dangerous. The philosophy of the Sherman Act is that it
should not exist." Id. at 536.

167. See Fox, The Modernization of Antitrust: A New Equilibrium, 66 Cornell L.Rev. 1140, 1182 (1981).
168. Professor Flynn, for example, supports a rule of reason
approach towards resale price maintenance but Professor Ponsoldt testified in favor of H.R. 585, the Freedom from Vertical Price Fixing Act". Ponsoldt, Enrichment, supra note
111, at 1170.

169. See MAXEINER,
170. MARTINEK,

supra note 17, at 116.

supra note 79, at 468.

171. See SCHMIDT,

supra note 79.

172. See Braun, supra note 17, at 360. See generally W.
MOSCHEL, RECHT DER WETTBEWERBSBESCHRANKUNGEN
(1983).
173. MAXEINE~, supra note 17, at 7. Maxeiner points out that
R. Bork's criticism of American antitrust applies to the GWB
as well. Maxeiner questions why the antitrust laws are
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judged so differently in Germany and America
same criticism applies. Id., at 7 note 17.

174. Fikentscher,

Introduction,

although

the

supra note 70, at 168.

175. Id.
176. See Fox, Antitrust, Economics, and Bias, 2 Antitrust
(1988-)-,-at6. RITTALER & SCHMIDT, supra note 4, at 107.

177. See Moschel,
178. SCHMIDT,

Economic

Evidence,

6

supra note 74, at 525.

supra note 79, at 81-84.

179. This problem is reflected in the discussion of the
workability competition concept. See notes 188-200 and
accompanying text.

180. SCHMIDT,

supra note 79, at 11.

181. See MARTINEK,

182. RITTALER

supra note 79, at 504.

& SCHMIDT,

supra note 4, at 104-14.

183. Fikentscher,

Introduction,

supra note 70, at 163-65.

184. See MOSCHEL,
at 3 et seq.

WETTBEWERBSBESCHRANKUNGEN,

185. The different views are listed
79, at 468 et seq.

supra note 172,

in MARTINEK,

supra note

186. In 1968 A. SchUller was the last scholar who concluded
on the basis of neoclassical theory that all vertical
restraints should be per se illegal. See SchUller, 19 ORDO
171 (1968).
---

187. See F. RITTNER,

WIRTSCHAFTSRECHT

(1979), at 279.
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188. J.A. SCHUMPETER,
1934.
189. J.M. CLARK,

THE THEORY

COMPETITION

190. E. KANTZENBACH,
(2d. Ed. 1967).

OF ECONOMIC

AS A DYNAMIC

DIE FUNKTIONSFAHIGKEIT

191. See I. SCHMIDT, US-AMERIKANISCHE
WERBSPOLITIK
(1973), at 54 et seq.
192. W. KARTTE, EIN NEUES LEITBILD
TIK (1969), at 94.
193. See MARTINEK,

DEVELOPMENT,

PROCESS

(1961).

DES WETTBEWERBS

UND DEUTSCHE

WETTBE-

FUR DIE WETTBEWERBSPOLI~

supra note 79, at 475.

194. For example if an restraint actually increases output
and decreases the prices this does not necessarily mean that
the restraint was benign. It might be possible that without
the restraint the output might have been even higher at
lower prices.
195. See MOSCHEL, WETTBEWERBSBESCHRANKUNGEN,
supra note 172,
at 44. See also Fox, Antitrust, Economics, and Bias, 2 ANTITRUST 6 (1988), at 6-10.
196. MARTINEK,

supra note 79, at 477.

197. Id.
198. Grosseketteler
asserts that vertical integration often
results in externalization
of the costs. Therefore consumers
and other competitors have to pay for the "power advantage"
of the integrated firms. Grosseketteler, Die volkswirtschaftliche Problematik von Vertriebsskooperationen.
Zur
wettbewerbspolitischen
Beurteilung von Vertriebsbindungen-,
Alleinvertriebs-,
Vertragshandlerund Franchisesystemen,
28
Zeitschrift fUr die gesamte Rechtswissenschaft
325 (1978)(an
economic analysis of vertical restraints in different distributorship agreements).
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199. This is one of the criticism of the New Coalition, see
Fox, Antitrust, Economics, and Bias, supra note 58, at 7.

200. See Martinek,

supra note 79, at 482-84.

201. Especially the view of George J. Stigler was adopted
from the proponents of the group competition concept. See
Salter, Bezugsbindungen
in vertikalen Kooperationssystemen,
1983 BETRIEBSBERATER
1241 (1983). B. TIETZ, DER GRUPPENWETTBEWERB ALS ELEMENT DER WETTBEWERBSPOLITIK
(1983). W.
BENISCH, KOOPERATIONSFIBEL
(4th Ed. 1973).

202. Martinek,

supra note 79, at 489.

203. See B. TIETZ,

204. BENISCH,

supra note 201, at 12 and 101.

supra note 201, at 96.

205. See Kohler, Individualwettbewerb
und Gruppnwettbewerb
- Besprechung von BGHZ 81, 322 "Original-VW-Ersatzteile
II",
146 Zeitschrift fUr Handelsrecht 580 (1982), at 584.

206. Id.

207. Grosseketteler warns that economic experience shows
that generally allowing cooperation leads to more market
imperfections rather than improving markets. Grosseketteler,
supra note 198, at 339. For further examples illustrating
the dynamic of concentration processes see G. WOHE,
ALLGEMEINE BETRIEBSWIRTSCHAFTSLEHRE
(1985), at 316 et seq.

208. See F. RITTNER, KOOPERATION - EIN STRUKTURLENKUNGSPRINZIP
DER WIRTSCHAFT?
(1969), at 7.

UND

209. See F. RITTNER, WIRTSCHAFTSRECHTL
supra note 187, at
280 et seq. MARTINEK, supra note 79, at 498.
210. A. SMITH, AN INQUIRY INTO THE NATURE AND CAUSES OF THE
WEALTH OF THE NATIONS (1776); For a German translation, see
WOHLSTAND DER NATIONEN (5th. Edition - translated by H.C-.-Recktenwald) .
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211. See L. von MISES, DIE GEMEINWIRTSCHAFT
id. NATIONALOKONOMIE
(1940). F.A. v. HAYEK,
STUDIEN (1969).

212. See E. HOPPMANN,
et seq.

213. MARTINEK,

WETTBEWERB

ALS AUFGABE

(2.d Ed. 1932),
FREIBURGER

(1968), at 61

supra note 79, at 499.

214. Id., at 500.

215. See MOSCHEL,

at 49.

216. F. RITTNER,

WETTBEWERBSBESCHRANKUNGEN,

WIRTSCHAFTSRECHT,

supra note 172,

supra note 187, at 281.

217. See MARTINEK, supra note 79, at 502. MOSCHEL, WETTBEWERBSBESCHRANKUNGEN,
supra note 172, at 54. F. RITTNER,
WIRTSCHAFTSRECHT,
supra note 187, at 281.
218. MARTINEK,

supra note 79, at 502.

219. Id., at 503.
220. Id., at 504.

221. MOSCHEL, WETTBEWERBSBESCHRANKUNGEN,
17 (addressing the oligopoly problem).

222. See, e.g., Posner,

223. Fikentscher,

supra note 79, at

The Next Step, supra note 9.

Introduction,

supra note 70, at 163.

224. The problem of entry barriers and market foreclosure
recognized by the GWB. See notes 468-543 and accompanying
text.

225. See SCHMIDT,

supra note 79.

is
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226. See, e.g. Easterbrook, supra note 130, Marvel & McCafferty, The Welfare Effects of Resale Price Maintenance, 27
J.L. & Econ. 363 (1985). For further information, see also
the articles in 30 ANTITRUST BULL.
227. See Dr. Miles Medical Co. v. John D. Park & Sons Co.,
220 U.S. 373 (1911); United States v. Parke, Davis & Co.,
362 U.S. 29 (1960). Monsanto Co. v. Spray-Rite Service
Corp., 104 S.Ct. 1464 (1984). Business Electronics Corp. v.
Sharp Electronics Corp.
U.S.
; 108 S.Ct. 1515
(1988).
228. See notes

254-263

and accompanying

text.

229. See note 55 supra.
230. For example, the Vertical Restraints Guidelines have
been criticized by a majority of the House Judiciary Committee as "designed to influence courts in private cases to
which the Division is not a party" in an area "where it has
unmistakably shown its intention not to enforce the law for
the past four years.", 48 BNA ATRR 1006 (June 13, 1985).
231. See House Passes Legislation to Reaffirm Per Se Rule
for RPM, Revise Monsanto, 53 Antitrust & Trade Reg. Rep.
(BNA) No. 1340, at 743 (Nov. 12, 1987).
232. Although the GWB does not know the rule of reason and
the per se rule, it is slightly incorrect to say that § 15
GWB establishes a "per se rule". A more accurate description
of the GWB's approach is that the prohibition principle applied to resale price maintenance has an identical effect to
the per se rule under American antitrust law.

233. § 15 GWB provides in full:
Agreements between enterprises with respect to
goods or commercial services relating to markets
located within the area of application of this Act
shall be null and void, insofar as they restrict a
party to them in its freedom to determine prices
or terms of business in contracts which it concludes with third parties in regard to the goods
supplied, other goods, or commercial services.

r178
234. 220 u.s. 373 (1911).
235. 220 u.s.

373, at 408-09.

236. Id.
237. Id.
238. Miller-Tydings
Act of 1937, Pub. L. No. 314, 50 Stat.
693 (1937). McGuire Act of 1952, Pub. L. No. 542, 66 Stat.
631 (1952); repealed Pub. L. No. 94-145, 89 Stat. 801
(1975), 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 1, 45 (1976 Supp.).
239. See Baxter,

supra note 68, at 934-35.

240. See SCHWARTZ,

FLYNN & FIRST,

241. See, e.g., United
29 (1960).

supra note 68, at 588-95.

States v. Parke, Davis

& Co., 362

u.S.

242. See, e.g.,
United States v. Parke, Davis & Co., 362
u.S. 29 (1960); Monsanto Co. v. Spray-Rite Service Co., 465
u.S. 752 (1984); Business Electronics Corp. v. Sharp
Electronics Corp.,
u.S.
; 108 S.Ct. 1515 (1988).

243. See Albrecht

v. Herald

Co., 390 u.S. 145 (1968).

244. 310 u.S. 150, note 59 (1939).

245. This tendency exists also in the area of horizontal
restraints. See, e.g., NCAA v. Board of Regents of the University of Oklahoma, 104 S.Ct. 2948 (1984). Broadcast Music,
Inc. v. Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc. 441 u.S. 1
(1979).

246.

u.S.

108 S.Ct. 1515

(1988), at ...

247. Unilateral action can only be challenged
to monopolize under Sec. 2 Sherman Act. Under

as an attempt
the GWB
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unilateral conduct not within the scope of Sec. 2 Sherman
Act may lead to antitrust liability.
248. 106 S.Ct. 1045, 1049

(1986).

249. Id. See also Edward J. Sweeney & Sons, Inc. v. Texaco,
637 F.2d 105, 110 (3rd Cir. 1980). The Court clearly stated:
"Unilateral action, no matter what its motivation, cannot
violate § 1." Id.
250. 433 U.S.

36 (1977).

251. Id.
252. See notes

264-279

and accompanying

text.

253. See, e.g., Monsanto Co. v. Spray-Rite Service Corp.,
104 S.Ct. 1464 (1984); Business Electronics Corp. v. Sharp
Electronics Corp.,
U.S.
; 108 S.Ct. 1515
(1988).
254. 572 F.2d 883 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 833
(1978) ("Ure entire thrust of the GTE Sylvania opinion is
'that departures from the rule of reason standard must be
based on demonstrable economic effects rather than formalistic line drawing'''). Id. at 885.

255. 433 U.S. 36, 57.
256. Id.
257. 572 F.2d 883, 885.
258. See Northern
5 (1958).

Pac. R. Co. v. United

States,

356 U.S. 1,

259.

U.S.

108 S.Ct. 1515

(1988).

260.

U.S.

108 S.Ct. 1515

(1988), 1522 note 3.
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261. 803 F. 2d. 1463 (9th. Cir 1986). See Ponsoldt,
ment, supra note 111, at 1167.

Enrich-

262. 803 F.2d 1463, 1468.
263. 465 U.S. 752.

264. United States v. Colgate Co., 250 U.S. 300 (1919). The
Court stated in Colgate: "In the absence of any purpose to
create or maintain a monopoly, the act does not restrict the
long recognized right of trader of manufacturer engaged in
an entirely private business, freely to exercise his own
independent discretion as to parties with whom he will
deal." Id., at 307.

265. See Hyde, The Proposed Legislation will Help Protect
Free Competition, 2 ANTITRUST 33 (1988).

266. For example, the investment might reflect an effort to
build up goodwill for new products, to acquaint sales personnel with new products, or to advertise these products.
Furthermore, opportunity costs exist because these efforts
could have been spent on another product. Moreover, the
dealer itself might loose goodwill when its customer's
expectations of getting certain products from this dealer
are disappointed. For example, when a customer who bought a
certain brand of stereo equipment from a dealer now wants to
upgrade his stereo system with equipment of the same brand.
The situation gets even worse if a dealer needs to offer his
customers a line of supply parts for the equipment sold,
such as peripheral equipment for computers.

267. Monsanto
1464 (1984).

Co. v. Spray-Rite

268. See GELLHORN,

269. United

Service

Corp.,

104 S.Ct.

supra note 31, at 311.

States v. Colgate

Co., 250 U.S.

270. 362 U.S. 29 (1960).

271. See L. SULLIVAN,

ANTITRUST

393 (1977).

300 (1919).
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272. 362 U.S. 29 (1969).

273. See George W. Warner & Co. v. Black & Decker
277 F.2d 787, 790 (2d Cir. 1960).

274. See Silberman, Remedial Legislation
Process, 2 ANTITRUST 33 (1988).

Rejects

Mfg. Co.,

the Market

275. See, e.g., Silberman, supra note 274, at 33. But see
Hyde, supra note 265, at 33.
276. 465 U.S. 752.
277.

U.S.

108 S.Ct.

1515

(1988).

278. The standard established in Monsanto was that a terminated dealer had to introduce "evidence that tends to exclude the possibility that manufacturer and nonterminated
distributors were acting independently",
465 U.S. 752, 764.
See also dissent of J. Stevens in Business Electronics,
U.S.
; 108 S.Ct. 1515 (1988), at 1534.
279. See e.g.

280. Former

§

U.S.
16 GWB (amended

; 108 S.Ct.

1515

(1988).

1973).

281. See Article, Vor dem endgUltigen 'Aus' fUr die Preisbindung, Tagesspiegel
(Berlin); June 13, 1973.

282. § 16 GWB. The exemption for books is based on policy
reasons, e.g. to ensure that bookstores are not merely concentrating on 'top sellers' and to protect smaller
bookstores against price competition from discounters. Insofar the educational goal prevails over the freedom of competition.

283. See Bericht des Wirtschaftsausschusses
zur Kartellrechtsnovelle
1973, published in 1973 WuW 585
(1973) (report of the commission regarding the amendment
the GWB).

of
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284. STRAUB,
22.

in: GEMEINSCHAFTSKOMMENTAR

ZUM GWB, § 15, at

285. STRAUB, supra note 284, at 9. The Federal Cartel
Authority reported that especially the prices of
refrigerators,
electrical equipment, winter sporting goods,
and cosmetic articles were lowered considerably. BundestagsDrucksache 7/2250, IV.

286. See GANAL,

supra note 79, at 73 et seq.

287. See Markert, Schultz & Tietz, Haben das Preisbindun sverbot und der Kontrahierun szwan
fUr Markenartikel
die Konzentration im Handel gefordert?, 1985 WuW 845 (1985).
288. Moschel,

289. United

Economic

States

290. § 15 GWB
291. EMMERICH,

EVidence,

v. Colgate

Supra note 74, at 540.

Co., 250 U.S. 300 (1919).

(fully cited Supra note 233).
supra note 59, at 100.

292. See Bundestagsdrucksache

293. For example, so-called
prohibited under § 15 GWB.

11/1158,

calculation

Anlage

1.

clauses

are

294. A 'most favorable treatment-clause'
says that a supplier has to give a dealer the same conditions which he
grants to another, more favorably treated, dealer. This
clause imposes economic restrictions on the freedom to set
prices and thus does not comply with § 15 GWB. See 80 BGHZ
43, 1981 JuS 772.
_

295. See GANAL, supra note 79, at 107 (citing several
decisions of the BGH sUpporting this view).

296. See Belke, Die vertikalen Wettbewerbsbeschrankungsver_
bote
nach der Kartellgesetznovelle
1973, 1974 ZHR 138, 245
(1974).
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297. See Belke,

supra note 296, at 244.

298. See MOSCHEL,
at 23~

WETTBEWERBSBESCHRANKUNGEN,

supra note 172,

299. GWB § 25.

300. § 25 (2) GWB.

301. § 25 (2) GWB provides:
Enterprises or associations of enterprises shall
not threaten or cause harm, or promise or grant
advantages, to other enterprises for the purpose
of inducing them to adopt conduct which, under
this Act or a decision issued thereunder by the
cartel authority, must not be made the subjectmatter of a contractual commitment.

302. OECD, REFUSAL TO SELL. REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE OF EXPERTS ON RESTRICTIVE BUSINESS PRACTICES (Paris, 1969), at
21.

303. WuW/E BGH 1474

(1976) "Architektenkammer."

304. Id., at 1478-79.

305. WuW/E OLG 2822

(1982) "Uhren Kramer/Seiko."

306. The GWB does not know a general discrimination prohibition. But see § 26 (2) GWB. See also notes 534-543 and
accompanying text.

307. 465 U.S. 752 (1984).
308.

U.S.

309. WuW/E OLG 2822

310. See notes

; 108 S.Ct. 1515

(1988).

(1982).

529-533

and accompanying

text.
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311. § 25(2) GWB. For further discussion,
and accompanying text.

see notes

303-309

312. § 26 (1) GWB.

313. See OECD Report, supra note 302, at 22. See also
SCHMIDT, supra note 79, at 119.

314. Unlike the American antitrust laws the term "boycott"
as used in the context of § 26(1) GWB does not require that
firms on either the manufacturer level or the dealer level
conspire. In the meaning of § 26(1) GWB the term boycott
means that one party incites another party not to deal with
a third party, the question whether inciting and incited
party are on the same or on different levels of distribution
is not of importance. This is explainable before the background of the differences in the legal systems. The GWB pursues the policy to define an arguably harmful conduct _ no
matter if the questionable conduct is horizontal or vertical. The quality of the conduct is decisive. Under the
American antitrust laws, however, the question horizontal or
vertical is of crucial importance. This might explain why
sometimes the courts have problems to adequately address
anticompetitive
conduct. See MARTINEK, supra note 79, at 523
(Martinek alleges that the horizontal/vertical
classification under the American antitrust laws contributes to
the susceptibility of the law towards political changes).
Id. See

----

315. For an explanation
of consumer welfare, ~
text.

316. See supra notes

School's definition
and accompanying

134-49 and accompanying

317. See Pos"ner, Chicago

318. See RITTALER

of the Chicago
notes 139-145

School,

& SCHMIDT,

text.

supra note 134, at 926.

supra note 4, at 88 et seq.

319. Compare Comanor, Vertical Arrangements and Antitrust
Analysis, 62 N.Y.U.L.REV. 1153 (1987) (mentioning that
several empirical studies showed results not complying with
Chicago School theory).
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320. See notes 134-146
321. See Ponsoldt,

and accompanying

Enrichment,

text.

supra note 111, at 1168.

322. Id., at 1167.
323. RITTALER

& SCHMIDT, supra note 4, at 89.

324. Id. But see BORK, supra note 138, at 294. "It is not
certain that resale price maintenance is never actually used
for the purpose of policing a manufacturer cartel, but is
appears reasonably certain that such use will be so rare and
the ease of detection so great that this objection should
not stand in the way of the legality of truly vertical
restraints". Id.
325. See RITTALER

& SCHMIDT, supra note 4, at 89.

326. See I. SCHMIDT, WETTBEWERBSTHEORIE
UND WETTBEWERBSPOLITIK, 6. KAP. III 2 b (1981). See also Baxter, supra note
68, at 946 (informational advertising reduces consumers'
shopping costs).
327. See Lukes, Aktuelle Probleme der Preisbindung zweiter
Hand und der Preisempfehlung,
1962 JuS 215 (1962).
328. See Flynn & Ponsoldt,
329. See Ponsoldt,
330. SCHMIDT,

Legal Reasoning"

Enrichment,

supra note 54.

supra note 111, at 1167.

supra note 79, at 192, 217 et seq.

331. See F. M. SCHERER, INDUSTRIAL MARKET STRUCTURE
ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE (2nd Ed. 1980).at 152-96.

AND

332. Id.
333. RITTALER
notes 134-146

& SCHMIDT, supra note 4, at 105-114.
and accompanying text.

See also
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334. Posner,

Chicago

School,

supra note 134, at 926.

335. For a discussion of the free rider problem,
342-361 and accompanying text.
336. See STRAUB,

see notes

supra note 284, at 10-19.

337. See Baxter, supra note 68, at 935. SCHWARTZ,
FIRST, supra note 68, at 590 et seq.

FLYNN &

338. Only when bigger stores employ "price strategies"
(especially systematically
"sales below costs") to drive
smaller competitors out of business § 37(a) GWB will apply.
Although § 37(a) GWB is aimed to protecting smaller and midsize competitors it does not intend to protect inefficient
businessmen from free market competition. EMMERICH, supra
note 59, at 227.
339. See EMMERICH,

340. STRAUB,

supra note 59, at 227.

supra note 284, at 8-19.

341. See STRAUB,

supra note 284, at 8.

342. But see RITTALER

& SCHMIDT,

343. See note 147 and accompanying

supra note 4, at 105-13.

text.

344. Justice Holmes called price cutters "knaves", in his
dissent in Dr. Miles: "I cannot believe that in the long run
the public will profit by permitting this court to cut
reasonable prices for some ulterior service of their own,
and thus to impair if not destroy, the production and sale
of articles which is assumed to be desirable that the public
should be able to get", 220 U.S. at 411-12. But see Schmidt,
supra note 79, at 71. Schmidt alleges that nonprice competition such as quality and service competition is generally
inferior to price competition and often used to avoid price
competition. Id. at 71 ..
345. See, e.g., R. BaRK, supra note 138, at 289 et seq.;
Easterbrook, supra note 130, at 13-14 ("No manufacturer
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wants to have less competition among its dealers for the
sake of less competition. The reduction in dealers' rivalry
in the price dimension is just the tool the manufacturer
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